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Abstract 
 
   The present study is a phenomenological exploration of the way men in London make 
sense of their experiences of anger. Data were collected from British online resources as 
well as individual interviews; and were analysed using Thematic Analysis, Discursive 
Psychology and Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis.  
   The aim was to explore how the emotional state of anger is comprehended by adult 
males living in London. In order to inform the exploration, the social and biological 
dimensions were taken into consideration, framing the discursive construction of their 
understanding of the emotional experience.  
      The results reveal individual tensions but also agreement on the main dimensions of 
anger experience, detection, understanding and expression. These are then applied to a 
critical evaluation of how the U.K.’s social constructs around anger and the angry person 
are presented in the participants’ accounts and how the participants address these 
constructs; as well as to a theorizing of what a person is and how the emotional 
experience makes one think about themselves after the experience is over. 
   The study contributes to ongoing debates about how emotions are experienced and 
understood by the person; how they are used to explain and justify his/her way-of-seeing 
and way-of-being in the world; and how discourse and experience interact with one-
another. Moreover, it is an exercise in the combination of qualitative methods of 
analysis. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
   Anger has a long tradition in the Western imagination. The ancient Greeks 
considered it important enough to attribute its advent to one of their twelve gods 
– Ares, the god of war. At the same time, however, Ares is painted in a negative 
light in ancient Greek mythology, often appearing like a fool in tales and being on 
the losing side at the Trojan War. “All his fellow-immortals hate him, from Zeus and 
Hera downwards, except Eris, and Aphrodite who nurses a perverse passion for 
him, and Hades who welcomes the bold fighting-men slain in cruel wars” (Graves, 
1960:73). Ares is resented because he is linked to blind fury and is often juxtaposed 
to his sister, Athena, who personified wisdom and military strategy. Ares was later 
on elevated in status as he was adopted by the Romans who considered him (under 
the new name Mars) to be their father.  
   Anger then became one of the seven deadly sins, according to Catholic catechism. 
Rather, it is its excessive version, wrath, that is included in the list of these sins, 
alongside pride, envy, gluttony, greed, lust, and sloth. In his 2011 book “Dante’s 
Deadly Sins: Moral Philosophy in Hell”, Raymond A. Belliotti argues (p.124-125) that 
Pope Gregory I, who compiled the definitive list of the seven deadly sins, “made 
clear that the dispositions were deadly because they generated serious sin and 
injuries; they served as necessary and final causes of the worst human excesses”. 
So, even though in Christian thought the wrath of God is a necessary part of the 
Armageddon (and thus an inseparable part of God’s plan), in the sphere of humans 
it is reproachable - and this might prove to be of great relevance to this study.       
   The present study explores the way anger is experienced by a non-clinical 
population in everyday life. I take a phenomenological approach, coupled with a 
discourse-analytic perspective and an eye on cognitive approaches, because 
cognition and emotion have been described as very tightly knit processes, 
influencing one-another (e.g. Eatough and Smith, 2006:486). This all is done with a 
view on the human as an organism, a collection of systems responding to emotional 
stimuli and situations in its totality, as suggested by Averill (1983). James (1890:15) 
also brought this up as a “general law that no mental modification ever occurs 
which is not accompanied or followed by a bodily change”. 
10 
 
   “Like any complex human behaviour, the emotions can be analysed at social, 
psychological, and/or biological levels” (Averill, 2012:28). This introductory chapter 
presents an overview on emotions from several fields of psychology before 
narrowing it down to some of the most prominent cognitive models of emotion. 
This is done in an attempt to map out how emotions have been traditionally 
understood in psychology; and to identify the different systems and modules that 
are activated and in operation during an emotional reaction, essentially outlining 
how emotions manifest in humans. Then the focus shifts to a brief discussion of 
phenomenology and the implications this choice of methodology has for the study 
of emotions. By doing so I focus on the assumptions and presuppositions about 
experience, ontologies and the relationship between the two that this school of 
inquiry brings with it. The focus then turns to the social construction of emotions 
(and, by extension, those experiencing these emotions). This is done in order to 
pave the way for the discourse-analytic part of the study; and to make the link 
between social constructionism and phenomenology clearer. Finally, I present 
some relevant research about humans as experiencers of anger.  
 
 
1.1 Anger, Emotions, and The Person  
 
   Anger has been classified (e.g. Ekman, 1972) as one of the six core emotions, 
alongside happiness, sadness, fear, disgust and surprise. Each of the core (or basic) 
emotions can be defined through what started as nine (Ekman, 1992) and 
developed into 13 qualities (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011:365): 
  
1. Distinctive universal signals 
2. Distinctive physiology 
3. Automatic appraisal 
4. Distinctive universals in antecedent events 
5. Presence in other primates 
6. Capable of quick onset  
7. Can be of brief duration 
8. Unbidden occurrence 
9. Distinctive thoughts, memories, and images 
11 
 
10. Distinctive subjective experience 
11. Refractive period filters information available to what supports the 
emotion1 
12. Target of emotion unconstrained2 
13.The emotion can be enacted in either a constructive or a destructive fashion.  
 
   Summing up, the authors stress that “the basic emotions are discrete 
physiological responses to fundamental life situations that have been useful in our 
ancestral environment. These responses are universally shared within our species 
and some are also found in other primates. The basic emotions are not learned 
from our culture or environment, but rather they are prewired responses to a set 
of stimuli that have affected our species for tens of thousands of generations” 
(Ekman & Cordaro; 2011:369). Their approach is one that focuses on the evolution 
of our biology and thus treats emotions as another tool for survival, retained 
throughout evolution for its adaptive value and honed in the process through 
millennia of natural selection.  
   From an evolutionary perspective, there is growing agreement that emotions are 
“adaptive responses that serve to organize cognitive, judgment, experiential, 
behavioral, and physiological reactions to changes in the environment.” (Lench, 
Flores and Bench; 2011:849). In other words, emotional experiences attune the 
person (as a system of neurons, glands and organs, supported by a skeleton and 
contained within a body delineated by the skin – the “body subject” according to 
Merleau-Ponti) to the specifics of each situation they find themselves in. Through 
this automatic process they think, behave, and feel differently, which prepares 
them accordingly for maximum attendance to, and engagement with, the situation 
or each particular item (creature, thing or action) in it. Or, as Tooby and Cosmides 
put it, emotions are “the structured functioning together of mechanisms” that have 
arisen as ways of the organism to respond to situations the species encountered 
numerous times in the past, which require “that a certain subset of the psyche’s 
behaviour regulating algorithms function together in a particular way to guide 
                                                          
1 I understand this to refer to the following process: the emotion is triggered pre-attentively or 
unconsciously (more on those terms later on in the chapter); then the person becomes aware of 
that trigger and looks for evidence that would support their justification for this trigger. 
 
2 I take this to mean that there are multiple targets that produce similar emotions in us. Not one 
thing makes us angry, happy, sad, etc., but many. 
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behaviour adaptively through that type of situation” (Tooby and Cosmides, 
1990:408). In other words, the individual stands at the forefront of the species’ 
evolution. His/her DNA carries in it everything advantageous the species has learnt 
in the past and it is through this endowment that the individual is capable of 
detecting, and responding to, potentially dangerous, nutritious, etc. stimuli 
instinctively. 
   The James-Lange theory of emotion (best promoted by James in 1884) brings 
these aspects together. The theory states that the perception of a stimulus 
produces a mental effect which in turn leads to a bodily expression with complex 
physiological manifestations. The perception of changes in one’s being, according 
to James, is the emotion. (see Strongman, 1996:8-10 passim) This is the difference 
between mere sense-impressions that lies in judgment, as the author himself put it 
(James, 1890:228).  
   This brings up the two levels of experience of emotion that are crucial to this 
study: what Harré and Secord called first-order monitoring (or prereflective 
experience) and second-order monitoring (in Averill; 2012:30), or conscious 
experience. The prereflective experience maps onto what appears in James’ work 
as the bodily changes without the awareness that follows them; so first-order 
monitoring is essentially the individual realizing that they are in the midst of a bodily 
reaction to some stimulus. The second-order monitoring involves the individual’s 
interpretation of the original experience, where awareness is “reflected back upon 
itself” (Averill, 2012:30), and it is at that point that the emotion is recognized as 
such. 
   Charles Darwin (1872) who argued for a categorization of emotions with a focus 
on the defining traits that distinguish between them also makes special reference 
to anger when he used anger, fear, disgust and so forth to specify distinct emotions 
(Ekman, 2016:31). Interestingly, Darwin’s aim with his 1872 book The Expression of 
Emotion in Man and Animals was to show that emotional expressions are “either 
simply dependent on the way in which the nervous system is wired or possibly the 
remnants of old habits” (Strongman, 1996:7), thus placing humans alongside other 
animals, rejecting the idea of humanity as the image of God and promoting his idea 
of evolution instead of a Garden of Eden. However, there seems to be something 
unique about human processing of emotion – and that is language and its role in 
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getting the person in touch with him/herself and with his/her social surroundings. 
“The capacity for reflective experience evolved concomitantly with the capacity for 
symbolization, and hence is closely related to language” (Averill, 2012:30) 
   In my view, Darwin claimed that there was nothing special about emotion 
activation (and expressive reactions) in humans. What about experience, an act 
which is based on interpretation, though? Activation can be defined as the person’s 
(unconscious or semi-conscious) reaction to the events that preceded the trigger of 
the emotion. Experience, on the other hand, is the period during and after the initial 
emotional reaction. Like James, I believe there is an initial stage in each emotional 
reaction, when one is not aware of his/her emotions.  
   So, the body starts feeling a way due to automatic, or instinctive, reactions and 
the mind tries to comprehend what this is. For this study I take emotional reactions 
to be addressing intentional objects: you cannot be angry unless you are angry at 
something and unless you have an interpretation for that. Given that my main data 
collection is through interviews, I would also like to propose that the language one 
uses to address the experience silently (i.e. the internal monologue) is very 
different from the language s/he uses to communicate this experience to someone 
else. The former may be grammatically and syntactically incoherent, as long as it 
makes meaning to the speaker; the latter will have to be structured and designed 
to address the interlocutor (see, e.g., Potter and Wetherell, 1987:106).  
   This, of course, brings up the rare (or not so rare) cases of people who, for 
example, shout incoherent abuse when they are angry. This can be interpreted in 
two ways, in my opinion: either they are addressing the other with the intent of 
making them aware of their anger and/or scaring them away (anger is high in 
approach motivation and directed to the harm of its object, as we shall see later in 
this chapter), or they are not addressing the other but rather themselves only 
instead of doing so silently they express it loudly.  
   There is no one or definitive way of defining emotions (Cromby, 2015:4-5 passim). 
For this study though, emotions can be theorized as a change in the individual, in 
response to a stimulus, which can be felt and expressed. The stimulus might be 
external (e.g. seeing a loved one that makes someone happy) or internal (e.g. a pain 
which makes one anxious); referring to the past (e.g. a memory that makes one 
sad), present (e.g. a slamming door that surprises someone) or the future (e.g. the 
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prospect of eating live bugs which evokes disgust); addressed to the self (e.g. the 
relief that one didn’t leave the stove on, as one feared all day) or to others (e.g. the 
contempt that one holds towards another over their lack of etiquette in the 
congregation). The stimulus brings about changes in the person’s physiology and 
cognition which are automatic and initially unconscious (points 3 and 8 in Ekman 
and Cordaro’s list). The person then feels the change and recognizes the emotion 
(like the James-Lange theory proposes). This recognition consequently brings with 
it a barrage of meanings, thoughts and images that the individual has associated 
with the detected emotion as well as a set of learned behaviours that follow it (as 
the Somatic Marker Hypothesis, which will be explored later on in this chapter, 
suggests).   
   The view that a relationship exists between cognition and emotion is now a 
dominant one among emotion theorists (Eatough and Smith, 2006:115). According 
to that view, the core part of emotion evocation is caused by cognitive workings 
between the person and the stimulus of the emotion. “From a phenomenological 
perspective, emotions and cognitions are closely related as aspects of our 
engagement with the world” (Smith, Flowers and Larkin, 2009:199). The way one 
attends to the world shapes (and is shaped by) his/her emotions and thoughts. Both 
are at the disposal of humans for maximally attending to a situation and optimally 
responding to it. A combination of the two can lead to a view that cognitions and 
emotions are interconnected and one drives the other: a person senses something, 
which then brings about a change in their physiology as an automatic and 
involuntary effect; this change is then interpreted as an emotion, which prompts 
the person into further engagement with the stimulus of that response (trying to 
find out why it happened, trying to predict what consequences it will have); and 
that in turn produces further emotional experiences. For example, I might see a fire 
which will make me scared. I will try to see where that fire comes from and what I 
can do to extinguish it. While I’m doing that I’m also thinking that I might be 
unsuccessful and that the fire might consume the entire house, which makes me 
anxious. This anxiety then propels me to try harder and faster to extinguish the fire, 
etc.  
   Studies have revealed changes in the person across systems (behavioural, 
cognitive etc.) that are brought about by emotional experience (e.g. Ekman, 1992; 
Frijda, 1986; Lench, Flores and Bench, 2011). These are crystalized into various 
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theories (or schools of theories) of emotion, each of which attempts to explain the 
emotional response as primarily produced by one of those systems. This fits well 
with Averill’s understanding of emotions as “syndromes”: a cluster of reactions 
which can take many forms but habitually reveal consistent patterns in their 
triggers and unfolding over time. “Any specific emotion, such as anger, refers to the 
way such elements are organized and the functions which they serve in relation to 
broader systems of behaviour” (Averill, 2012:13).  
   Provided the link between cognition and emotion as stressed above, some of the 
most prominent cognitive theories (and relevant to the present study’s theoretical 
lens) are discussed below.   
 
1.1.1: Emotions, Attention and Memory 
  Studies have shown time and again that the emotional reaction a stimulus causes 
to the individual has a direct effect on how the person attends to the stimulus and 
how they remember it.  “Findings from both real-life studies and experimental 
studies suggest that certain characteristics of negative emotional events are 
perceived and retained in an automatic fashion. In particular, experimental 
research reveals that there is a superior advantage for the detection and 
recognition of stimuli indicative of threatening situations” (Christianson, Freij and 
Vogelsang, 2007:13).  
   A classic psychological test to explore that is the utilization of masked stimuli. 
These are images presented while the participant engages in a visual task. The 
masked stimulus is presented at rates that the human eye cannot consciously grasp 
so the participant never understands that the image was presented. Stimuli that 
relate to fear (e.g. spiders or blood) habitually result in greater skin-conductance 
than fear-irrelevant stimuli (Dolan, 2018:1191). This shows that, even though the 
person has not consciously grasped the stimulus, his/her brain’s circuits have 
picked up on it and have prepared the body to act accordingly. Baldwin, Carell and 
Lopez (1990) showed that the same holds true for even less dire/urgent situations. 
They tested students who were instructed to think of a research idea. Half of them 
were presented with a masked stimulus showing the approving face of one of their 
fellow-students, while the other half were presented with the disapproving face of 
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their department chair. The self-ratings of the idea for the second half were 
significantly lower than those of the first half.  
   A different line of research has shown that when exposed to stressful events, 
critical information can be extracted automatically and evoke a response if 
evaluated as emotionally significant. “Due to attention-demanding stimulus 
characteristics and personal involvement, controlled conceptual resources are 
subsequently allocated for further analysis of the stimulus. In short, critical details 
will be extracted by pre-attentive mechanisms and controlled processes will 
subsequently be allocated to the emotionally relevant information” (Christianson, 
Freij and Vogelsang, 2007:14). In other words, human attention seems to operate 
in two modes: a fast and automatic one, and a slower and voluntary one. This 
means that one’s way of attending to a situation will split into two: the important 
and the unimportant details. It is interesting to note that this time-lapse between 
the two phases corresponds to Ekman and Cordaro’s 11th point on the (2011) list 
(i.e. the “refractive period”). 
   How emotionally-laden events are retained in memory is not a fixed process, 
however. Some studies (e.g. Peace and Porter, 2004; Berntsen, 2001) show that for 
negative, or traumatizing events, recall of central details is much better than central 
details for positive events, whereas peripheral information is more distorted. So, 
according to this view, a negative event persists in memory much longer and much 
more clearly than a positive one. Contrary to this, other studies show that traumatic 
events tend to be repressed and the individual forgets about the central details, or 
even that the event transpired. Interestingly, this holds true whether the person 
was the perpetrator or the victim of the traumatic event. Victims of rape and 
torture are very likely not to remember details of the surroundings or the figures 
that were present during the events (see, e.g. Christianson and Nilsson, 1989), 
while murderers often find it difficult to recall details of what else was going on 
during their act of murder (e.g. Christianson and Merckelbach, 2004). The results 
of these studies show that there is something special about emotional events. 
Whether they are retained more vividly than non-emotional events, or suppressed 
in memory, the brain processes memories differently when emotions are present.  
    The results of studies like these are very relevant to the present thesis, despite 
the latter focusing on how people make sense of their experiences and the former 
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on how the organism interacts with the world. In anger, detection of a stimulus 
leads to a) attempts to contain or repel it; and b) attempts to eliminate it, to prevent 
its reoccurrence in the future. There seems to be a reason why studying memories 
of anger can be very different from studying induced (or otherwise occurring) anger 
in real time. That is, the participant has to try and put the whole physiological, 
behavioural, judgmental and cognitive alteration brought about by anger, as well 
as the high activation this brings about, into words. The present study’s data are 
autobiographical memories, and it is important to bear in mind that the 
reconstruction of these memories may lead to a very different understanding of 
anger than what would arise were we to study real-time, induced in a laboratory 
setting or naturally occurring.  
 
 1.1.2: Attribution and Appraisal in Emotions 
    Following on from the cognitive approach, appraisal and attribution (e.g. 
Schachter, 1964; Weiner, 1985) has been a dominant theme in emotion research. 
This focuses on how the person interprets the stimulus that gives rise to an 
emotion: what the person reads in that stimulus and how, for the person, that 
reading is related to his/her emotional arousal.  
   Attributions relate to where a person locates the source of his/her emotion. This 
has been described by Weiner (1985) as a temporal process which follows three 
steps: It all starts with the individual locating a stimulus and envisioning the 
interaction s/he would like to have with it. As this interaction unfolds, or slightly 
after it is over, the attempt for a desired outcome is judged as success or failure. 
Then, if the outcome is evaluated negatively, a reason for this failure is sought. 
Finally, the person classifies the cause along three attributional dimensions: causal 
locus (is the cause brought about by a person or by a situation?), stability (is the 
cause likely to disappear or not?), and controllability (is the cause the result of 
voluntary action?) (see Eatough and Smith, 2006:116). This framework provided a 
promise for a straight explanation of emotional arousal as a result of these three 
steps. However, Eatough and Smith (2006:116) describe causal attribution models 
as “normative” because what they present are ideal positions of what people ought 
to do, instead of what people actually do when they attend to their emotions and 
try to put them into words.     
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       The authors claim that “undoubtedly, emotional reactions have an evaluative 
component, but to reduce this to simply a function of cognitive processing is to 
ignore the experiencing inter-subjective person. The meaning-making activity of 
the individual sometimes involves rational appraisal, but it also entails being 
imaginative, intuiting, and intentional.” (Eatough and Smith, 2006:129). 
Consequently, the claim that attributions exert a causal effect on emotions has 
more recently been challenged by appraisal theorists (e.g. Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, 
& Pope, 1993; Lazarus and Smith, 1988), who “argue that attribution is a particular 
form of knowledge, which assists the appraisal process by making inferences about 
the perceived causes of an event.” (Eatough and Smith, 2006: 116).  
   As such, to bring an emotion into being, more than causal attributions is needed. 
The person must engage with what s/he considers to be the ‘facts’ of the events, 
to appraise and evaluate them, and bring them together in a coherent whole (i.e. 
in the form of a narrative) in order for an emotional response to arise. This process 
is termed appraisal. It is important to note, however, that reaching that point of 
convergence is not the end of the story: Emotions do not arise as a direct result of 
appraisal; rather, both emotion and appraisal are processes (instead of on/off 
states with standard manifestations and fixed points of onset and completion), 
which influence one another in a dynamic fashion (Eatough and Smith, 2006: 115-
117). In other words, the way something makes one feel will have influence (or 
even change in the long or in the short term) the way this person attends to the 
stimulus and vice-versa, thus forming a self-feeding loop. 
   Along this line, emotions appear to also be necessary in humans for their decision-
making abilities. Some situations call for an emotional response which will “attune” 
the individual to his/her surroundings and lead to an (evolutionary and socially) 
appropriate response. To explain this, the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio offered 
his “Somatic Marker Hypothesis” in 1994. What he proposed is that the brain takes 
information from previous encounters with a stimulus/situation and stores them as 
memories which include the reaction (behavioural as well as emotional) of the 
person to that stimulus and the results (behavioural and emotional) of that 
reaction: how did the person react to the event and what consequences did that 
have for him/her? Upon subsequent encounters with similar stimuli/situations, the 
brain retrieves that emotional memory, which helps the person decide how to 
respond to the newly-encountered but similar-to-past situation.  
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   Damasio argues that this formation and storage of memory happens in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex – the area of the brain where the somatosensory 
system is represented; i.e. the area which projects to the person an image of what 
their body (including the skin, muscles, skeleton, glands and organs) feels and looks 
like during a given event. After all, what prompted him to that theory is the 
observation that patients with damage to that area had difficulty in experiencing 
and expressing emotion, and that led them to abnormal decisions (e.g., believing 
people to be their friends when they weren’t, or having unreasonable bursts of 
anger). This correlation between abnormal emotional experience and abnormal 
decision-making illustrates the link between the two and highlights the importance 
of emotions in successfully going through life, both biologically and socially:  
“certain classes of situation, namely those that concern personal and social 
matters, are frequently linked to punishment and reward and thus to pain, 
pleasure, and the regulation of homeostatic states, including the part of the 
regulation that is expressed by emotion and feeling. The inevitability of 
somatic participation comes from the fact that all of these bioregulatory 
phenomena, including emotion, are represented via the somatosensory 
system” (Damasio, 1996:1416)    
   Emotions, then, can be best seen as having arisen as part of humans’ evolutionary 
adaptation to their environment, and it may be said that the correct identification 
and expression of these emotions is a vital factor in the survival of the species and 
the prosperity of the individual. Given that the species homo sapiens has developed 
to be largely walled off from the “animal kingdom”, one could assume that the 
environment these emotions are generated from is by-and-large the communal (or 
social) environment. Our everyday lives, for many centuries now, have revolved 
around communication with other humans so, even though the basic emotions are 
not learned (as the authors above stress), their identification and appropriate 
expression are.   
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1.2 DISCOURSE AND EXPERIENCE 
    In this section I will attempt to sketch out the relationship between discourse and 
experience, the point of intersection which grounds the rationale for this inquiry.  
How does discourse shape experience and how does experience guide discourse? 
   Discourse and Experience are fairly abstract terms and the discussion will get quite 
labyrinthine; so prior to the examination of the in-between them interaction, a 
definition of each of the two terms will be presented.  
 
1.2.1: Discourse 
   In very general terms, “discourse” can be described as strategic macro-alignment 
of signs. Tied explicitly to language, “discourse is the umbrella term for either 
spoken or written communication beyond the sentence. Text is the basic means of 
this communication, be it spoken or written, a monologue or an interaction. 
Discourse is thus a more embracing term that calls attention to the situated uses of 
text: it comprises both text and context” (Georgakopoulou and Goutsos, 1997:13). 
What is important about this quote is the inclusion of context in the effort to define 
discourse. Regardless of the audience (or absence of it), discourse foregrounds and 
underlines properties of the text that would otherwise (for example, if one is to 
study only the grammar of the text, or the ethnic origin of the vocabulary that 
compose it) not find a suitable place in our effort to understand it. Context can be 
understood as internal and external relations of the text (Fairclough, 2003:36). 
Internal is the way each component of the text ties-in with previous components of 
the same text; external is the way the text relates to other aspects of the world, like 
the social setting (e.g. a wedding, a court of law or a football game), the identity of 
the speaker (e.g. female, mother, doctor or blind), and other texts (e.g. the Quran, 
BBC’s coverage of Trump’s election, or a McDonald’s advert).  
   Georgakopoulou and Goutsos continue by saying that “however, text is not just a 
product of discourse, as customarily assumed (cf. Brown and Yule, 1983) that is, the 
actual (written or spoken) record of the language produced in an interaction. Text 
is the means of discourse, without which discourse would not be a linguistic 
activity” (1997:13). This presupposes and implies that discourse is inextricably 
bound to text and that it is a linguistic activity exclusively. However, several 
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theorists disagree. For example, the research provided by the anthropologist John 
Gumperz (1982) has shown that even gestures or mere sounds can count as 
discourse, provided they transverse the realm of mere communicative instances 
and bring to the table a greater level of social meaning with their instantiation. Or 
Parker (1999:3) argues that anything that can be formed into a text (e.g. an action, 
a painting etc.) counts as discourse. Indeed, other theorists have argued that 
several different fields of social practice (where ‘signs’ are a necessary condition for 
the practice to be successfully communicated) can count as discursive domains. 
And indeed, discourse can be seen as a link between language and society: 
“Discourses are durable entities which take us to the more abstract level of social 
practices” (Fairclough, 2003:42). Therefore, although the main focus is on discourse 
as a property of the social dimension of language, the society that constitutes this 
social dimension is of equal importance to the text itself.  
   From a Marxist perspective, society is organized in hierarchies, with the ruling 
classes controlling the means of production (and communication). Of course, 
society is not a stable entity; on the contrary it is perennially in a state of flux – 
hence the Marxist doctrine that “The history of all hitherto existing society is the 
history of class struggles”. It therefore should come as no surprise that, in its effort 
to maintain dominance, the ruling class offers an ideology to the society over which 
it rules in order to keep them in place. This ‘ideology’ is designed to provide 
justification for the society’s status quo (and, by extension, the need to maintain in 
at any cost) in ways that, when not brute force, are very much discursive. “Ideology, 
then, becomes the category of illusions and false consciousness by which the ruling 
class maintains its dominance over the working class” (Fiske, 2011:158). This is 
achieved in a top-down fashion, because of and through the use of communicative 
media that, as Fiske notes, “include the educational, political, and legal systems, 
and the mass media and publishing” (idem).  
   This dominance through communication is rarely achieved through mere 
projection, assertion and re-assertion of the ruling class’s beliefs and attitudes. 
Slogans and maxims are effective for keeping the main ideological lines in the minds 
of people and for making them part of the everyday communication, but they fall 
short in providing people with an actual reason for trusting these slogans (or the 
ruling class in general). More often than not, “the meanings generated by any one 
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text are determined partly by the meanings of other texts to which it appears 
similar. This is called “intertextuality”” (idem).  
   “Intertextuality” can be seen as a form of dialogicality (in Bakhtin’s terms). 
“Undialogical language is authoritative or absolute” (in Holquist, 1981:427) and 
therefore may draw attention to the very fact that difference is excluded. False 
dialogicality, however, can take the place of authoritarianism and absolutism to 
make the communicative end product seem like it is “relativized, de-privileged, 
aware of competing definitions for the same things” (idem.) whereas in fact it is 
simply an assertion of the one-sided viewpoint of the text producer. This is because, 
as Fairclough points out, “a significant initial question is: which texts and voices are 
included, which are excluded and what significant absences are there?” (Fairclough, 
2003:47) In other words, the producer of a text can shape it to look like it 
incorporates different voices and different points-of-view when in fact they only 
bring in voices and viewpoints that are very similar to their own.  
   This links to Fairclough’s ‘external relations’ of texts. “Texts inevitably make 
assumptions. What is ‘said’ in a text is ‘said’ against a background of what is ‘unsaid 
but taken as given” (Fairclough, 2003:40) and this is what can be termed 
“assumption”: “something which has been said or written elsewhere, and that the 
readers have heard or read elsewhere” (idem). Perhaps it is better to use the term 
audiences instead of readers to allow for other forms of communication receivers, 
like hearers to come into the story. But the meaning remains that, because of the 
dominant culture’s (that is, the culture that is established, promoted and sustained 
by the ruling class) all-encompassing and far-reaching nature, some ways of 
understanding texts can be taken for granted within a society at a given point in 
time. By extension, these taken-for-granted meanings create assumptions within a 
society. “The capacity to exercise social power, domination and hegemony includes 
the capacity to shape to some significant degree the nature and content of this 
‘common ground’, which makes implicitness and assumptions an important issue 
with respect to ideology” (Fairclough, 2003:56).  
   It is important to note, however, that the Dominant Culture is not the only one 
available in any society (at least any free society where the expression of a different 
opinion is a right of the citizens). There are different ways to relate to the world; 
ways that shape the way one acts, speaks and sees. Nevertheless, one could claim 
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that these, too, are tied-in to the dominant discourses of the culture, at least from 
an analytical perspective. That is because they can be examined as standing in 
relation to these dominant ways-of-being and ways-of-seeing. Nevertheless, I 
would argue that even those dissenting viewpoints (often termed counter-cultures 
or subcultures) are organized in very much an hierarchical way themselves, where 
the established ways-of-seeing and ways-of-being are passed on to newcomers by 
the subculture’s safeguards (that is, people of enterprises that aim to ensure the 
continuity of the prevailing meanings found within the subculture’s practices), 
again in a top-down fashion. These too, then, provide the member of the culture 
with a way-of-being in, and a way-of-seeing the world. Of course, this does not 
mean that every person is helplessly caught up within one discursive system or the 
other. In fact, one rarely wholly and exclusively subscribes to just one discursive 
system. Instead, discourse(s) provide their appropriators with ways of thinking 
about, and ways of relating to, the world.  
      “Discourse constitutes part of the resources which people deploy in relating to 
one another – keeping separate from one another, cooperating, competing, 
dominating – and in  seeking to change the ways in which they relate to one 
another” (Fairclough, 2003:124). Discourse and discourses, therefore, provide the 
common ground for people to investigate their identities, experiences and overall 
ways-of-being and ways-of-seeing. As seen earlier, this common-ground comes 
with assumptions. Fairclough presents 3 types of assumptions:  
Existential assumptions, about what exists; propositional assumptions, about what 
is or what can be or what will be the case; and value assumptions, about what is 
good and desirable and what is not (Fairclough, 2003:55).  
   The concept of assumptions leads Fiske to state that “ideology is determined by 
society, not by the individual’s possibly unique set of attitudes and experiences” 
(Fiske, 2011:157). Similarly, Goffman states that “although evaluation may 
ultimately be subjective, whatever judgments are made must be relative to explicit 
meritocratic and demonstrably objective standards of ability and achievement” 
(1986:9) and in a similar vein Harré states that “the public conversation of the 
cultural group and the private thoughts of the members of the group form a 
continuous conversational web” (Harré, 1998:13). 
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   Based on all this, Adrian Bennett’s assumption “that discourse is composed of 
more or less reasonable and reasoned acts which actors perform on their way 
towards achieving particular goals” (1983:97) gains significant value. Indeed, this 
assumption brings together the elements of cultural common-ground, personal 
intentions, linguistic determinism and action orientation that cover most of what 
discourse is in practical terms: a strategic means to achieving one’s end. The term 
discourse “signals the particular view of language in use (…) as an element of social 
life which is closely interconnected with other elements” (Fairclough, 2003:3). 
Closer to a phenomenological approach, a discourse may be defined as “a system 
of statements which construct an object” (Parker, 1992:5).   Parker (1992:6-19 
passim) proposes seven criteria for what a discourse is. According to these, a 
discourse is realized in texts; it is about objects; it contains subjects; it is a coherent 
system of meanings; it refers to other discourses; it reflects on its own way of 
speaking; and it is historically located. Going further on how these above criteria 
find place within the social, political and economic realm of today’s world, Parker 
also offers that discourses support institutions (by perpetuating the social 
relationships that allow these institutions a dominating presence in society); that 
discourses reproduce power relations (by treating the current state of affair in each 
society and at each point in time as a natural and unchallenged status-quo); and 
that discourses have ideological effects (in the sense of giving a sense of identity 
and being to the persons who are brought up within these discourses). 
   Discourse and discourses, in other words, guide one in his/her exploration of 
him/herself within, and in relation to, the world. These guides provide the tools for 
one to understand the self and the world, but they also limit one in this endeavour.  
        
1.2.2: Experience 
   To begin with, experience is always experience of something (even if that 
something is termed “nothingness” by the individual). This brings to the fore two 
main concepts to be discussed: the thing and the individual.  
   “The thing itself” is what Husserl famously urged researchers to turn their 
attention to. This is not as straightforward as it might at first appear. Harré gives a 
famous example of “a chair”. This chair can be investigated in many different ways, 
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from its atomic composition to the place it occupies in the room and what Feng 
Shui would say about that. When it comes to the way the chair is experienced by 
someone, we are entering the domain of phenomenology. Phenomenology is 
central to this study and will be discussed later on in this chapter, but for now some 
core points will be presented to help the unfolding of the argument. 
    The first major point to make here is that it is not the chair itself that is the object 
of investigation, but one’s experience of it. When one sees a chair, a complicated 
process is happening in the eye, which involves, among other mental process, 
inversion and re-inversion of the object in order to be perceived in its actual 
position by the person. The person then may enter a wide range of other mental 
processes, like remembering what chairs there were in their parents’ house or 
thinking of that one time they were enjoying a nice ice-tea while lying on a couch.  
   “Experience”, therefore, can be defined as a situation and one’s subjective 
involvement in it. Simply being near events that happen is not enough for one to 
experience them; there has to be some cognitive reaction by the person that links 
them to the event. This contrasts with the concept of prehension as presented by 
Whitehead – a form of uncognitive apprehension, often non-conscious. Regarding 
this, the founder of the idea has claimed that “consciousness is the crown of 
experience, only occasionally attained, not its necessary base”. However, 
Whitehead employed the term “experience” to refer to every kind of activity 
between every kind of entity and, even though it might be a useful concept in 
exploring the instantiation and development of some bodily activities (e.g. why do 
animals stay away from fire?), its orientation can hardly be made relevant to the 
present study. Langer, on the other hand, also writing about prehension, reserves 
“experience” for instances of awareness (in Cromby and Willis, 2016:488) and this 
is compatible with the eloquent way William James addressed the issue in his 1890 
“The Principles of Psychology”: “My experience is what I agree to attend to”.  Kelly 
echoes James’ sentiment. “Only when man attunes his ear to recurrent themes in 
the monotonous flow does his universe begin to make sense to him” (Kelly, 
1963:52).  
    All these link the individual experience to the object, but the phenomenon 
belongs neither to the body that perceives the object, nor to the object itself. 
Experience is always experience of something external (e.g. objects, events) or 
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internal (e.g. memories, fantasies). Husserl (1983) employs the term “intuition” to 
underline its presence in the person’s mind. This type of presence presupposes a 
level of perception and consciousness which would be impossible without language 
(Giorgi and Giorgi, 2008b:31-32 passim). Whereas other animals can be said to be 
(almost) purely motivated by a stimulus-response process, the human mind 
(almost) forces one to engage in more ways with the internal and the external 
world; and that is done largely through language.  
   I side more with Langer and Husserl and for me therefore, experience is the most 
personal level of sentient existence. I see it as combining a vast multitude of the 
person’s characteristics, some more-or-less stable, like the Personality Big-5 
(extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to 
experience), and some not-so stable, like how hungry or tired someone was during 
the experience.  
   Experience involves one losing oneself in it and finding oneself being lost in it 
before losing oneself in it again. In a sense, the experience of something is the 
moment3 one encounters an item (object, event, process) which generates a 
psychological4 reaction in him/her. The presence of the psychological reaction 
becomes apparent, even fleetingly, to the individual. At that moment, parts of one’s 
life5 come into play to colour the encounter and imprint it in memory.  
“Phenomenologists use the term ‘phenomenon’ as a general term, to refer to 
the actual grasp that one has of the real things and events that exist in the 
world transcendent to that grasp or apprehension… When one begins to 
specify ‘phenomena’, one begins to articulate objects such as percepts, 
memories, images, cognitions etc., but to understand these terms correctly 
from a psychological viewpoint, for phenomenologists, is to understand them 
as experienced referents and not as referents that exist in themselves 
independently of the specific grasp of a specific consciousness” (Giorgi, 
1995:30).  
                                                          
3 This term works best to describe how the level of engagement with the stimulus one presents; in a 
sense, a moment is an encounter. 
4 This term encompasses aspects of cognition, judgment, behaviour and physiology. 
5 This involves one’s memories, attitudes, beliefs as well as unconscious drives, repressed wishes, 
etc. 
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   Therefore, it is the thing as experienced and understood that forms the 
phenomenon – and this process entails thought which in turn entails language and 
a certain orientation to the world. 
 
1.2.3: The Relationship Between Discourse and Experience 
   It would be fair to say, then, that both language and feeling6 are at the same time 
constructed and constructive. The same phenomenon can be described in a variety 
of different ways (Potter and Wetherell, 1987:35) and, regardless of their 
differences, “Langer and Whitehead converge upon a view of feeling as the most 
basic constitutive element of experience, the very stuff from which (what we call) 
cognition and (what we call) emotion get subsequently differentiated. Felt 
prehensions— how the world is for us, right here, right now, within these 
activities—constitute us, at the same time as they constitute our world." (Cromby 
and Wills, 2016:489). 
    At the same time, however, discourse shapes the way this experience is 
understood by the individual. One of the most prominent thinkers to link 
experience and discourse, and probably the most popular of them all, is the French 
philosopher Michel Foucault (1926-1984). According to his thinking “discursive 
constructions and practices are implicated in the ways in which we experience 
ourselves (such as ‘sick’ or ‘healthy’, ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’, ‘disabled’ or ‘able-
bodied’, and so on). As a result, an exploration of the availability of subject positions 
in discourse has implications for the possibilities of selfhood and subjective 
experience” (Willig, 2003:182-183).  
   In other words, the way one has been raised (and conditioned) to think about the 
world and all its aspects (at least the ones one is aware of) has a profound influence 
on the way one will experience his/her encounters with these items (this is the 
subjective experience; more on the possibilities of selfhood later in this chapter). 
The reason for that is simple: being taught (through family, friends, mass media, 
school etc.) how to think about certain items of the world creates expectations 
about how one should and will react to these items upon their encounter.  
                                                          
6 See pages 42-44 for a more extensive description of feeling and the affective turn. 
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   When the encounter happens, however, there is a whole different story 
unfolding: The person will react (emotionally, judgmentally, behaviourally) to these 
items a certain way. These will either conform to or contrast with the way the 
person was brought up to think about these items by his/her surroundings; most 
probably it will be a mixture of conformity and contrast. This is also very likely to 
stem from different ways-of-seeing and ways-of-being in the world that one has 
gathered and appropriated from different sources. It is important to note at this 
point that, even though the signs are fixed within a specific community and at a 
certain point in time, there are different ways of arranging these signs in relation 
to one-another in order to reach original, new and counter-hegemonic ways of 
cutting up the world. As the Foucauldian school stresses:  
“Dominant discourses privilege those versions of social reality that legitimate 
existing power relations and social structures. Some discourses are so 
entrenched that it is very difficult to see how we may challenge them. They 
have become ‘common sense’. At the same time, it is in the nature of language 
that alternative constructions are always possible and that counter-discourses 
can, and do, emerge eventually” (Willig, 2008:113)7.  
   For example, one may have heard bad things about anarchists from his/her school 
and a certain sector of the media, but good things about them from his friends’ 
brothers and a different sector of the media.   
 
   The person will then have to form a narrative in his/her head about his/her 
encounter with the item, what the experience was like, what impact it had on them 
as a person, and what impact it may have (had) in their life from then on8. This 
narrative is generated in the language one speaks. Therefore, in order for one to 
put their experience into words (thus giving it a form that they can narrate to 
themselves and, more importantly, to others and be understood), one has to reach 
out to a well of lexical items that the speech community in which one belongs uses. 
This lexicon was there before the person’s encounter with the experience, most 
                                                          
7 It is because of this interplay of dynamics that linguistic signs do actually change within societies 
and a signifier that 200 years ago meant something “bad” can now come to mean something 
“good”. 
8 This, incidentally, fits Labov’s main points of orientation (what things were like before the 
encounter); complicating action (the encounter); resolution (the impact of the encounter); and 
coda/evaluation (what changes this encounter brought about, or not, in the person’s perception). 
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probably before the person was even born. Therefore, one has to use words 
(signifiers) that others have endowed with meaning (signified) as tools for the 
understanding and transmission of one’s experience to self and others.  
   As a result of this, the person has come to have expectations about the events 
s/he will encounter. To use George Kelly’s fundamental postulate: “A person’s 
processes are psychologically channelized by the ways in which he anticipates 
events” (1963:46). In other words, the person already has some conceptions and 
expectations of the events (the encounter with the item) before the event itself 
occurs. These conceptions and expectations are there before one’s first encounter 
with the item, but are not rigid and fixed- they fluctuate and can be revised.  
   For example, one probably has an expectation of what “employment” (i.e., paid 
labour) will be like before they become employed for the first time. These 
expectations will be in place before his/her first day at work based on what he hears 
about work from his surroundings, how work is portrayed in the society one grew 
up in, the nature of the job one has in mind etc. These expectations will be in place 
before his first day at work and thus, his first day at work will be compared and 
contrasted to these expectations (things tend to not be exactly the way one 
imagines them to be). In other words, he anticipated the event like X but it turned 
out to be like Z (Z=X-E+R). The next day he goes to work, his expectations will be Z; 
by the end of his 10th year at the same job, his expectations for the next day at work 
will probably be Y [Y=Z+W+F-(D+1)+S] and so on. Each new encounter with 
“employment” will broaden some aspects of the person’s expectations about work; 
some will be solidified and some will be weakened; and eventually it will create in 
the person new expectations about their next encounter with the item “work”.  
   Kelly discusses the implications of this constant flux and expectation in depth. To 
begin with, he draws our attention to how the events are phrased. “Like a musician, 
he must phrase his experience in order to make sense out of it” (1963:52). The very 
act of phrasing (and its end product – the phrase) are of paramount importance in 
Kelly’s thinking.  
   “The phrases are distinguished events. The separation of events is what man 
produces for himself when he decides to chop up time into manageable lengths” 
(idem). Therefore, what one will call “an event” is not something fixed. For 
example, “joining the protest” for someone may begin from the moment he left his 
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house; for another it might start from the moment she stepped outside the bus and 
merged with the protesting crowds; whereas for a third it might start from the 
moment police became visible. Similarly, one may call the start of police violence 
the end of the event; another may call his goodnight greeting and renewal of 
participation to the union with his colleagues as the end of the event; and a third 
may call the event to be over only when she returns home.    
   At this point it is important to make a distinction between experience and an 
experience. As the founders of IPA point out, people tend to be immersed in their 
experience and only momentarily become aware of their selves within the 
unfolding events. “At the most elemental level, we are constantly caught up, 
unselfconsciously, in the everyday flow of experience. As soon as we become aware 
of what is happening we have the beginnings of what can be described as ‘an 
experience’ as opposed to just experience” (Smith, Flowers and Larking, 2009:2). 
As the authors point out, an experience is a comprehensive unit of understanding, 
an encounter with an item that may unfold over several parts, often separated in 
time, but “linked with a common meaning” (idem), in a way that the person can 
pick up the segments, examine them as a united event and speculate upon them 
meaningfully.  
    “Within these limited segments, which are based on recurrent themes, man 
begins to discover the bases for likenesses and differences” (Kelly, 1963:52) 
Therefore, the way one chops-up events a) divides or unites them; and b) draws up 
similarities and differences between them. Kelly continues:  
“We point to each of a series of things and count: one, two, three… The 
counting makes sense if the things are distinguishable from one-another, and 
it makes sense only in the respect that they are alike. Before we can count 
them we must construe their concrete difference from each other, their 
abstract likeness to each other, and their abstract difference from other things 
which are not to be counted. We must be able to construe where one thing 
leaves off and another begins, which one is similar enough to the others to be 
counted, and what is extraneous. What we count depends on what abstract 
to be counted” (ibid, p.54)  
   To go back to the example of “working life”: If a person who has been in 
employment for a week is asked what it is like to be employed, they will have to 
31 
 
give an answer. She will then have to consider what each day of her employment 
was like, what made them similar and what made them different, and provide an 
answer that summarizes these. Before doing that, however, the person will have to 
decide where the notion of “employment” starts and where it finishes. Does it start 
the moment she gets out of bed? Does it start the moment she jumps on the bus? 
Does it start the moment she enters his workplace? Similarly, where does it end? 
Does it end the moment she leaves her workplace; the moment she takes the bus 
home; or the moment she gets back home? More importantly, how similar and how 
different has each day been to the rest in regards to these events? The fact that 
different people will take different starting and ending points in their conception of 
an event leads to Kelly’s Individuality Corollary (ibid, p.55) (“Persons differ from 
each other in their construction of events”); and this, in turn, leads to how one 
relates events to one-another, the Organization Corollary: “Each person 
characteristically evolves, for his convenience in anticipating events, a construction 
system embracing ordinal relationships between constructs” (ibid, p.56).  
   This all leads to Kelly’s Experience Corollary: “A person’s construction system 
varies as he successively construes the replication of events” (ibid, p.72) 
   “Since our Fundamental Postulate establishes the anticipation of events as 
the objective of psychological processes, it follows that the successive 
revelation of events invites the person to place new constructions upon them 
whenever something unexpected happens. Otherwise, one’s anticipations 
would become less and less realistic. The succession of events in the course of 
time continually subjects a person’s construction system to a validation 
process. The constructions one places upon events are working hypotheses, 
which are about to be put to the test of experience. As one’s anticipations or 
hypotheses are successively revised in the light of unfolding sequence of 
events, the construction system undergoes a progressive evolution. The 
person reconstrues. This is experience. The reconstruction of one’s life is 
based upon this kind of experience” (ibid, p. 72).  
   What is important in this quote is the distinction between experience that has 
already been lived (‘knowledge’ of an experience) and experience which still awaits 
to be lived (‘anticipation’ of an experience). Of course, the same action (e.g. cooking 
pasta) is never exactly the same across its numbers of repetitions and, thus, 
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knowledge and anticipation occupy two different spaces which nevertheless do 
have some shared space.  
   And in all this, the person’s sense of self also comes into play. As Harré points out, 
“in recollection and in anticipation one’s sense of self is involved in different ways” 
(Harré, 1998:12). Regarding the formation of that sense, the author states: “The 
biological endowment of a human being with an active brain and nervous system is 
manifested at first in relatively undifferentiated and unordered mental activities 
that are then shaped and modulated by the acquisition of discursive and practical 
skills which facilitate display of the centred organization we recognize in our own 
experience” (Harré, 1998:12). Harré’s quote foregrounds the notion of one’s 
already acquired experience in establishing a sense of how one reacted towards 
that experience, and how one expects s/he would react to that experience again. It 
is also important to underline his use of words “acquisition of discursive and 
practical skills”. Harré invokes Vygotsky’s Zone of Proximal Development for the 
accomplishment of this acquisition, which presupposes that one will have to be 
taught by someone else how to say or do things.  
   It may appear overly simplistic, but the fact that these signs pre-exist the person 
tie one inextricably to one’s society. This has profound effect on the way a person 
understands his/her experiences and his/her self, as at any given point one is 
anchored to a symbolic system which permits and forces him/her to be understood 
in terms that were passed down to him/her. “People produce a flow of action, some 
public and some private, some symbolic and some practical. In one sense people 
are forever producing and reproducing their own minds and the societies they live 
in” (Harré, 1998:15) 
   Therefore, since reconstruing is carried out using the discursive tools provided by 
one’s society, we are brought back to the point of language and social practices.   
   What Kelly describes is how one defines the events and, in turn, what impact this 
definition and his encounter(s) with the events has for the person’s expectations; 
how these expectations are altered over the course of time; and what leads to these 
alterations. These definitions of events, however, then has to be compared (and 
contrasted) to “the principles of organization which govern events –at least social 
ones- and our subjective involvement in them” (Goffman, 1986:8). Goffman called 
these principles of organization “Frames”. “Since frame incorporates both the 
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participant’s response and the world he is responding to, a reflexive element must 
necessarily be present in any participant’s clear-headed view of events” (Goffman, 
1986:5). This takes us back to the notion of one’s involvement with the events, 
one’s attendance to events, but brings in the individual factor as well. When one 
reflects on one’s experience and presents it to an audience (or even to himself), 
one needs to take into account his/her own position towards the unfolding events 
(what Goffman calls “strips of activities”), and the level of his/her engagement with 
them.  
   Here, an important distinction needs to be made. As Smith, Flowers and Larkin 
(2009) pointed out, individuals are usually engrossed in their activities and thus not 
aware of their selves in those activities. Goffman believes the same and even claims 
that in order to be engrossed in an experience, one has to leave language and 
thinking behind (Goffman, 1986:345-347 passim). However, once one decides to 
transmit the experience, one has to resort to language – and by doing so, one uses 
his/her own unique combination of socially pre-defined symbols to assign meaning 
(personal and social) to the experience.  
   However, linking to Kelly’s notion of expectation, the way a person (in a society) 
frames an experience also affects the way this experience actually unfolds. “When 
we deal with an incompetent person and find it difficult not to smile, or with a mad 
one and find it difficult not to show fear, or deal with the police and find it difficult 
not to show guilt, what we are tending to give away is not a person, ourselves, but 
a frame, one that we had been maintaining” (Goffman, 1986:487). So one’s 
expectations about the experience they engage in directs how one reacts during 
that experience.  
   Therefore, language/discourse has to be absent (to the best possible extent) in 
order for one to be immersed/engrossed in an experience. When one reflects on 
that experience, language is a tool one will unavoidably use – and the default 
(within a certain space and a certain time) social shapes, linguistic restrains and 
mental forms this brings along with it will come into play as well. Peter Ashworth 
takes us back to the work of William James at that point, stressing that “James 
builds up a general case for the importance of what he calls the ‘fringe’ of the focal 
object of which we are conscious. An object of awareness gains its meaning in large 
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measure from the ‘halo of relations’9 with which it is connected – its ‘psychic 
overtone’” (Ashworth, 2008:7).  
   The whole idea of similarity and difference, and the construction of an experience 
by the participant, as brought forth by James and Goffman, is further advanced in 
Ashworth’s thinking by a reference to Edmund Husserl. “Husserl later on pointed 
to a similar idea: the ‘horizon’ of a phenomenon. That is, an object of awareness is 
affected intrinsically by the whole web of its meaningful connections within the 
world of experience” (Ashworth, 2008:7) 
    
   It is important to note, however, that an experience can be reconstrued in many 
different ways by the same person. “Franz Bentano (1838-1917)… viewed conscious 
experience as a process; experiencing was an act, so that different kinds of 
experience are to be distinguished by the particular ways in which we gain 
consciousness of the object of experience. In particular, the ‘kind’ of conscious act 
involved in relating ourselves to something so as to form a judgment about it is 
different from the conscious act by which we achieve a perception of something. 
So judgment and perception and other mods of conscious experience involve 
different orientations to the object” (Ashworth, 2008:6).  Or, as Kelly notes, “Not 
only do men differ in their construction of events, but they also differ in the ways 
they organize their construction of events. One man may resolve the conflicts 
between his anticipations by means of an ethical system. Another may resolve 
them in terms of self-preservation. The same man may resolve in one way at one 
time and in the other way at another. It all depends on how he backs off to get 
perspective” (Kelly, 1963:56). And this links directly to the Foucauldian notion of 
one’s subjective positioning towards the experience.  
 
   So a person encounters an item (“experience”) and then they have to present this 
experience, both to themselves and to others, in a way that can be understood. 
“The pressure to be accountable and intelligible to others sustains and gives power 
to certain communal organization of self-experience” (Potter and Wetherell, 
                                                          
9 This seems to be sitting somewhere in the middle between semantic associations in the speech 
community’s lexicon, and a person’s own mental/free associations (as Psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud 
would put it). 
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1987:106). If we assume that one’s identity is the summation of one’s 
interpretation and reconstruction of one’s stance towards their own experiences, 
we can see how this has affects how one views him or herself as a person. The way 
one responded to one’s encounter with an item will then have to be examined by 
the person, who will have to give an honest answer to him/herself about what it is 
that they took away from that experience. “The third dimension of self-
consciousness and self-monitoring is none other than the capacity we have to give 
discursive accounts of and commentaries upon what we perceive, how we act and 
what we remember” (Harré, 1998:12)  
   These accounts will then be compared and contrasted to the way the experience 
is socially constructed in the community they operate in and, eventually, this will 
lead to some form of evaluative judgment of the person himself along the lines of 
good–bad or, in Fairclough’s terms, desirable-undesirable. “Children learn to see 
themselves as others see them (Mead, 1934)” (in Potter and Wetherell, 1987:98) 
This means that one will have to compare his/her evaluation of the experience to 
the social norm; but also that they will find themselves reacting to the experience 
along the evaluative lines laid down for them by their family, school, friends and 
society. “Since discourse is primarily public and only secondarily private, so 
cognition, the use of various devices for mental tasks, is primarily public and social, 
and only secondarily private and individual” (Harré, 1995:144) 
   This may prove to be problematic, as people sometimes may not want to enter 
this evaluative judgment and comparison – but language leads them there anyway. 
It could be this that sets defence mechanisms (like avoiding the experience, lying 
about their judgment to an interviewer, repressing the experience etc.) in motion. 
  The discourses of the groups one subscribes to, therefore, shape one’s encounter 
with an item of this world. Social narratives provide the tools to examine the 
experience but they also limit what can be seen as part of this experience (and in 
turn what this experience can be seen as part of).  
   All these take us back to the Foucauldian notions of subjectivity and discourse. 
“Discourses offer subject positions, which, when taken up, have implications for 
subjectivity and experience…” (Willig, 2008:113). These discourses are socially 
constructed and this means that one’s way-of-seeing and way-of-being in the world 
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is one’s alone, but at the same time it is firmly anchored to the society’s values, 
attitudes, beliefs, as well as their way of expressing and transmitting those.  
   Of course, all this begs the question “about the extent to which we can theorize 
subjectivity on the basis of discourse alone” (Willig, 2008:123). Personally, I believe 
that discourse covers the vast majority of one’s conception of his/her own 
subjectivity (and those of others). Certainly, there are things beyond words; items 
of the world that humanity has not yet noticed, attended to, or deciphered. It is 
perfectly possible that one does not accept that even “the unconscious is 
structured like a language” (as the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan famously 
put it) or even that humans think in language (the “mentalese”). However, 
whatever it is that humans think in, there comes a time when they will have to 
examine their experience if they wish to achieve some notion of sense about their 
selves.  
   As Socrates famously put it, “the unexamined life is not worth living”. Given that 
“man is by nature a social animal” (as Aristotle famously put it), I believe one 
naturally turns to his/her surrounding culture, the one established, maintained and 
debated by the community in which s/he operates to look for meaning. Besides the 
fact that they are going to use the lexicon that has been passed down to them by 
their surroundings (family, school, friends, media), a large part of children rearing 
in humans involves their parents, guardians or teachers teaching them the “right” 
ways to behave and talk within their community. These then become internalized 
and they become the tools for the person to view oneself – a living creature 
(animal) within a culture. So, by default, in order for one to gain a sense of self, a 
perspective on their own existence, they have to compare their experiences (and 
their evaluations of them) to those of the society they are in. Or, as Potter and 
Wetherell (1987:106), with reference to Harré (1985) put it, “self-experience is 
formed as the child learns the grammar of our language and perfects 
communication”. 
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1.3 The Social Side of Emotions 
   Emotions are something that can be felt and expressed. In other words, the 
individual can detect them in him or herself; his/her body (e.g. accelerated heart-
beat and shortened breathing), thinking (e.g. memories or thought patterns), 
behaviour (e.g. shouting or crying), and judgment (e.g. thinking that one is useless, 
the world is an ugly place and the future is bleak). Then the person will have to 
recognize them; identify them; and express them to themselves or to someone 
else.  
   This takes the enquiry into emotions to social dimension, as the emotion’s 
recognition is something that is learnt in each culture and family (see Morgan and 
Averill, 2008:163) and this recognition brings with it a story that follows the 
emotion (a narrative that justifies and illuminates the experience and the 
expression it assumes); whereas the communication will have to transpire not only 
in a language the other understands (although nonverbal prosodic cues have been 
shown to be of special interest – see Sauter et al., 2010) but also delivered in a 
manner the other can relate to and accept as socially appropriate.       
   Besides the personal side of emotion arousal (where one’s behaviour, cognition, 
judgment and physiology are altered purely on the basis of the excitation brought 
about by the stimulus), there is a social side to it. Humans operate in societies and 
societies come with rules. Stressing the difference between nature and nurture, 
Jean Piaget writes: “Social rules, as Durkheim has so powerfully shown, whether 
they be linguistic, moral, religious, or legal etc., cannot be constituted, transmitted, 
or preserved by means of an internal biological heredity, but only through the 
external pressure exercised by individuals upon each other” (1932:183).  
   Emotions, in this study’s perspective, are interpretations and interpretations 
cannot exist outside a context; in our case, a cultural and interactional one. Culture 
can be defined as the structuring of social life and the wider cultural context in 
which one is brought up and the influence this has on his/her emotional responses 
has been the subject of much debate. Central lines of that debate navigate around 
the issues of how each culture defines emotions and, consequently, how one is to 
recognize them in his/her person and how to appropriately express them. Averill’s 
view of emotion, which resonates strongly with me, “is that although biologically 
based it is largely socially constructed in humans” (Strongman, 1996:113). Averill 
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(2012:13) defines emotions as “socially constructed syndromes (transitory social 
roles) which include a person’s appraisal of the situation, and which are interpreted 
as passions (things that happen to us) rather than as actions (things we do)”. This 
definition has two crucial components: the socially transmitted side of emotions, 
and the perception of them by the person experiencing them.  
    The view of emotions as transitory social roles underlines the expressive and 
experiential component of the emotional reaction as learnt: the person 
communicates his/her state to the surroundings. At the same time, the person has 
learnt how to interpret his/her inner state (what s/he calls emotion) by interacting 
with others and picking up clues about these inner states from their attendance to 
ones s/he considers relevant to the ones s/he experiences at present.  “By the time 
we can turn around and reflect upon them, feelings are already shaped by the 
discourses we use to fix and render them available for inspection” (Cromby and 
Harper, 2009:344).  
   Varieties of research on emotion treat them as culturally and socially constructed. 
Within that framework, it is seen that different cultural meaning systems play a 
central role in the shaping (or, sometimes, constituting) of the emotional 
experience itself. The emphasis here is therefore on “the cultural variation, 
mediated by cognitive categories of ethno-psychological understanding (such as 
that of the culturally constituted ‘self’) by the social structural correlates of such 
understandings, and/or by verbal communication” (Greco and Stenner; 2008:59). 
Essentially, what is emphasized here is a view on emotion as a reaction that is seen 
as socially validated (i.e. taught, recognized and consequently applauded or 
condemned).  
   When it comes to the influence of culture on the communication and 
understanding of emotion, evidence has been found both for the culture 
equivalence model and for the cultural advantage model (Soto and Levenson, 
2009:882). These two models map onto how well one can recognize emotions in 
others. The culture equivalence model posits that people from different cultures 
(and races, according to the study) can recognize equally well emotions in people 
of their own culture and in people of other cultures. By contrast, the cultural 
advantage model posits that people can recognize emotions in others more easily 
if the others are from a similar origin as them.  
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   Despite the conflicting nature of these two models, their existence points at the 
crucial understanding of emotions as a dual concept: both a universal phenomenon 
in humans (and other primates) but also (and in contrast to other primates) largely 
shaped according to each society’s norms, traditions and linguistic resources.  
   Not only that, but emotions are also historically shaped. Like with any discourse 
(and language in general), meanings and patterns change with time, as the socio-
political climate changes and new relations, terms and  items enter the people’s 
everyday realities, new necessities and comforts are formed and new life 
aspirations are considered desirable in each society – see for example Stearns and 
Stearns’ (2008:51-54 passim) discussion of how new sanitary procedures in 1800s 
France led to a different understanding of urine: from a tolerable (or even 
welcome) substance, to a disgusting one. This, in turn, led to different emotional 
reactions to it, as well as “a real shift in the evaluation of the physical senses” 
(2008:52). As a consequence of that, new ways of looking at people and their social 
class came into being, with the poor (who had no access to the new sanitary 
procedures) considered disgusting and the rich considered clean. This, in turn, 
created new ways of looking a cleanliness, not only as a desirable trait but also as a 
sign of nobility in itself, and thus a ticket to higher strata of society.      
   When it comes to expressing emotions, the way each culture paints them has a 
major effect on how one will attend to them, or even acknowledge their existence. 
The reason for that is that when one claims experience of an emotional state, 
others also see him/her under the prism of that state and this has consequences 
for how they will judge or act towards him/her. Therefore, the way one will 
understand him/herself during the emotional reaction will impact how they will 
perceive themselves; how they will behave in order to express that emotion; and 
consequently how they will be seen by others.  
   “Western discourse on emotions constitutes them as paradoxical entities 
that are both a sign of weakness and a powerful force. On the one hand, 
emotion weakens the person who experiences it. It does this both by serving 
as a sign of a sort of character defect and by being a sign of at least temporary 
intrapsychic disorganization. On the other hand, emotions are literally 
physical forces that push us into vigorous actions.” (Lutz, 2008:63).  
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   Hence, a desirable trait in the Western world is to experience as little emotion as 
possible; or, at the very least, to express and display as little as possible of that 
emotion in order to prevent the suspension of logic, composure, agency over one’s 
acts and self-control. This lack of self-control is accentuated by the motivation 
brought forth by emotions: even though one may not be sure what it is s/he is doing 
when in an emotional state, s/he will go on and do it nonetheless. This may lead 
one to lose face – to act or speak in ways that are deemed socially unacceptable 
and then having to apologize for it (or otherwise manage his/her relationships with 
the people who were present during his/her expression of emotion).  
   So, for example, “where aggression is viewed as a breakdown of internal control 
and/or normal cooperative interaction we would expect the audience to assume a 
more condemnatory stance toward the scenario being related.” (Campbell and 
Muncer, 1987:491). This is exemplified well in the British culture, I think, with the 
overt and exaggerated negative politeness (Brown and Levinson, 1987): the 
assumption that the other person wishes to be left alone, and the way of 
approaching them that this brings along, usually followed by discursive approaches 
that emphasize hedges (e.g. “would it be too rude to ask…”) and an exaggerated 
expression of apology and gratitude. But more of that in the Methodology section.  
   On the other hand, the Western discourse cannot ignore the evolutionary 
advantage of emotions as discussed above: they stay with the human race precisely 
because they attune the individual to respond to the environment with full force. 
Thus, a mid-way balance can be theorized, where the individual accurately 
perceives their emotions as s/he has seen them in others, restrains him/herself 
enough to suppress the automatic expression that emotions call for, and expresses 
him/herself with appropriateness to the social surroundings.  
   When one is to communicate his/her emotions in ways more voluntary than facial 
expressions or body postures, one’s culture has usually created a framework (or 
even ritual) according to which the expression is to take place. The time and place 
we express ourselves, as well as the way we do so, is subject to social norms, taught 
in childhood and perpetuating throughout one’s life (Silberman, 2003:2). These 
rules are sometimes spelled out clearly, but sometimes they are implicit, floating in 
the social norms as part of everyday interactions. “These unstated rules are often 
not apparent until someone has broken them” (Tavris, 2003:3). In each culture, 
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therefore, we find distinct ways of presenting not only the emotion, but also the 
significance this emotion has had for the person experiencing it: why did this 
emotion arise, how did it influence their behaviour, and how do they relate to their 
previous actions now? These ways of speaking about emotions and the emotional 
side of humans have been termed “emotion narratives” and their primary function  
“is the repair of a person’s status as a responsible member of society 
(Shotter, 1984), and more specifically of his or her threatened 
identity. People generally do not like to be seen as a coward, a 
hothead, or a childish person. When experiencing or expressing 
emotions, people are concerned about how they will be evaluated, 
and whether their behaviour had good or bad consequences for their 
identity” (Fischer and Jansz, 2008:168)  
    
   The concept of being taught what an emotion is takes on a special significance 
when it comes to how one experiences that emotion: how does s/he think about 
him/herself and the others; how is the source of emotion evaluated; what other 
emotions does this particular one neighbour with; and what line of 
action/expression does this emotion call for? These are all taught and, arguably, 
cannot replace the innate cognitive, behavioural and physiological effects of an 
emotion, which are universal and hardwired according to Ekman’s view: Like all 
bodily urges, one can learn how to properly express or temporarily suppress them, 
but the internal mechanisms are still operating. You can only choose to suppress 
the expression of a yawn (because you’ve learnt that it is inappropriate to yawn in 
some social situations) after it has been physiologically triggered in the body. 
Simply thinking that “I must not yawn” is not enough to prevent the yawn.  It is 
similar with emotion expression in my opinion: only once the emotion has been 
triggered can the person recognize it and express it (or not) accordingly. Or, like 
Husserl, I believe that we can get direct knowledge of the world through our senses, 
but what and how we think about the world can distort this reality (in Strongman, 
1996:15) in order to match the way we have learnt to think. 
   However, the socially taught ways of attending to emotions do shape up the 
emotional experience in ways that demand a special rationale from the person to 
understand their experience.  And although the “power to shape is a very different 
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matter from the capacity to create from nothing” (Ready, 2008:78), there is 
extensive power in what these shapes bring with them for the person experiencing 
the emotion. Morgan and Averill (2008) put it best in the following quote: 
“From infancy we are taught the meanings of our emotions, at first 
by parents and siblings and later by teachers, television and 
friends. We are taught the general cultural forms of interpreting 
our feelings, as well as more idiosyncratic, familial forms. And we 
enlarge and refine these meanings within the context of 
subsequent experiences and relationships. Yet, however refined, 
our every emotion bears with it an imperative cultural history, a 
history which guides and governs the choice and expression of our 
feelings. […] If we ultimately feel anger, it’s not only a judgment 
about precipitating occurrences, it’s a commitment to a way of 
understanding the present: for example, by seeing one’s self as the 
injured party, by condemning a particular person or action, by 
asserting one’s boundaries in the face of shifting relationships. All 
“true feelings”10, from self-love and pride to anger and loss, 
establish the meaning of past and present events and create a 
context for future conduct. By establishing meaning they 
ameliorate confusion, by creating new context they enable 
commitment” (Morgan and Averill, 2008:163)    
 
    When considered together as components of the same process, these views on 
emotion bring the focus of the study close to what in recent years has been termed 
the “affective turn” among social scientists: “The increasing significance of affect as 
a focus of analysis across a number of disciplinary and interdisciplinary discourses… 
registering a change in the cofunctioning of the political, economic, and cultural” 
(Clough, 2007:1). The affective turn presents “an emergent interest in emotion, 
affect and feeling, understood as experiences and phenomena neither wholly 
reducible to biology nor simply capable of being captured by language” (Cromby, 
2012:90). For scholars of this field affect refers generally to the capacity of bodies 
                                                          
10 Averill defines “true feelings” as what society (and, by extension, the person) sees as 1) deep, 2) 
intense) and 3) passionate. The notion of the “true feeling” is assumed to reveal something original 
about the person’s inner workings. 
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to respond to situations in the margins of consciousness: “the self-feeling of being 
alive – that is, aliveness or vitality” (Clough, 2007:2). 
   Yet, this field does not treat affect as a uni-dimensional attribute of matter. 
Rather, the perspective exhibits “a concern for re-thinking the relationship 
between what have traditionally been considered as separate psychological realms: 
feeling, emotion, or the affective and thought, cognition, or the mental" (Cromby 
and Willis, 2016:477). Researchers theorize “a reflux back from conscious 
experience to affect, which is registered, however, as affect, such that “past action 
and contexts are conserved and repeated, autonomically reactivated but not 
accomplished, begun but not completed”. Affect constitutes a nonlinear 
complexity, out of which the narration of conscious states such as emotions are 
subtracted, but always with a “never-to-be conscious autonomic remainder”” 
(Clough, 2007:2). In other words, the affective turn works as a bridge between 
biological states, everyday experience, what Freud termed the “unconscious”, and 
what Damasio referred to as the Somatic Marker Hypothesis.  
   One of the great enterprises of that school in recent years is to challenge the view 
of core (or basic) emotions as presented in this study’s introduction. Personally I 
don’t see the two as incompatible, but it is not this study’s intent to discuss this. I 
would like to point out however that even within the field of emotions as 
understood within the “affective turn”, a notion similar to the two-stage 
monitoring of emotion (Harré and Secord) is also found.  
“Massumi (1995) defines affect as “unqualified intensity,” and distinguishes it 
sharply from emotion, which he describes as both a “subjective content” and 
a “sociolinguistic fixing” of experience. For Massumi emotion is personal 
whereas affect is pre-personal, coming before experience and consisting 
purely of “intensity”: energy, force, motivation, given propensities toward 
salience. Emotion is the residue of affect once its effects are tamed, captured, 
or normalised by the sociolinguistic. So rather than being directly experienced, 
affect precedes experience, providing its motive force or conditions of 
possibility. Hence, affect necessarily eludes signification, representation, and 
semantic capture, since it is the very power which makes these—and indeed 
all other activities—possible." (Cromby and Willis, 2016:480) 
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   Language and sensations, in that view, work together in order to reveal one’s 
experience to that person. The “affective turn” has generated much excitement 
with its prospects of capturing human experience as a unifying process and has 
been taken up by social scientists to explore fields as divergent as the effects of 
political power on the person (Clough, 2008), technologies that work as an 
extension of the body (Clough and Halley, 2007), the influence of one’s culture on 
their everyday experience (Smith and Campbell, 2016), and second language 
acquisition (Prior, 2019).  It has also attracted a lot of criticism precisely because of 
the separation between the bodily and the mental that is inherent in it. Theorists 
have attempted to tackle this issue; Cromby and Willis (2016) most notably, discuss 
the notion of ‘feeling’: a looming sensation that is always present and factors into 
the experience of the person by uniting the mental and the bodily. “Feeling is the 
primordial texture of being” the authors argue, “the continuous and most 
fundamental stuff of which all experience is woven” (Cromby and Willis, 2016:485). 
The authors proceed to stress, carrying forward the concept of a reflux from 
conscious experience back to affect as presented by Clough in the previous page, 
that "feelings are already intentional, already meaningful—albeit that their 
complete meaning only gets realised in their lived, contingent conjunctions with 
the signs, symbols, words, events, and activities that interpellate them and which 
they continuously suffuse (Ruthrof, 1997)” (Cromby and Willis, 2016:489). 
   Margaret Wetherell (2012) has also done an astonishing job in presenting the 
affective turn within the broader context of psychological research, albeit one that 
is impossible to summarize within the constrains of this study. It is worth noting 
however that, in her view: 
“affect is of a highly dynamic, interacting composite or assemblage of 
autonomic bodily responses (e.g. sweating, trembling, blushing), other body 
actions (approaching or avoiding), subjective feelings and other qualia, 
cognitive processing (e.g. perception, attention, memory, decision-making), 
the firing and projecting of neural circuits (e.g. from the thalamus to the cortex 
and the amygdala), verbal reports (from exclamations to narratives) and 
communicative signals such as facial expressions. An emotional episode, such 
as a burst of affect like rage or grief, integrates and brings together all of these 
things in the same general moment.” (Wetherell, 2012:61) 
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   In other words, according to this version, body and mind are always in interaction 
and one casts the responses and actions of the other in a different light. One’s 
culture also becomes particularly important for the interpretation of the 
experience however, since the way the language and its signs have been shaped in 
each society guides the way people think (and therefore feel), as the section on 
Discourse and Experience shows.   
 
Let’s turn to anger now, to see how the above general frameworks apply there. 
 
1.4 Anger and the Person 
   This section explores how the rules and principles about emotions in general 
discussed so far apply to anger. The focus is both on automatic changes it produces 
(e.g. in physiology and behaviour), as well as the socially constructed way of 
attending to it. The social constructionist view is largely indebted to the writings of 
Averill (2012). 
   Within the discipline of psychology, anger has been explored from a variety of 
different perspectives. First and foremost, as stated earlier, anger was included in 
the seminal list of core emotions (alongside happiness, sadness, fear, disgust and 
surprise - Other emotions include contempt, shame, guilt, embarrassment, and awe 
– Ekman, 1992:170.) as compiled by Ekman in 1972 and has since constantly been 
included in such lists (e.g. Johnson-Laird and Oatley’s 1989). 
   In his 2016 paper “What Theorists Who Study Emotion Agree About”, Paul Ekman 
references the results of a questionnaire that was sent out to a large number of 
psychology, medicine and other professionals. 91% of the 74% of participants “who 
had chosen only the discrete choice”11 said that anger “should be considered to 
have been empirically established” (p.32). In other words, the theorists who insist 
that the main defining trait of each emotion is that it is distinguishable from others 
believe that anger is the most distinguishable of all emotions.  
                                                          
11 The “discrete” choice links to Darwin’s theorizing of discrete emotions. The other choice harks 
back to Wundt’s theorizing, which sees emotions as discrete from one-another, but primarily as 
intra-discernible, “via dimensions of pleasant-unpleasant and low-high intensity […] For example, 
the anger module differs from the fear module, but anger varies in how unpleasant it feels and in its 
strength” (Ekman, 2016:31) 
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     Anger has been identified as the most easily and universally recognized emotion 
along with happiness according to Elfenbein and Ambady (2002). This tells us that 
the experience of anger is something that people from very different countries and 
cultures can relate to: having had that experience themselves, they can read clear 
signs of its expression in other people; this relates to the first criterion for core 
emotions by Ekman as shown in the list above.  
   Charles Spielberger distinguished between State Anger and Trait Anger in 1982. 
Like with Trait and State Anxiety, Trait and State Anger map onto two separate 
modes of anger: State Anger is a fluctuating emotional state, largely dependent on 
one’s surroundings and what is going on in these surroundings at a given point in 
time. Trait Anger, on the other hand, is one’s tendency to respond angrily to a 
situation.    
    Even though anger has been said to be neighbouring other emotions, particularly 
negative ones (e.g. Aldrich and Tenenbaum, 2006), as well as destructive and self-
harming behaviours, Izard (1991) argues that from an evolutionary perspective 
anger has “the obvious function of energizing one for defence” (Strongman, 
1996:112). Consequently, anger has been described as nature’s response to the 
obstruction or otherwise interference with one’s pursuit of a goal that is significant 
for him/her; or as nature’s reaction to an attempt at harm to the individual – and 
thus related to a negative affect because it follows the detection of threat which 
brings about discomfort (e.g. Gable, Poole & Harmon-Jones, 2015:165). “In addition 
to removing the obstacle or stopping the harm, anger often involves the wish to 
hurt the target” (Ekman & Cordaro; 2011:365).  
   This last note that links anger to a desire to cause harm sustains the dialogue on 
whether anger is a positive or a negative emotion. “Averill characterizes anger as a 
conflictive emotion which is biologically related to aggressive systems and to social 
living, symbolization and self-awareness. Psychologically, it is aimed at the 
correction of a perceived wrong and socioculturally at upholding accepted 
standards of conduct” (Strongman, 1996:112). Averill (1983) stresses that anger 
persists with humanity because of, not in spite of, its affective and expressive 
symptoms – and thus it is still an evolutionary viable response, a way of 
safeguarding the community and to advance the security and prosperity of the 
individual.  On the other hand, anger has also been described as a “brief madness”, 
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where one loses control over oneself and acts in unusual, often incomprehensible 
ways – “the match is psychological as well as linguistic, because in many cultures 
an enraged individual and an insane one are both regarded as being out of control, 
unable to take responsibility for their actions” (Tavris, 2003:8). 
   Anger, then, is seen as destructive and harmful but this description can take two 
shapes: the negative one, where anger leads to the breakdown of agency and 
control in the individual; and the positive one where anger works as a shield for the 
individual and his/her close ones. (see point 13 in Ekman and Cordaro’s list). 
 
1.4.1.   The Social Side of Anger 
   From a social perspective, anger is the sign that someone has broken the (explicit 
or implicit) rules of a society; that they are not behaving as (one would think) they 
ought. “This “ought” quality suggests that a major role of anger is its policing 
function” (Tavris, 2003:3). In this view, anger is one’s way to restore order and 
normality. In that view, anger arises out of one’s disapproval of another’s conduct. 
However, it may also arise from the way one believes s/he is perceived by others. 
   Both men and women have been found to report experiencing shame (and its 
derivatives, humiliation and guilt) after an anger episode (Kring, 2000:221). T.J. 
Scheff (1995, 2003, 2004) has also identified shame as a neighbouring emotion to 
anger. According to Scheff’s thinking, shame and pride both result from the self’s 
perception of the evaluation of the self by others. These perceptions create a type 
of mood which accompanies the individual through most of his/her waking hours 
as a kind of background noise12. The individual is usually unaware of that 
background noise, but it still shapes his/her thoughts and feelings.  
   Shame for Scheff is ‘exterior’ and ‘constraining’ in the sense that they rest upon 
the way the individual has come to understand society’s (and by extension micro-
societies’/subcultures’) expectations of him/her. Like Goffman, Scheff 
acknowledges the social side of shame in the sense that it emerges between 
individuals – one feels ashamed because someone else is looking down on them. 
Scheff complements this with Lewis’s (1971) notion of ‘feeling trap’. A feeling trap 
                                                          
12 Scheff refers to this as the Cooley-Scheff conjecture: “Adults are virtually always in a 
state of either pride or shame, usually of a quite unostentatious kind” (Scheff, 2004:399). 
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can be best understood as a feeling the origins of which remain a mystery to the 
person experiencing it, the “continuing control of one’s thoughts and behaviours 
by hidden emotions” (Scheff and Retzinger, 2000:9). 
   Scheff discusses these feeling traps in particular regarding shame and describes 
how they can lead to what he terms a “spiral”. Starting from what he terms a 
“shame-shame spiral”, the author describes a spiral that consists of feeling 
ashamed, and then feeling ashamed that one feels ashamed which leads to further 
shame. Scheff uses the example of how blushers blush even more when they realize 
that others see them blush to illustrate this. The work of Lewis (1971) lends support 
to this view, especially as it foregrounds the non-conscious, lurking nature of the 
trap. She describes shame as a wordless state, largely revealed to the individual 
through imagery; which manifests involuntarily in one’s stance (e.g. lowered head); 
and which activates autonomic bodily reactions such as blushing and sweating. 
These “make shame a primitive, irrational reaction, to which there is difficulty 
applying a rational solution. One is often ashamed of being or having been 
ashamed. Shame thus compounds itself out of an intrinsic difficulty in finding a 
“rational” place for it in the adult’s psychic life” (Lewis, 1971:428). Lewis bring forth 
the concept of the feeling trap, stating that “these difficulties which the person 
experiences in identifying his psychological state may result in his being “caught” in 
shame reactions without being aware of his shame state” (Lewis, 1971:428-429).  
   According to Scheff, a similar spiral which traps the individual may arise out of 
shame’s relation with anger: the “shame-anger spiral” consists of being made to 
feel ashamed, then feeling angry that one (is made to) feel ashamed. He discusses 
them as a ‘loop’ “which is usually experienced as though it were a single affect, 
“helpless anger”, or, in a more intense form, “humiliated fury”” (Scheff, 2004:396). 
These are terms that Scheff borrowed from Lewis (1971), who also stressed the 
relationship between shame and anger, claiming that a current of aggression 
against the self and the other follows an episode of shame (Lewis, 1971:427).  
   Scheff’s thinking extends to include what he terms triple shame-anger spirals. 
When one feels accepted and a sense of belonging, the author claims, the 
background noise that person hears is that of pride. “However, when there is a real 
and/or imagined rejection on one or both sides (withdrawal, criticism, insult, 
defeat, etc.) the deference-emotion system may show a malign form, a chain 
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reaction of shame and anger between and within the interactants […] I refer to such 
explosions as triple spirals of shame and anger (one spiral within each party and 
one between them) […] The unlimited fury of shame/rage in a triple spiral may 
explain why social influence can be experienced as absolutely compelling” (Scheff, 
2004:397). This process, the authors argue, shows that one’s past experiences leave 
an emotional residue in one which surfaces whenever a similar experience in 
encountered, albeit in a non-conscious and often non-traceable form (like Clough’s 
‘affect’ and Cromby and Willis’ ‘feeling’).  
    Given that triple spirals involve a spiral within each of the two parties along with 
one between them, I posit that it is difficult to explore and flesh them out when 
interviewing only one of the two parties. The interviewee will present their version 
of the events and this only reflects their own, personal understanding. 
Nevertheless, there are three instances in the data which come very close to 
presenting a fully-formed triple spiral and these will be addressed accordingly 
(however it is worth remembering that even in these instances it is my own 
interpretation of what a participant says about the other person that leads me to 
envision this triple spiral).  
   The vignette that opens Burkitt’s 2014 book “Emotions and Social Relations” can 
be seen as a case of shame-anger spiral. A working-class man boards the train to 
find an upper-class woman sitting on the seat that was assigned to his wife. After 
the woman’s initial refusal to give up the seat he broke into a fit of rage, physically 
and verbally assaulting her. According to his interpretation of the event, what 
infuriated him was not primarily what the woman had done, but her social status 
that accompanied that action: in his head he had been put down by the upper class 
all his life and this was just another incident in this process of humiliating him. 
Therefore, his reaction was targeted to all the upper-class people who had made 
him feel ashamed for his social standing throughout the years, not this woman in 
particular.    
    Shame therefore seems to be strongly linked to anger and for this reason it will 
be addressed in this study as the intrapersonal ‘feeling trap’ and the internal ‘chain-
reaction’ between anger and shame as it is presented in the participants’ accounts 
of their own experience.  
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    Anger, then, can be described as an emotion the roots of which are found in the 
survival and prosperity of the individual, but the branches of which are informed by 
the social fabric one operates in. One’s perception of the relation between oneself 
and others within a social network can give rise to anger, both when one feels that 
others break the accepted social norms and conventions; and when one feels that 
others feel that s/he break these norms and conventions.  
 
 
1.4.2: The Physiological Changes During Anger 
   As a discrete emotion, anger produces changes in cognitive, judgment, 
experiential, behavioural and physiological outcomes. (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 
2011:passim). The cognitive, judgment, behavioural and physiological changes 
associated with anger have been explored in depth. Here I will present basic 
findings from research on changes in Physiology, since it is very relevant to the 
present study’s scope: By locating the physiological, automatic changes anger 
brings about, the phenomenon can be more rigorously grounded and framed, thus 
providing a backdrop against which the individual experience of the emotion can 
be tested. As Smith writes:  
“For IPA, the body and its perception may provide an excellent crucible for 
research. While recognising the gap which can exist between an object and 
the individual’s perception of it, a phenomenological researcher may indeed 
be interested in elucidating the nature of that gap. Therefore, the existence of 
real entities such as bodies and illnesses provides a useful background against 
which to compare different accounts of physical processes. So a 
phenomenologist may choose to focus on the way two people may speak very 
differently about what is ostensibly, and medically categorized as, the 
equivalent illness precisely because of the light that may shed on the 
subjective perceptual processes which are operating in the person’s 
interpretation of their health status […] While IPA may perceive the nature of 
the links in a particular way, it shares with the social-cognitive paradigm a 
belief in and concern with, the chain of connection between account, 
cognition and physical state.” (Smith, 1996:265) 
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   The evidence so far discusses how the person responds to the stimulus that has 
brought about the emotion. However, “in addition to feelings towards are feelings 
of bodily changes, that sense of ‘what it is like’ bodily to experience an emotion” 
(Eatough and Smith, 2006a:485). When experiencing anger, blood flow to the arms 
and hands increases (in Ekman & Cordaro, 2011:368), while the facial expressions 
that accompany the emotion are perceived as similar to other approach-motivated 
states such as determination (in Gable, Poole & Harmon-Jones, 2015:165).    
   More importantly, the shift from parasympathetic Autonomic Nervous System 
(ANS) to sympathetic ANS during anger episodes has been extensively documented 
(e.g. Guyton & Hall, p.706). This maps onto the shift from a calm and undistracted 
mode of existence to an aroused and alert one. Therefore the sympathetic ANS is 
often termed the ‘flight or fight’ mechanism of human physiology: it pushes 
persons to a state where they have to hunt down a prey; or a state they either have 
to confront a danger or flee from it; it orients the person towards a threatening 
stimulus. Psychophysiological studies have demonstrated that the evocation of 
anger coincides with excitation of the sympathetic nervous system, and that there 
is a direct relationship between the intensity of anger and the propensity to act out 
aggression. (Averill, 1982; Zillmann, 1988, in Eatough & Smith, 2006:495). 
Interestingly therefore, changes in physiology have been shown to significantly 
correlate with changes in cognition, behaviour, and self-reported experience 
(Lench, Flores & Bench, 2011:844). So it is very hard to have any one of these 
isolated.  
   Not much is known about the experience of anger in humans, however; about the 
phenomenology of anger. This issue has been raised in recent years (e.g. Fischer 
and Jansz, 2008: 166; Genuchi and Valdez, 2015:15013; Barber, 2018:332); and the 
study of the experience of anger seems to be welcome as a complementary factor 
to anger theorizing in general.  
 
                                                          
13 “Additional research in this area focusing on the relationships between masculine role norms, the 
internal experience of anger, expressed anger, and depressive symptoms in men will likely provide 
further clarification regarding the nature of anger as a component of atypical depression in men.” 
(Genuchi and Valdez, 2015:150) 
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1.5 PHENOMENOLOGY  
   When a person attempts to understand what it is that made him/her feel that 
way, they do not investigate the emotion but their experience of the emotion: how 
the emotion appeared to them. This appearance is what can be termed 
“phenomenon”. “Modern phenomenological psychology… is the study of 
consciousness and experience, an individual’s perception of the world being the 
crucial aspect of psychological investigation” (Strongman, 1996:15). 
‘Phenomenology’ is a complex word, brought about by the combination of “logos” 
(i.e. to understand and to put into words) and phenomenon (i.e. how something 
appears to someone). In other words, it is concerned with how one makes sense of 
the world as the world appears to one; but also with how one communicates this 
understanding.14  
   For this study Phenomenology is at the same time a philosophical worldview, a 
method of inquiry, and a way of understanding emotion. 
   The scope of phenomenological psychology is empirical; this word, however, in 
contrast to the way it is used by behaviourists and positivists of all kinds, here 
stands for “of experience”. In other words, phenomenology seeks to make sense of 
how one understands his or her own experiences. According to the 
phenomenological viewpoint, “self and world are inseparable components of 
meaning” (Moustakas, 1994:28). This is termed intentionality within the 
phenomenological paradigm, and means that “the appearance of an object as a 
perceptual phenomenon varies depending on the perceiver’s location and context, 
angle of perception and, importantly, the perceiver’s mental orientation (e.g. 
desires, wishes, judgements, emotions, aims and purposes)” (Willig, 2008:52).  
   Moustakas follows up on this, writing that “thus the act of consciousness and the 
object of consciousness are intentionally related” (Moustakas, 1994:28). In other 
words, what the person brings into their perception of the world is as important as 
what the world puts in front of the person for them to perceive. This relation is also 
captured in the framework of intentionality by the terms noema and noesis. Noema 
is the way the object appears to the individual; not the object itself, but its 
                                                          
14 In a completely different field of knowledge, vision science, phenomenology (or rather, 
phenomenological experience) is considered “the defining characteristic, the necessary and 
sufficient condition, for attributing consciousness to something” (Palmer, 1999:627). 
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phenomenon. Noesis is the act of perceiving, of endowing with meaning and of 
revealing further layers of meaning as a result of this.  
   Much of the understanding gained in phenomenological research in psychology 
comes from introspection (see Strongman’s description of James’ methods, p.14-
16). Husserl distinguished between 3 discrete stages in one’s attempt to gain 
understanding with this method, and later theorists have honoured them: epoche 
(one’s suspension of presuppositions and presumptions, judgments and 
interpretations in order to become fully aware of what is actually before him/her), 
phenomenological reduction (the presentation of the phenomenon in its totality, 
including the obvious and ‘objective’ facts as well as the resonance it has with us 
and the experience it generates), and imaginative variation (the attempt to 
understand how the phenomenon, and our approach to it, came into being). (see 
Willig, 2008:53; also Moustakas, 1994 ch. 5).  
   What this process describes is a movement away from the excitement of the 
moment into a calmer and more focused approach to the relationship between the 
person and the stimulus that brought about the experience. The common, everyday 
perception of the stimulus does not vanish, but through these stages the individual 
takes steps back to ‘bracket’ the emotion and “try and establish what is at the core 
of the subjective experience” (Smith, Flowers and Larkin; 2009:14)  
   Emotions in phenomenological research, then, are the interpretations people give 
to their lived experiences of physiological arousal and cognitive activation towards 
a stimulus which has special meaning within the context of their personal history. 
The emotional reaction/activation is closer to what Husserl termed “essence”, 
while the phenomenon is the interpretation brought about by intentionality and 
bracketing.     
    Consequently, from the present study’s phenomenological perspective (and 
combined with the cognitive theories discussed above), emotions are changes that 
someone detects when comparing his/her calm (baseline) way of being to the 
excitation of the moment. Then s/he gives them a name s/he has learnt from 
his/her environment. In the process, actions like locating the source of that 
emotion; attributing the change to that source; and appraising the situation to 
make it fit one’s life-story, to understand its significance and to decide his/her 
future (immediate or not) course of action all come together to colour the 
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construction (or reconstruction) of that emotional experience in his/her head. As 
such, it calls for a research paradigm that does not look for objective scores (e.g. 
absolute values in skin conductance or an inter-researcher reliability in classifying 
facial expressions) but rather aims to explore the subjective value this experience 
has for someone: how is it that someone understands and presents this experience 
and are the factors that lead to that?  
   Based on what I have written above, I need to reiterate that emotions can be 
defined in a number of different ways. For the present study I follow a definition of 
emotion informed by Wetherell: “[…] a relation to others, a response to the 
situation and to the world. An emotion is above all a relational pattern and as such 
is automatically distributed and located across the psychological field” (Wetherell, 
2012:24). This is very similar to that proposed by Ian Burkitt in his 2014 text 
“Emotions and Social Relations”: embodied patterns of relation that take on special 
significance when represented in language. Burkitt’s definition of emotion unfolds 
based on what the Oxford English Dictionary defines as a “strong feeling deriving 
from one's circumstances, mood, or relationships with others”.  As Burkitt stresses, 
there are four different components in this definition.  
    First, “emotion” is a process that is triggered in the body based on automatic 
detection of internal or external stimuli. However, it is important to stress here that 
when I am referring to an automatic detection in the body I am thinking of an all-
encompassing version of the body, including skin, bones, glands, organs, arteries as 
well as neural circuits beyond awareness (not limited to what Freud called the 
unconscious), highly indebted to Wetherell’s 2012 (pp.54-64) description.  
   After this initial pre-reflective stage (which nevertheless includes body and brain) 
has been accomplished, the individual reflects on his/her bodily reaction and names 
it with the socially appropriate term15; what his/her culture has defined as a term 
for this reaction. In order to accomplish this second stage, the individual needs to 
draw on the other three components of the OED definition. What were the 
circumstances that led to that reaction? What was the mood of the person during 
that reaction – and how has it changed since? And finally, what is his/her 
relationship with the persons who instigated the emotion – and with others 
                                                          
15 Or someone else who is present will name it for them, e.g. “You shouldn’t get this 
angry”.  
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present? The first addresses the question of “what happened?” – what was the 
change in circumstances that brought about this feeling? The second relates to the 
interpretation the person gives to the feeling. Their mood prior to the event that 
gave rise to the feeling will colour their interpretation of the feeling. For example, 
if someone is in a bad mood and someone bumps on them in the street they might 
interpret it as one instance in a long story of people’s indifference towards them, 
whereas if they are in a good mood they might interpret it as an instance where the 
other person was careless. Additionally, one’s monitoring of mood change before 
and after the event orients him/her to an identification of the feeling towards 
something that could explain this shift in mood. Finally, the relationship one has 
with those involved in the event comes into the discussion. What had they come to 
expect from these others, and how do they feel their reaction is received by the 
other?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
CHAPTER 2: PREVIOUS STUDIES ON THE EXPLORATION OF THE 
EXPERIENCE OF ANGER 
 
   Few studies throughout the years have focused on the phenomenological 
understanding of the experience of anger. E.L. Stevick’s seminal study came in 
1971, followed by Averill’s collection of 1982 studies (published as a tome titled 
“Anger and Aggression: an essay on emotion”) and his 1983 paper “Studies on 
Anger and Aggression”. After that, it took twenty years for the first study of anger’s 
experience in men to surface – S. P. Thomas’ “Men’s Anger: a phenomenological 
exploration of its meaning in a middle-class sample of American men”, to be 
followed by 15 years of silence on that front. As the present study was drawing to 
a close, a new paper (Barber, 2018) appeared. Besides these, the way anger is 
experienced in men’s everyday life remains largely unexplored in psychology. In this 
section I discuss how the above studies relate to the present one, while also 
discussing three papers by Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis researchers 
(Eatough, Smith and Shaw, 2008; Eatough and Smith, 2006a; Eatough and Smith, 
2006b) although they study the experience of anger in women, as they provide the 
main analytical method I use for the exploration of this topic.   
     I will start the examination of previous literature with the studies of Eatough and 
Smith and Eatough, Smith and Shaw, as their method of phenomenological analysis 
is the same one I use in my study and closer to the interpretative (in contrast to 
descriptive) phenomenology. In their two 2006 papers, Eatough & Smith take an 
Interpretative phenomenological approach to analysing a woman’s (code name 
Marilyn) interview about her anger. The interview is led by the female author of the 
papers (Eatough), and together they then engage in hermeneutic circle of what 
anger means for Marilyn, how it makes her feel about herself and what impact it 
has on her life and relationships (e.g. with her mother and son). Expanding on that 
case-study, Eatough and Smith teamed up with Rachel Shaw in 2008 to carry out an 
IPA study on a larger sample. Five women participated in that study, exploring their 
experiences of anger, which the authors then present through the prism of the 
hermeneutic circle employed in IPA.    
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    Eatough and Smith’s (and Shaw’s) studies are fine-tuned IPA explorations. 
However, these authors studied women and that in itself sets up a very different 
context of understanding and expressing the experience, as we shall see a few 
pages further down. Moreover, my study complements the IPA analysis with a 
Discourse Analysis of the same data, making more pronounced the symbolic-
interactionist dimension of the narratives as produced and understood. 
   E.L. Stevick presents a phenomenological study of anger, albeit much closer to 
descriptive phenomenology. She focuses on “how anger is experienced and 
distinguished, the types of situations out of which it arises, its distinguishing 
behavioral and experiential constituents” (1971:135). So, essentially, she follows a 
phenomenological method to use people’s everyday experience of anger as a route 
to defining what the emotion itself is.  This is in contrast to what I pursue in the 
present study and somewhat clashes with the ontological orientation of the present 
study. The clash arises from the fact that Stevick’s study views anger as something 
fixed, a passion that attacks different people in the same way. I use previous 
findings of psychological research to construct what anger is and to use it as a 
background against which individual experiences of it can be understood. The main 
symptoms might be the same, because there is such a ‘thing’ called anger that 
people can recognize in themselves and in others with high accuracy. However, the 
way each person relates to his/her experience of that emotional state can be very 
different to how every other person relates to it. Besides that, her sample is 
composed of women exclusively, which creates very different implications for the 
expression of the emotion as we shall see in the next chapter. Moreover, the 
participants were teenagers (and therefore with a much different outlook on the 
world than adults) and people the researcher was already acquainted with – former 
pupils or friends of hers. Therefore, the way they answered the questions and the 
amount of detail they revealed about that stigmatized emotional state might be 
affected by their relationship with the researcher.       
   The above studies’ samples were women and that alone creates a much different 
set of understandings of anger, aggression and their expression than men. Even 
though the present study can be compared to these in an effort to gain an 
understanding of anger as a pan-human phenomenon (and indeed, the results they 
brought up are similar to the ones here), studying the way men make sense of, and 
present, their experiences comes with a different set of behavioural and mental 
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patterns, largely shaped by the social dimension of anger judgments and 
expressions (see the section on “Why Men?” in the next chapter “The Present 
Study” for more details on the gendered dimensions of anger).  
   Moving on to explorations of men’s anger, Thomas (2003) embarks on an eidetic 
phenomenological study. Her methods of data collection and analysis are very close 
to IPA, although she does not acknowledge the methodology (presumably, IPA was 
not something she had heard of in 2003). The difference between analytic methods 
in her study and mine brings forth a great advantage of IPA. By engaging in the 
hermeneutic circle, the researcher has the opportunity attend to the phenomena 
mentioned by the participant by moving between the researcher’s and the 
participant’s point of view on several turns, and thus get to a deeper level of 
understanding what the participant presented but also how the researcher 
interpreted it. The richness of the analysis increases, therefore, as does the 
analytical rigor. Relevant to the point made about IPA in contrast to eidetic 
phenomenology, we shall see in the following chapters that despite Thomas’ study 
having almost twice the participants (19) the present study employed, the themes 
produced do not address the social and mutual construction of meaning – rather, 
they stay on a surface level of ‘photographing’ the phenomenon offered in the 
participants’ accounts. Thomas places great emphasis on the metaphors and other 
linguistic devices employed by the participants to describe their experiences of 
anger, thus hinting at the importance of discourse analysis. She does not, however, 
carry out a full analysis of this sort. When discussing her results, Thomas compares 
and contrasts the way men produce their accounts to the way women do; thus she 
uses her study to shed light on gender differences in the expression of anger, rather 
than studying the experience of the emotion by men in depth.  
    Barber’s 2018 study is very close to the current one in design and scope. He 
focuses on six men living in London and the way they experience anger. Barber’s 
study utilizes a context very similar to mine (London-based male adults). His 
approach however, although phenomenological is somewhat brief, not different 
from what Guest, McQueen and Namey (2014) term a ‘brief and focused analysis’: 
a short analysis that produces results useful for an immediate improvement of 
services, but does not offer a rich and detailed exploration of the phenomenon. 
Barber’s questions are informed by his engagement with theoretical perspectives, 
and it is these questions that guide his phenomenological exploration of the 
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emotion. These questions, as they are formulated, are much closer to what a 
therapist seeks for the betterment of his/her patients – he stresses that in order to 
be eligible for participation, people had to present their anger as “’problematic’ and 
impacting on their world” (p.335). He therefore has a fairly narrow focus on what 
the experience might be like. Accordingly, his main focus is therapeutic: how can 
men control their anger better? My focus, on the other hand, is one of exploration 
of the effects this emotional experience has on the way we see ourselves. By 
extension, my questions were designed so as to allow participants to bring what 
they considered important in the discussion – not what previous literature has 
designated as important. Moreover, my approach to the study hails the discourses 
drawn upon by the participants to address their experience as of equal importance 
to their exploration of that experience: in fact, I claim that without these discourses, 
that exploration (if not the experience itself) would be very different. Barber’s 
theoretical background which informs his questions is informed by the discourses 
developed by previous studies to address the emotion – but he does not 
acknowledge it or work with it in his paper.  
 
    The present study takes an Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis perspective 
which is however coupled with methods from Discourse Analysis and Thematic 
Analysis, in order to explore the phenomenology of anger and how it is expressed. 
The main focus is on the way anger is experienced and understood by people; what 
it links to; and how it can be talked about. The focus of the analysis lies primarily on 
the feelings and thoughts during the experiences themselves and the consequences 
these had for the participant. The linguistic and discursive resources one draws on 
to express these emotions are also of vital importance for the study, however; 
anger is often expressed as a story which involve the person and his/her respective 
ingroups and outgroups (along with the stereotypes that go with them) (see Beck, 
1999:20-40 passim), which provides the grounds for exploration of how these 
entities are constructed in the accounts.  
     
   Furthering the social constructionist ties of IPA, my study brings a discourse 
analysis perspective to the table – and that largely differentiates it from previous 
studies in the field.  Barber’s paper emphasizes the societal manifestations of anger 
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by exploring the rates of violent crimes, and Eatough & Smith emphasize the 
cultural “appropriateness” of anger as addressed by their participant. However, my 
approach is quite different. Given that the definition, identification, and 
appropriate expression of anger are largely social constructs within each culture I 
see how the participants utilize these constructs as discourses that allow a way-of-
seeing and a way-of-being that permits for a uniquely individual description within 
the socially acceptable framework. Furthermore, I look at how they address this 
description to me within the interactional setting; what techniques do they use to 
flesh out the experience and to accomplish a self-presentation they are happy with? 
 
   Averill’s studies and thinking have influenced me greatly – and methodologically 
I by-and-large follow his steps. Working within a constructionist framework to the 
theory of emotions, I (like he) look at how emotions can be conceptualized before 
tackling the issue of how they are experienced. However, our methods of 
approaching the topic are different. For example, in his 1983 paper, he did not 
interview participants; instead, he gave them surveys to fill-out and asked them to 
write about one instance that made them angry. This creates very different 
implications than my face-to-face, one-on-one interviewing strategy. By being in a 
room with the participant, I immediately present them someone to address their 
experiences to. In Averill’s study, on the other hand, the participants were in a 
position where they could much more easily imagine they are addressing their 
narrative to whoever they liked – the experimenter, their loved ones, themselves, 
etc. Also, Averill asked them to write about one event that made them angry.  This 
imposes a restriction that in my oral interviews was intentionally avoided: 
participants were encouraged to explore each event in depth, but also to branch 
out to other events in a fashion not dissimilar to psychoanalysts’ free-association 
technique. Finally, interviews were audio-recorded in real-time, so if the 
participants wished to change something they earlier said, they had to manoeuvre 
explicitly around that; Averill’s participants, on the contrary, had the option to scrap 
as many versions of the events as they wished before keeping a final one and 
presenting it to the experimenter. So our different methods of choice constrained 
and liberated the participants’ accounts in different ways, thus shaping the 
accounts themselves and the way the participants attended to the investigation.  
61 
 
   In his 1982 book, Averill takes a social constructionist16 position much like my own 
and, even though not explicitly referring to IPA, the author does cover most of the 
grounds IPA research would cover. What I do differently is that I explicitly 
acknowledge the different ontological, epistemological, and methodological 
assumptions IPA and Discourse Analysis bring with them and then I work with these 
assumptions to see how core approaches can be combined to illuminate different 
aspects of a phenomenon and to complement each-other (Frost, 2011).     
          Averill defines emotions as being interpreted as passions from the person 
experiencing them – something happening to the self, instead of something the self 
does. I think there is great truth in this, because of the unexpected nature of 
emotional reactions. It may not be the whole story since I can, potentially if I want 
to, start bringing back memories that are bound to make me feel sad, angry, 
jealous, happy etc. – or, at least, more sad, angry etc. than I was before bringing 
back these memories. I understand Averill’s position as referring to his concept of 
“true feelings”, ignoring the voluntary side of it mentioned in the previous 
sentence.  
   This interpretation of emotions as passions is based on what Averill (2012) 
presented as five general principles: First, the Physiological, Social and 
Psychological Imperatives, each of which corresponds to a way of reacting to the 
emotion (and hence to an automatic interpretation of the bodily reaction to the 
emotional stimulus). The first is close to what Darwin (and Ekman) wrote about. 
The second is the ways society and culture has instilled in us and are now operating 
as taken-for-granted knowledge. The third is close to the attention-attribution-
appraisal theories as discussed earlier. Then Averill presents two more principles: 
Systemic Conflict and Cognitive Disorganization, which address the person’s 
subsequent reaction to the emotional response (much like what is termed second-
order monitoring). Systemic Conflict refers to the uncomfortable condition of two 
or more of the above imperatives clashing with each other, or with the demands of 
                                                          
16 Averill uses the term “social constructivism” instead. This brings up a tension by today’s 
standards, as constructivism and constructionism refer to two different processes: the former 
illustrates how people construct concepts as thoughts in their heads, whereas the latter refers to 
how people are immersed in concepts that have been constructed by social processes (see Burr 
2015:21 for more details). The term “constructionism” does not appear in Averill’s texts so one 
cannot blame him for confusing the two – it seems more likely that the two were used 
interchangeably when he was conducting his studies. (This brings up an interesting point for the 
Foucauldian notion of genealogy of language which unfortunately falls outside the scope of the 
present study). 
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reality. An example of this might be when one feels jealousy in a situation where 
they are expected to feel pride or happiness (if, say, one’s sibling got engaged the 
same week they themselves were abandoned by their loved one), or in a situation 
where one’s body reacts with disgust but the person wants to carry on engaging in 
the activity (maybe because they see that it brings pleasure to someone they care 
about). “The conflict may then be resolved through a compromise reaction. 
Moreover, if the compromise presents some threat to the integrity of the 
individual, as is frequently the case, the compromise reaction may be “disclaimed” 
(Schafer, 1979), for example, by interpreting it as a passion rather than as an action” 
(Averill, 2012:25). Cognitive disorganization refers to the limitations and 
breakdown of an individual’s self-monitoring. Upon finding oneself unable to 
discern whether the experience of emotion is an action or a passion, one “is 
engulfed in an undifferentiated flood of experience” (Averill, 1998:116). So, for 
example, when one gets angry at someone and they start crying and shouting, they 
further the initial emotion. At the end of that episode, when they reflect back on 
the experience, they will have trouble differentiating where the involuntary 
reaction ended and where the voluntary behaviour began. Averill stresses that this 
is not an all-or-nothing affair, but also underlined that this tends to happen in 
extreme occasions only. 
    Averill’s “Anger and Aggression: an essay on emotion” was published in 1982 
(reprinted in 2012) and is a collection of the author’s papers, covering an extensive 
if not exhaustive area of anger research. Through its 14 chapters (each a different 
paper), Averill takes us through a journey of how anger can be conceptualized (Part 
A) and experienced (Part B). This journey consists of the following steps. First, he 
gives an overview of what he defines as emotion, drawing attention to the 
difference between how emotions are experienced and how they are expressed. 
He summarily touches on the difference between anger and aggression to illustrate 
this.  
   Then he presents the biology behind anger and aggression – how do different 
systems of one’s body come together to form what the individual then experiences 
and understands as anger? How do central neural mechanisms contribute to this 
emotional reaction, and what is the role of expressive reactions?  
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   Following this, the author presents an example of the variation anger and its 
expression can take across cultures. He discusses the cases of “Wild Man Behavior” 
(New Guinea), “Running Amok” (Malaysia), “To Nu” (Brazil) and “Ikari” (Japan). 
These four states represent different reasons why anger rises in individuals and 
different ways it is manifested. Each of the cultures where these appear addresses 
the issue of the emotion itself, its expression, as well as the person feeling and 
expressing it in different ways and with different consequences for the person and 
the community. These range from the elimination of the person (Amok) to his/her 
full re-integration in the community. That chapter highlights the cultural framework 
as an indispensable context for understanding one’s experience and expression of 
an emotion, as well as the community’s response to its (proper or improper) 
expression.  
   Next, Averill presents the way six different philosophers across the centuries have 
attended to the topic of emotion and emotional experience: Plato, Aristotle, 
Seneca, Lactanius, Acquinas and Descartes. Each of them presents a different 
account for where emotions come from, the role of the individual experiencing 
them, and the consequences this has for the understanding of the self. Before 
returning to a synthesis of the above topics in Chapter 6, Averill presents the legal 
side of anger in Chapter 5: how does justice respond to instances of anger, and 
what implications does this have for the understanding of the individual and the 
emotion? In Chapter 6 the author presents different sources that may bring about 
anger, and the way they interact with the individual.  
    The book then turns into Part B. Whereas Part A provided a theoretical 
framework for understanding anger as an evolutionary phenomenon within a 
cultural context, Part B focuses on the experience of anger by the individual. In 
chapters 7-11 Averill touches on issues of anger and its expression from the side of 
the angry person (Targets, Instigations and Motives; Responses and Consequences) 
as well as from the side of the person receiving the angry response. Then he 
proceeds to highlight the differences between anger and annoyance, the temporal 
dimension of anger (how anger surfaces, manifests and dies out) and the 
differences between men and women in the experience and expression of anger.  
    In Part B, Averill explores the subjective experience of anger, much like I do in the 
present study. Even though I am massively influenced by his work and attempt at 
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an all-encompassing scope, there are several differences in our methods, and here 
I will present the main three: First, in his exploration of subjective experience, 
Averill uses self-report methods from a large number of participants who are asked 
to fill-in a questionnaire and self-report scales. This already comes into sharp 
contrast with my methodology, since these questionnaires and scales are already 
designed by the experimenter. The way I opt for the collection of data is one of 
semi-structured interviews, where participants are called to address their 
experiences in their own terms. An immediate consequence of this is that Averill 
aims at a general/broad/panhuman understanding of anger’s manifestations (as 
seen also by the numbers of his participants), whereas I aim at an in-depth 
exploration of how anger meshes with the individual’s self-perception. In other 
words, Averill’s primary focus is the emotion itself, whereas my primary focus is the 
participant.  
   Second, Averill’s subjects are both men and women – and indeed a large part of 
his papers revolves around the differences between the two sexes in the 
experience and expression of the emotion. Instead of researching the way anger 
manifests in the two sexes, I instead focus on one, aiming to offer an in-depth 
analysis of how physiological and social imperatives weave into men’s 
understanding and presentation of their experiences.  
   Third, spurred on by Averill’s stress on cultural and historical contexts, I limit my 
research to individuals living in London at the time of the study – and this 
foregrounds the importance of the situational context in the study: how do 
participants choose to present their experience to a stranger, with whom they only 
share the context of the city and its culture?    
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
CHAPTER 3: THE PRESENT STUDY 
 
   One half of the analysis is focused on the emotional experience of anger itself and 
how it is comprehended by the participant; whereas the other half looks at how the 
participant chooses to talk about the experience. Therefore, I aim to provide an 
interpretative exploration of how anger is experienced while taking into account 
the different ways one can employ to talk about it. I am interested in the similarities 
as much as the differences between the accounts collected, since “qualitative 
methodology was designed expressly to explore the subjective dimension of any 
issue towards which different points-of-view can be expressed” (Sterner, Watts and 
Worrell; 2008:215). 
 
  3.1 Methodology  
   The design of this study is one of pluralistic qualitative research methods. There 
are three main axis of analysis: Thematic Analysis, Discursive Psychology and 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. Each of these is approached in separate 
parts of the analysis. They all come together in the discussion, however, to 
complement each other and thus lead to what Frost (2011) calls complementarity 
and triangulation (which is a very different form of triangulation than that posited 
by quantitative research).  
“Triangulation can offer a more in-depth, multidimensional insight to the 
complexity of the social world. It can generate ‘complementarity’ (Moran-Ellis, 
2006:48) instead of highlighting flaws in measurements. It can ‘reflect 
different aspects of a phenomenon’ (idem), and inform researchers about 
both the phenomenon under study and the research process” (Frost, 2011b:8) 
   By employing this design, I hope to address both the macro- and the micro-level 
of experience that participants bring to the table. The macro-level “acknowledges 
the constructive power of language but sees this as derived from, or at least related 
to, material or social structures, social relations and institutionalized practices”, 
whereas on the micro-level “multiple versions of the world are potentially available 
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through this discursive, constructive work, and there is no sense in which one can 
be said to be more real or true that others” (Burr, 2015:24).  
 
3.1.1: Cultural Data: Collection and Methods of Analysis 
    First, to establish a comprehensible framework of how anger is presented, 
understood and talked about in the English culture, I followed a simple but effective 
procedure: Google-search. 
   Google is an online search-engine that generates results based on a search item. 
This is a word, phrase or any other linguistic item (e.g. acronym, affix etc.) the 
searcher wishes to learn about. When one searches on Google for an item, they are 
presented with a list of choices – the screen displays a handful of items at any given 
time. The search-engine provides links to websites that contain some feature that 
makes them relevant to the search-item – this would often be the search item itself 
found in the website’s text, but it may also be that the website’s designers have 
“tagged” the item in the website’s description without it appearing on the text 
itself. Each website is displayed in the Google-list with a broad title picked by its 
designers to summarize the website (in big blue letters), the electronic address 
where the text was sourced from (in small green letters) and a 2-line peek into what 
the result is about.  
   The results generated are the result of two main processes: the relevance of the 
website to the search-item; and the popularity of the website. In other words, the 
more a website is visited by people who want to find out about a specific search-
item, the higher that website will appear on the Google-list when someone 
searches for that specific item. This creates a number of implications for the way 
information is distributed on the internet and, by extension, about the way the 
internet shapes the population’s exposure to information. Most relevant to this 
study is the following: the more people visit a particular website to find out about 
a search item, the more probable it is that someone searching for that item for the 
first time will visit that particular website, too: of course, the individual will be 
presented with a variety of options, but the more popular websites will appear 
higher on the list and feature more frequently in the list, too. Therefore, once a 
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website has reached a threshold of Google-popularity17 it enters a self-feeding loop 
according to which its information becomes more and more likely to be read by 
people with every search for that particular item. Therefore, although the list is 
initially formed by the users, it then proceeds to form the users’ opinions on what 
is the best source of information. In that way, Google can shape the face of 
knowledge and norms in a society by directing people to a specific source (and 
therefore discursive construction) of information.  
   The process is not as straightforward as this paragraph might make it look; 
instead, Google is guided by a complex algorithm which distinguishes among fine 
details (like, for example, whether the search is performed on a computer or a 
mobile phone) and is also guided by the “filter bubble effect” which ensures that 
the websites one previously-visited will show again, probably higher in the list, with 
each new search by this person; that websites containing similar approaches will 
also appear in the search; and therefore eventually leads to a recycling of 
information of similar political, social etc. orientations.18 This algorithm’s structure, 
function, extent and scope lie far outside my field of knowledge or this thesis’ 
scope. I do posit, however, that this is the most likely way one would try to find out 
about anger (in general or his/her particular anger) and thus, although Google 
cannot be blindly trusted as a methodological tool, it is one of the best indicators 
we have about how anger is represented in this culture. 
    The Google-search was carried out in two steps. For the first one,  my search item 
was “anger” and I filtered the results to “Location: UK only” to ensure that the 
results which were generated are the ones that have been shaped by the searches 
in the United Kingdom alone, excluding any and every other place in the world. The 
procedure was straightforward: I collected the first 100 items that the search 
brought up. This was done to flesh out what people in the UK “google19” about 
                                                          
17 Google-popularity here is defined as the number of times website X is visited when people search 
on Google for item A. 
18 In order to control for this factor, I collected the items in a single search, early in my 
research, from a pc that had not been used for research purposes yet. Given Google’s links 
to other platforms of communication and self-presentation (such as social media and 
phone applications) perhaps this was a futile attempt at objectivity, but I deemed it as a 
methodologically necessary one. 
19 “Google” is the search-engine, whereas “google” is the verb that stands for “using the Google 
search-engine”. 
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anger, as this seems to be a driving factor in the algorithms that guide the search-
engine’s list of results.   
   The results of the Google-search were subjected to Thematic Analysis in order to 
illuminate the topics people look for; the approaches and angles the results offer; 
and how these come together to construct a web of references to guide one’s 
understanding.  
   Then, partly because of my knowledge of the British culture and partly driven by 
the results the Google-search brought up, I turned my focus to Anger Management 
Centres (AMCs). Again, I searched online using the Google engine for these centres. 
My search item was “Anger Management Centre London” and the first 100 results 
were collected, which were from 9 different AMCs based in London.  
   This two-step initial study was designed to illustrate what people in London are 
exposed to when they go online to find answers about (their) anger. Following that, 
the way people themselves talk about, and make sense of the emotion is presented.  
 
3.1.2: Interview Data: Collection and Methods of Analysis 
    The participants’ data were extracted through interviews; semi-structured, one-
to-one interviews conducted face-to-face in a space between the private and the 
public (e.g. a quiet room in a university library). An interview schedule can be found 
in Appendix B. Participants were invited to be interviewed on their experiences of 
anger, revolving around the emotional, cognitive and bodily fluctuations in the 
individual; the individual’s perception of oneself when angry; the role of the other; 
and the participants’ understanding of anger itself. The guiding questions were 
formulated based on the principles of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis: 
open-ended and exploratory questions that allow the interviewees to bring what 
they consider important to the discussion; and open-ended prompts for further 
discussion of points that look like they could be key to the exploration but (or 
perhaps and so) remain relatively untouched by the participants. Spelling out the 
experience in its full detail and/or impact is never an easy thing, especially when 
talking to a stranger, so a gentle push from the interviewer and a reminder that the 
interviewee’s experience is of utmost importance during the interview are designed 
to invite the interviewees to be more open about their experiences.  
69 
 
    The interviews were then transcribed according to the principles and conventions 
of conversational analysis (e.g. Gumperz, 1982) for maximum elaboration on the 
way participants brought out the words and other utterances, although not the full 
range of conversation analytic notations was used, in order to ensure readability 
and to keep the focus firmly on the content of the accounts. This manner of uttering 
words is key for bringing the important parts for the participant to focus, and thus 
guide the subsequent analysis towards the bits where richness of experience is 
plenty. Each word, utterance (e.g. “um”, “eh”), false-start (e.g. “the in-, the 
initial…”), repetition (e.g. “it’s… it’s… it’s a way”) and pause were noted as they all 
contribute to my search for the story-as-formulated during the interview: where 
does the participant feel confident about what they say, and where not? Where do 
they feel they need to rework in their minds the narrative before uttering it? When 
the volume of the voice went up, this was noted with a “*” sign, to indicate where 
the participant placed emphasis. Instances where the participants laughed were 
also recorded, as laughter more often than not colours what is being said (as, e.g., 
ironic) and sheds light on further emotional investment and self-reflection of the 
speaker (e.g. they might be laughing at what they just said because they recognize 
it is not true). Gestures and acts of leaning towards the microphone were also 
recorded, as they are non-verbal signs which carry a lot of interactive meaning, 
either underlying what is being said or standing in place of an utterance. Overlaps 
between the interviewer’s and the interviewee’s utterances were kept to a 
minimal, as I waited until they had fully finished their utterances and then gave a 
further pause of a few seconds before continuing to the next question or prompt. 
When they do occur, though, they are noted with a “/”. These were usually 
instances where the interviewee jumped in while I was still formulating a question 
or prompt, and were thus retained in the transcription to display the urgency and 
passion which shone through at parts of the interview, and thus also works as a hint 
for the emotional investment of the participants. The interviewer’s prompting 
utterances (e.g. “mhm”, “hm”) were also noted in the transcriptions to allow for 
clarity and transparency in the interviewing technique, but were left out of quotes 
that appear in-text for the sake of tidiness. 
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    For the first part of my analysis I employed Discursive Psychology to explore how 
the participants orient their talk during the interaction. The second part shifts to 
IPA to see how the experience is understood. 
   3.2 METHODS 
   Three approaches (Thematic Analysis, DP and IPA) come together in the 
discussion to complement each other pluralistically: Thematic Analysis provides a 
framework of how anger is culturally understood and transmitted in the UK. DP 
reveals how the participants utilize interpretative repertoires to communicate their 
experience and how they choose to orient to that experience within the context of 
the interview. IPA explores how participants make sense of their experiences during 
the interview20.  
 
   3.2.1: Thematic Analysis 
  For this study I carried out a thematic analysis which resembles what Guest, 
McQueen and Namey (2014) call quick and targeted analysis, the purpose of which 
is to “help in the design of a subsequent instrument or other research element” 
(p.11, ch.2). In the case of my study, I aimed to bring up themes that could inform 
the cultural framework in which my participants’ interviews could be understood. 
A theme should represent a conceptual category which can work as an umbrella-
term under which representations of different but similar items can converge and 
be accurately summarized. 
     My corpus included 100 Google-hits and 9 websites from Anger Management 
Centres in London. These were divided into two sets of data (the Google hits on one 
hand and the AMCs’ websites on the other) which were approached differently.  
    For the first set, my interest as a researcher was dual: What is it that people 
google about anger; and how anger is presented in the introductory 2-line sneak-
peek. This sums up the information and general impressions that circulate widely 
among the British public through access to this search-engine. 
                                                          
20 In my view, the interactive context of the interview is extremely important in phenomenological 
methods. How relaxed and safe a participant feels will have a direct impact on his/her exploration of 
his/her experience. 
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    I did not visit any of the websites in the list for a more extensive exploration of 
their contents; instead, I only analysed the 2-line “sneak-peeks”. By focusing 
exclusively on the titles and “sneak-peeks” Google offers, I aimed to get the 
impression that someone who googles “anger” in the UK (on 12 October 2016) 
would get. My approach for this set was therefore inductive and themes were 
identified on a semantic level; I was trying to see what these data have in common 
and how they can be grouped together in themes. I followed the six steps offered 
by Braun and Clarke (2006). I familiarized myself with the data and generated initial 
codes. Then these codes were brought together for me to start forming themes. 
For example a website coded as “damage” and another coded as “help” would be 
brought together because of their conceptual similarity (what would form, for 
example, the theme of “control”). Eventually, if enough codes could be brought 
together, a theme was generated. 
    In other words, my aim was to explain how Anger is conceptualized in Britain’s 
Google-searches through targeting these Google-search items themselves. In 
contrast to classic versions of thematic analysis, where a text would be explored as 
a whole to identify the different themes that arise in it, my analysis started from a 
list of items, all independent and very different from one-another but all relating to 
anger, and the themes I identified are different angles on the topic of anger, each 
of which presents a point of convergence for two or more items.  
  In order to keep the analysis focused and explanatory, I had to decide the depth 
to which I would go for my analysis and whether or not each sneak-peek could be 
used for more than one theme. Websites offer a particular perspective about their 
content and it is hard (maybe even impossible) to talk about a subject (say, “the 
faces of anger”) without bringing in a set of values and ideologies about this subject 
– which will in turn result in a textured approach that reveals more than one 
assumption, evaluation and presupposition about the topic.  
   Given that this is a “quick and targeted” analysis which is meant to inform (but 
not determine) the subsequent different stages of analysis, I decided to strip things 
down to their baselines; I decided to use each Google-hit to correspond to one 
theme only. This limitation had to be imposed in order to avoid conceptual tunnel 
vision: “the overcategorisation of data, assigning more data to one category than 
actually belongs, or seeing or justifying most things as being related to, or 
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considered examples of, the concept being investigated” (Morse and Mitcham, 
2002:30). So, essentially, even though different sides of evaluation are sprinkled all 
over the texts, I posit that there is a core of meaning, the “theme”, which defines 
the text. It was slightly risky methodologically, but since I am the only researcher, I 
had to uncover the meaning for each text independently.  
    This also brought about the necessity to acknowledge that some websites could 
not be included in the analysis, as the themes best used to describe them did not 
amass to a greater theme shared between websites. For example, three of the 
items that appear on the list are news stories that popped up simply because the 
word “anger” was in the title and they were popular because they were in 
circulation at the time. They were very different from one-another however, and 
the best theme they would build up to would be “news stories” – which is not very 
apt as a theme as it does not provide any substantive perspective, evaluation or 
even information to be analysed about anger.   
    For the second data set the same six steps identified by Braun and Clarke (2006) 
were followed, but the approach was framed differently. The themes here were 
generated from my theoretical interest in the area instead of inductively. The first 
step had given rise to a theoretical question which was “how do experts in the topic 
of anger construct the topic?”. I visited each of the nine websites and looked for 
the ways they present anger and the angry person, as well as the way they present 
themselves. Therefore, instead of focusing on semantics alone, this part of the 
analysis was aimed at the latent content of the websites. As such, the second step 
of the thematic analysis comes largely from a constructionist paradigm, “where 
broader assumptions, structures and/or meanings are theorized as underpinning 
what is actually articulated in the data” (Braun and Clarke, 2006:85). 
    Taken together, the two steps (of Google-hits’ inductive analysis and of AMCs’ 
constructionist analysis) form a small, self-sufficient study which starts from an 
exploration of what Google presents as anger in Britain and moves to an 
investigation of how anger experts theorize the emotion. This study was designed 
to  provide a context both for the (loose) structure of the interviews and for their 
analysis, since my assumption is that the information, perspectives and discourses 
people are exposed to somehow inform them about how they ought to attend to 
their anger. 
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3.2.2: Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis  
   Phenomenology can best be seen as philosophy with many different branches, 
approaches and angles (Willig, 2008:71; see also Giorgi and Giorgi, 2008:165). 
There are however two main strands of phenomenological psychology: descriptive 
phenomenology and interpretative phenomenology. The present study follows the 
second strand, with what Schleiermacher (1998) termed the hermeneutic circle: a 
circular movement for the researcher from his/her presupposition to interpretation 
and back again. This strand has been developed in the last two decades into the 
method called Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) (see Smith, 1996; 
Smith, 2011; Smith and Eatough, 2006; Smith and Osborn, 2004; Smith, Flowers and 
Larking, 2009).   
   Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) was developed as a means to 
study lived experience and its significance for the person. Its two main axes are 
Phenomenology (see above) and Interpretation. The researcher employs the 
hermeneutic circle to establish a link between the two. By employing the 
hermeneutic circle, the researcher tries to make sense of the participant trying to 
make sense of the experience. The participant, in other words, engages with the 
interpretation of the phenomenon, while the researcher engages with the 
interpretation of the participant’s interpretation. The whole and the parts are 
equally important in IPA, as the whole illuminates each part and each part 
contributes towards an understanding of the whole. 
   IPA research is usually conducted in face-to-face settings, where the participant 
is invited to talk about his/her experience of a phenomenon. Popular applications 
have been found in health psychology with researchers investigating the 
experience of pain (e.g. Smith and Osborn, 2007); sexual practices (e.g. Flowers, 
Duncan and Knussen, 2003; Lavie and Willig, 2005); or addiction and recovery 
(Penny, Newton and Larkin, 2009). IPA is exploratory and idiographic. In contrast to 
the vast majority of psychological research, IPA does not look to be nomothetic, to 
come up with rules that may neatly explain the bulk of the studied phenomena. 
Instead, it focuses on the personal take of each participant, highlighting the way 
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that participant presents the phenomenon and drawing attention to the similarities 
as well as the differences between participants’ accounts.   
   IPA is guided by rigorous methodical and theoretical underpinnings, and these 
were followed for this study’s design and analysis (Smith, Flowers and Larkin; 
2009:79-107 passim). I started with the way the interviews were conducted: semi-
structured, one-on-one face-to-face interviews with open-ended, exploratory 
questions that allow the participants to bring what they consider important to the 
conversation; and prompts that invite them to dig deeper into the account they 
have given me. Following the verbatim transcription, each interview was read and 
re-read in order to familiarize myself with the data. This was accompanied by the 
step of initial noting, where I made notes on the parts of the accounts that 
immediately struck me as important, to help me formulate a clear idea of how each 
interview unfolds. These included descriptive, linguistic and conceptual comments. 
Based on the first two steps, emergent themes were developed. The aim here was 
to reduce the volume of the material while maintaining complexity. Following that, 
I searched for connections across the emergent themes. By abstracting the gist of 
what the participant says, contextualizing his responses, locating polar opposites in 
his narrative, gauging the frequency with which themes appear in the narrative and 
paying attention to the function each theme serves, different themes from 
different parts of the interview come together to form super-ordinate themes; 
large-scale themes which bring several minor themes under the same roof and 
further allow to reduce the volume of the material, while at the same time 
elaborating on the complexity of the themes.  
    This process was followed for each participant separately. Following that, I 
looked for patterns across cases: the most potent themes and the way theme in 
one participant illuminate themes from another participant were the driving factors 
here, in an effort to locate and explore the key features the participants’ accounts 
have in common. Then a table was formed, displaying how many of the participants 
touch on each theme (see Appendix C). 
   In IPA research, as the object of inquiry shifts from the researcher’s understanding 
of his/her own experience to understanding the experience of a research 
participant, so does the way of attending to the phenomenon change: “the 
research participant’s account becomes the phenomenon with which the 
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researcher engages” (Willig, 2008:54). That is because the researcher 
acknowledges that there is neither a direct access to the other person’s experience, 
nor a way for that person to suspend all presuppositions and presumptions about 
what it is that they experienced. The experience for that person, then, becomes 
what the researcher explores. In that exploration, the researcher must 
acknowledge his/her own contribution in shaping that particular account of the 
experience (what is termed reflexivity) and must instead try to bracket the 
phenomenon – to try and “engage in a critical examination of his or her customary 
ways of knowing (about) it” (Willig, 2008:54). 
   The researcher has to suspend all prior beliefs s/he holds about the topic of their 
research and rather listen to what the participants have to bring to the table. At the 
same time, the researcher needs to assume a role similar to what Moustakas 
(1994:39) describes as “enhancer of identity”: s/he must make the participant feel 
secure and relaxed enough to explore his/her experiences and expose them to the 
researcher; assure them that what they have to say in the present context is what 
the researcher takes most interest in; and help them in their process of deciphering 
the meaning of their experiences.  
   The participant, in turn, must be presumed to take part in the study because they 
are willing to follow the steps of phenomenological reduction (and thus become 
engaged in a phenomenological analysis of their own experience): suspend how 
they feel now about the events discussed and try to remember and describe in as 
much detail as possible how they felt when it happened; understand how their prior 
experiences shaped the ones under discussion; and understand how the experience 
came into being in the way it did.  
  “Phenomenology is the first method of knowledge because it begins with 
“things themselves”; it is also the final court of appeal. Phenomenology, step 
by step, attempts to eliminate everything that represents a prejudgment, 
setting aside presuppositions, and reaching a transcendental state of 
freshness and openness, a readiness to see in an unfettered way, not 
threatened by the customs, beliefs, and prejudices of normal science, by the 
habits of the natural world or by knowledge based on unreflected everyday 
experience.” (Moustakas, 1994:41)    
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    But this may actually be too much to ask of people. Even the seasoned 
researcher, rigorously trained in phenomenology’s grounds, with great skill for 
introspection, is still a human who has grown up among, and has been taught by, 
other humans. He or she might think they have reached this transcendental state 
when reflecting on a “thing itself”, but one can always argue that this is still a 
‘distorted’ view of the state and of the thing, largely informed by what they have 
come to identify as transcendental through these long years of immersion into a 
culture. Imagine asking a participant who is taking part in a university study to reach 
this state within the few hours of interviewing! This brings up the challenge 
Heidegger posed to Husserl’s thinking: namely, that description is interpretation 
(Giorgi and Giorgi, 2008:167). It would be fairly easy for anyone at any time to 
provide a factual description of their experiences. What they are really called to do, 
though, is to provide an interpretation for their experience – and this seems to 
address higher mental activities.     
   The researcher then has to try and get in the participant’s shoes both in the time 
of the event and in the time of the interview/research. The researcher has to try 
and understand why the participant now speaks about the event that took place 
then in the way s/he does and what importance and influence it had in their life. All 
this without any claim to an objective understanding of the experience either, since 
there is no direct window to someone’s reliving of that experience in their minds.  
   Setting and interlocutors are also important in IPA. The researcher acknowledges 
that his/her understanding and ideology, orientation, and prior assumptions all 
factor in to how s/he will interpret the participant’s input. This is where social 
constructionism and symbolic interactionism can provide a solid ground for 
reflection on why things present themselves the way they do: an investigation of 
how and why things are presented and what actions of self-presentation are 
accomplished through that construction.  
   IPA has strong links to symbolic interactionism (Smith et al. 2009:194). These links 
are mostly along the lines of theory, epistemology and ontologies. IPA is partly 
influenced by symbolic interactionism. “Symbolic interactionism provides a 
theoretical perspective with basic assumptions that people act on the basis of the 
meanings that things have for them and that meanings emerge in the process of 
social interaction between people” (Shinebourne, 2011:44; see also Denzin, 
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1995:43-47 passim). At this stage, the analytical procedure shifts its focus from the 
empiricist to the constructionist, since the topic is approached as a construction of 
the experience into a narrative that is produced to be communicated. The 
originators of IPA strongly emphasize its focus on linguistic devices available to, and 
utilized by, the individual to bring forth his/her experiences.    
    An understanding of the main theoretical (and methodological) underpinnings of 
symbolic interactionism, as presented by Denzin (1995:43-44) will help illuminate 
the origins of IPA and its take on phenomenology. 
   Denzin presents 7 key points for symbolic interactionist thought (and action). 
First, interactionists see society as “a framework for the construction of diverse 
forms of social action” and they study “how people produce their situated versions 
of society” (1995:44). Second, they examine how people “do things together” 
(1995:44) – i.e. how everything is culturally grounded, shaped and interpreted. 
Third, interactionists “like texts which express an immediacy of experience, 
unmediated by the social scientist’s interpretations” (1995:44) – they like to stay 
close to what the participants bring to the table and explore it from the participant’s 
side. Fourth, interactionists understand “that their texts create the subject matter 
they write about” (1995:44) and that no imported model from other disciplines can 
fit the lived experience of a person. Fifth, interactionists “study the micro-power 
relations that structure the daily performances of race, ethnicity, gender and class 
in interactional situations” (1995:44). Sixth, interactionists focus on “biographies 
and lived experiences of interacting individuals… the stories people tell one another 
about their life experiences” (1995:44). Finally, interactionists ask “how” instead of 
“why” (1995:45). Therefore the seven points of Denzin can be crystalized to a 
methodological view that privileges the case study and the idiographic approach. 
They focus on how a person, living in a particular society at a particular time, coming 
into the communicative practice with a history/biography, utilizes linguistic, 
cultural and other symbolic resources available in order to present a version of 
his/her experiences, the way s/he understands the phenomena under examination. 
The researcher then engages in an analysis of the account produced by the 
participant, with special focus on the participant’s way of presenting the case, the 
case itself, and the way it is being constructed for presentation within that 
particular interactive setting.  
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   These fit in nicely with IPA’s orientation to idiographic, exploratory enterprises, 
utilizing the hermeneutic circle. Essentially, researcher and participant engage in a 
mutual attempt to understand the subjective experience of the phenomenon under 
investigation. An acknowledgement of symbolic interactionism also opens up the 
possibility for a fruitful dialogue between IPA and Discursive Psychology since they 
place the development of the hermeneutic circle within the interactional context.  
 
 
3.2.3: Discursive Psychology 
   For this study I employ Discursive Psychology (DP), in order to explore what it is 
that the participants do with their language during the interview: how do they 
construct themselves and the situation and what implications does this create 
about the way I am expected to interpret it? How does, what is said, justify or 
excuse the participants’ actions, thoughts and behaviours? 
   DP is concerned with how people accomplish actions through their speech. It 
focuses on how, through their linguistic and discursive choices when giving 
accounts of phenomena, they create implications for the way they see the world, 
the way they exist in it, and the way they relate to others. Through their discursive 
constructions people create excuses, offer justifications, make accusations, give 
praise etc. “Instead of cognitive entities and processes being the principal analytic 
resource, as they are in mainstream psychological research, they are approached 
empirically as participants’ ways of talking. The focus is on the way cognitions are 
constructed in talk, and how their implications are oriented to” (Edwards, 2001:3) 
  DP highlights three core approaches to discourse. First, that discourse is both 
constructed and constructive. In order to express themselves, people draw from a 
well of already established repertoires within a culture. At the same time, they can 
be inventive and original with their use of these repertoires in order to give rise to 
new meanings and ways of being and seeing the world. Second, that discourse is 
action oriented. People use these repertoires precisely because they want to be 
understood in a certain way by their interlocutors. Third, discourse is situated in 
time and space; in an interactional setting; and rhetorically. In other words, what is 
said can be understood according to what came before and after, according to the 
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identity/role the speaker enacts (e.g. a medical doctor in a hospital or a patient in 
the hospital) and in relation to what it counters: alternative constructions of events 
are thus used to manage attempts (real or potential) to counter them (Potter, 
2012:119). “Thus, to understand discourse fully, one must examine it in situ, as it 
happens, bound up with its situational context” because “people construct versions 
of the world that have implications for their own dispositions and thoughts; and 
they construct versions of that psychological stuff to have implications for actions 
and events in the world” (Wiggins and Potter, 2008:77).  
      A vital tool in conducting DP is the “interpretative repertoire”: “a lexicon or 
register of terms and metaphors drawn upon to characterize and evaluate actions 
and events” (Potter and Wetherell, 1987:138). Interpretative repertoires do a 
similar explanatory work as social representations, which are “dynamic models of 
the interrelations of schema and experience. They are group representations which 
allow communication between individuals about internal or abstract experiences 
and concepts” (Campbell and Muncher, 1987:489). An interpretative repertoire can 
be conceptualized as “a cluster of terms, categories and idioms that are closely 
conceptually organized. In most cases, interpretative repertoires are identified by 
analysing a set of open ended interviews in which participants address a set of 
different themes” (Potter, 2012:114).  
   An advantage of interpretative repertoires over social representations is the idea 
that rather than make the unlikely assumption that all the people who use them 
are members of the same social group, “it is much more fruitful to accept that 
repertoires are available to people with many different group memberships, and 
patterns of accounting may not be the neatest way of dividing up society, or 
confirming conventional categorizations” (Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 156). In 
other words, the concept of interpretative repertoires takes the focus away from 
the “nature” of the speakers (which is seen as somehow entangled with their group 
memberships) and places it on the phenomenon that is discussed. As a result of 
this, “a second major difference with social representations theory is that there is 
no attempt in discourse analysis  to find consensus in the use of repertoires in the 
sense that some people are found to always use a certain repertoire, and certain 
people another” (Potter and Wetherell, 1987:156). The focus therefore remains 
firmly on the situation/occasion and not on the identity of the speaker. Finally, 
“discourse analysis has eschewed any form of cognitive reductionism, any 
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explanation which treats linguistic behaviour as a product of mental entities or 
processes […] The concern is firmly with language use: the way accounts are 
constructed and different functions […] the point is that analysis and explanation 
can be carried out at a social psychological level which is coherently separable from 
the cognitive” (Potter and Wetherell, 1987:157).  
 
   The founders of DP focused on the interactive unfolding and the multiple 
linguistic tools available to make oneself understood the way they want to be. In 
order to achieve that without explicitly saying “I wish to be understood as X”, the 
speakers will have to address shared social ground with their interlocutors. As such, 
DP seems to have strong connections to ‘positioning theory’.  
    What Davies and Harré defined as positioning can be seen as a discursive practice 
“whereby selves are located in conversations as observably and intersubjectively 
coherent participants in jointly produced storylines” (Davies and Harré, 1990:48), 
whereby interlocutors take up positions already offered by their society/culture to 
paint themselves in the light of the presuppositions and the implications that come 
from these. These positions allow the speakers to get their interlocutors to 
understand the message of their words on a deeper level, one informed by the way 
marked terms have been coloured in their culture and society throughout the years. 
Nevertheless, the authors stress, this process needs be neither conscious nor 
completely informed regarding the history of said marked terms. However the use 
of terms or syntactic structures does bring along with it assumptions and 
presuppositions about what is being said that go beyond the surface level of 
pragmatics.  
    
     Positioning theory refers to how the narrators utilize existing discourses 
available in their societies to align themselves with, in order to explain what they 
experience, how they experience it and why they experience it in that way (Harré, 
1990). Burr describes Harré’s work on positioning as emphasizing the role of choice 
in the Western mind-set and the moral responsibilities that come with it, as shaped 
by centuries of cultural products and discursive practices that emphasize this 
particular aspect of humans - in contrast to, say, Islamic cultures where “the focus 
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is upon how people may bring themselves to act in accordance with choices and 
decisions that have already been made for them by Allah” (Burr, 1995:133). Harré 
and Van Langenhove argue that “in conversations, the social forces of acts of 
speaking, positions and storylines form mutually determining triads, called 
positioning-triangles. Adopting a ‘position’ involves the use of rhetorical devices by 
which oneself and other speakers are presented as standing in various kinds of 
relations. These include relations of power, relations of competence 
(knowledge/ignorance), relations of moral standing (trustworthy/trusting) and so 
on” (Van Langenhove and Harré, 1999:362). By (consciously or not) adopting 
positions, therefore, speakers signal to their interlocutors where they are coming 
from and create a context in which their utterances are to be interpreted. 
   DP therefore is preoccupied with both construction and function of speech. How 
is the utterance constructed by the individual, and what effects does this have in 
the communicative event? Essentially DP focuses on meaning-making, and 
therefore shares some ground with IPA (Eatough and Smith, 2008:184). From a DP 
perspective however, “the person providing the account is not consciously 
constructing, but a construction emerges as they try to make sense of a 
phenomenon or engage in unselfconscious social activities like blaming or 
justifying” (Edwards and Potter, 1992:34).   
    As a set of data I used the interviews carried out for the participants’ exploration 
of their anger. These interviews were conducted using open-ended questions and 
are not naturally occurring data, thereby violating one of the rules for DP. However, 
I propose that they still make for fruitful ground for Discursive Psychology because 
the topic of the interviews invited the participants to display opinions and 
psychological states that would very likely require some further self-presentation 
and action-orientation for them to get their point across to their desired effect. 
Therefore I could still approach the same data with a different set of analytic 
questions for the Discursive Psychology part of my analysis.  
   My broad question revolved around the way the participants present themselves 
in the experience: what ownership do they claim over their emotions; and how do 
they justify their thoughts and actions during and about the emotional episode? As 
I became more and more familiar with the data the questions started getting more 
refined, focusing both on the micro-level of justifying their choices and on the 
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macro-level of making global presentations. These then started crystalizing into the 
phrases that guided my coding of the data: how is anger presented and what 
implications does this have for the presentation of the self and others? Similarly, 
how is the ‘angry person’ presented and how is the participant’s image of himself 
constructed to compare to that? 
   In order to analyse the function of their accounts, I had to ‘read’ the context in 
which they were constructed (Edwards and Potter, 1992:33), both in the cultural 
context in which they were produced and in the communicational situation. Sitting 
across the table from a stranger who is asking them about issues that may 
compromise their self-image and public standing. The single word “anger” may be 
broadly seen as one of the six core human emotions (according to Ekman, 1973). 
However, often being classed as a “negative” emotion (mainly because of its ties to 
destructive, offensive or self-harming behaviour – Strongman, 1996:112), it carries 
harsh connotations (in the western world).  
 
3.3 PROCEDURE 
   The way the data was collected included me sitting down for a face-to-face 
interview with participants (who willingly and voluntarily contacted me in order to 
participate in the study). The interviews were semi-structured with open-ended 
questions, thus going against DP’s principles (Wiggins and Potter, 2008:75) and 
towards IPA’s principles.  
    In order to be eligible for the study, participants had to be male (to minimize 
gender differences in the perception of the gendered self; differences in 
physiological arousal; differences in expression and language); adults (for ethical 
reasons); and living in London for a minimum of 5 years. This final criterion was 
inserted in order to ensure that all participants have all been immersed in the 
British culture as found in the country’s capital; and that they participate in the 
same rhythms of life and speech; hence I expect my participants’ experiences to be 
presented in a way that can be expressed and understood within that community.  
   The researcher tries to make sense of the participant who tries to make sense of 
the experience (Smith, Flowers and Larkin, 2009:3). There are several implications 
that arise because of this: 
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   First of all, an implication is that the researcher does not have direct access to the 
participant’s experience. S/he only has access to what the participant shares with 
them; and that, only through the researcher’s own understanding of the world, the 
self, and the topic.  
    An equally important implication is that the participants do not have direct access 
to their discussed experiences either. These experiences are of the past, so they 
only have access to the memories of those experiences. Little cognitive, 
behavioural, judgmental or physiological changes due to the experience itself occur 
during the interview- and any changes in any of those domains is only down to the 
recall of the experience and the changes this recall brought rather than an 
encounter in the here-and-now of the interview.  
    If a participant was to be made angry, they would experience a change in 
cognition, behaviour, judgment and physiology – and the understanding of that 
would be the experience itself. For the needs of this study, however, the 
participants need to discuss their past experience of that emotional state. In other 
words, they need to put into words their recollection of that experience – and this 
gives rise to a whole new set of implications.  
   “Individual self-reports of emotion may be influenced by stereotypes and are 
certainly dependent upon memory (Fischer, 1993). Fieldman Barrett (1997) has 
shown that retrospective reports of emotions are influenced by an individual’s 
perception of their personality” (Kring, 2000:223). Also, the participants did not 
generate their stories in isolation; they were in a room with me. This implies a need 
for the study of interaction itself. Starting from the previous point, the two 
interlocutors (researcher and participant) are engaged in a conversation – however, 
only one’s face is at stake in this conversation; the participant’s. Their experiences 
might set their public face at risk of compromise. They talk to me about their 
experience of that “negative” feeling and thus they portray themselves as having 
indulged in it. Since the study is largely phenomenological in scope, it is worth 
remembering that “Phenomenological Psychology is not concerned with 
understanding cognition… Instead, the intentional correlation leads to a focus on 
the experience of things in their appearing and the way in which they appear to us 
as we focus our attention on them in consciousness. The mind is, therefore, no 
longer understood as something that is private to an individual (‘a ghost in the 
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machine’) but instead recognized as something intrinsically public” (Langridge, 
2007:13-14). Therefore, participants are invited to share their experiences of anger 
with me in the risk of being understood as not fitting into the socially acceptable 
way-of-seeing and way-of-being in the world.  
 
3.4 Participants  
   Ten adult men took part in the study. They were recruited either through 
responding to advertisements that were posted around the university, or through 
snowballing from common acquaintances of ours. The degree of distance between 
researcher and participant was not always rigid (for example, participant 3 is a 
friend of a friend, so we had met twice on social occasions before doing the 
interview; and I could recognize participant 5 from his name and bands’ pictures as, 
at the time of the interview, I was writing for a music magazine that covers this 
music). It was held up as a standard, however, to allow participants an exploration 
of their emotions without the stress that their participation might have an impact 
on their social lives. Given the grey area21 in which most human relationships 
operate, the lack of familiarity between researcher and participant was necessary 
to allow for references to people and situations that might have been left outside 
the accounts if the participants feared this information might leak outside the 
boundaries of the present study.  
    As Denzin (1995:44) points out, from a symbolic-interactionist perspective it is 
important to have some notion of the biographies interviewees bring to the 
discussion to frame their experience. I will here attempt to present the participants 
in the way they presented themselves to me. Demographic details were chosen to 
provide enough information to give an impression of where their accounts are 
coming from, but also not enough information to jeopardise their anonymity. 
Additionally, the main aspects of themselves they brought into the conversation 
are included, since they formed the prism through which the participants were 
talking to me about their experiences of anger.  
                                                          
21 By “grey area” I am referring to the multiplicity of feelings we might be holding for any one of our 
close relationships. I might be best friends with someone but, in exploring my anger, I might find I 
need to refer to that one time that particular person made me furious – and how this was resolved; 
or not resolved. 
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    P.1 is a 2nd generation British, in his mid-20s. He spoke a lot about his OCD and 
the frustrations this brings with it on an experiential (e.g. how he feels in front of 
his family about it) as well as the practical (e.g. how he will avoid places and 
situations he thinks will trigger his OCD) level.  
    P.2 is Canadian in his early 40s. He spoke a lot about how he relates to his 
memories both on a personal (e.g. how he deals with past trauma) and on a 
professional level (i.e. how he uses this connection to his past to bring the roles he 
plays as an actor to life). 
    P.3 is mixed-race Scandinavian in his late 30s. He spoke a lot about frustrations 
that arise due to lack of internal balance and social acceptance. This includes past 
abuse of recreational drugs, problems fitting-in because of his dark skin tone, unfair 
treatment by friends, and more.  
    P.4 is British in his mid-20s. He spoke about how, at the time of the interview, he 
was attempting to find some meaning and pleasure in life. Bringing his anger under 
control was one aspect of that, accompanied by attempts to balance work and 
pleasure, to find a way to communicate with his friends and girlfriend calmly, etc. 
    P.5 is Scandinavian in his early 30s. He spoke about his attempts, at the time of 
the interview, to rise above problems of the past (controlling anger being one of 
them, along with injuries which halted his career in sports, problematic 
communication with work partners etc.) and be a calm and composed person. 
    P.6 is European citizen in his mid-30s. He spoke about how, at the time of the 
interview, he was in the process of rediscovering himself away from his family 
influence and trying to push forward with his own decisions in life.  
    P.7 is British in his early 30s. He spoke about efforts to reclaim his standing in the 
world, which seems to be damaged after leaving the UK educational system. He 
spoke a lot about the discipline that comes with being in a boarding school and how 
he went through a period of his life feeling weak, attempted suicide and was 
admitted to a mental health institution.  
    P.8 is 2nd generation British in his early 40s. He spoke about frustrations that 
arise because of his family situation (partly caring for an autistic child), instances of 
being taken advantage of in the past, and how he pursues a new outlook on life 
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nowadays through studying law and keeping up with social issues in the UK and 
abroad.  
    P.9 is British in his early 30s. He spoke of frustrations that arise from his family 
circles (where violence is a commonplace and communication fails), from abusive 
relations of the past and present, and from his mental health which has in the past 
led him to be hospitalized. His viewpoint is a positive one though, stressing that he 
was, at the time of the interview, in the process of improving all these situations.  
    P.10 is British in his early 30s. He spoke a lot about his relationship, citing it as a 
source of anger and frustration as well as pleasure and comfort. His accounts were 
largely about balancing priorities between what he wants to do and what his 
girlfriend wants to do and mentioned in length how some of her family problems 
have had an impact on him, from which he had still, at the time of the interview, 
not recovered.  
 
3.5 Researcher 
    The participants are invited to explore their experiences and present them as 
clearly but also as truthfully/accurately as possible. The researcher is invited to 
explore these narrations too, through the process of interpretation. A few words 
on myself, then, might provide transparency and add rigor to the analysis.  
    At the time of writing this (March 2019) I am a 32 year-old Greek, living in London 
since 2004. From a very young age I have been attracted to anger as found in Greek 
mythology, Biblical stories, tales and legends that are passed down from generation 
to generation, comic books, cartoons, and then later movies and music - I am an 
avid fan of heavy metal and its multiple sub-genres (indeed, incorporating the 
heavy metal cultural context was part of my initial plan for this study). I am also 
very preoccupied with aggressive thoughts and fantasies, and I still struggle to find 
ways to express my anger in a way that is appropriate to the social context and the 
interactional situation. I am working on these through creating my own art, 
studying psychology and psychoanalysis, and attending psychoanalytical therapy. 
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3.6 Recruitment 
   The study was approved by the Psychology Ethics Committee at City, University 
of London, in July 2016 (code: PSYETH (R/F) 15/16 213b). The approved Standard 
Ethics Form ensures that all measures are being taken to ensure the safety of 
researcher and participants; that participants are made aware of the topic of the 
study, the way their data will be stored, analysed, presented and destroyed; their 
assured anonymity; and their right to withdraw at any time or ask the researcher 
to remove their data from the study within 72 hours from the end of the interview. 
The ethics committee also approved the interview schedule (which consisted of the 
open-ended questions and some potential prompts), the Participant Information 
Sheet (where all the above are mentioned and clearly explained), the Debrief Form 
(where the participants are reminded of the study’s aim and the way their data will 
be treated), as well as the Recruitment Advert which is a summarily presentation of 
the study’s aims and an invitation for people who fulfil the inclusion criteria to 
contact the researcher so they can arrange a meeting to participate in the study. 
All this material can be found in Appendix E. 
   Each participant got in touch through the e-mail address supplied in the advert 
(participant 9 contacted the supervisor via email instead). Following an initial 
screening, where they had to confirm that they meet the inclusion criteria of being 
male, adults and living in London for a minimum of five years (two people who 
responded to the advert could not be included in the study due to violations of one 
of those), the participant information sheet was sent to each participant and an 
interview place and time was arranged. Most interviews took place in semi-private 
places: Participants 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9 and 10 were interviewed in rooms at City 
University that I had booked especially for the occasion. The participants who 
weren’t students were signed in at the reception desk – the rest found me in the 
allocated room. The participants were familiarized with the safety instructions (like 
how to contact the security in case of emergency; or where to go in case of an 
evacuation process). Participant 4 was interviewed at his workplace: he works at a 
pub in north London and the interview took place at the staff room, which was 
sufficiently quiet for the interview to go on uninterrupted and to be recorded 
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clearly. Other staff members (and customers) were in the premises but they did not 
enter the room, allowing the participant free expression. Participant 5 was 
interviewed at his house after his request because of long working hours and 
inconvenient location. I informed a friend about the address I was visiting and 
instructed him to try and contact me if I hadn’t sent a message within 3 hours of 
the beginning of the interview. The participant’s wife was on the lower floor of their 
house and the interview took place in the upper floor. Participant 6 was interviewed 
at his workspace: a rehearsal and recording studio. Again, I informed the same 
friend about the address I was visiting and gave him the same instructions. The 
interview took place in out-of-hours at the studio, which allowed us a great degree 
of quiet even though owners of adjacent studios were in the building.  
   Following our introductions and me welcoming them to the room, participants 
were presented with the participant information sheet once more, as well as the 
consent form. I explained the details of the study, their right to withdraw at any 
time, their guaranteed anonymity and the use their data will be put to. After making 
sure they had no questions about the procedure, participants gave consent by 
signing the form. The interviews were invariably held one-to-one, face-to-face to 
allow the participants a degree of relaxation and to avoid having to conform or 
comply with other participants’ accounts, thus jeopardising the idiographic nature 
of the exploration. Interviews were audio-recorded in two devices (an mp3 player 
and my mobile phone), both of which were constantly visible to the participants to 
remind them of the ongoing interview.  
 
 3.7 Why Men? 
    Anger is linked to aggression and violence, which are in turn linked to the 
hormone testosterone (e.g. Peterson and Harmon-Jones, 2012). Therefore, the 
basis for differences in the experience of anger between men and women is already 
there from the biological underpinnings of each sex: men are by nature designed 
to be more responsive to anger than women do. Physiological reactions of men’s 
and women’s bodies in anger seem to be different, too – as well as the medical 
conditions they lead to (Kring, 2000:220).  
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   Perhaps more importantly, however, men and women have different ways of 
perceiving and expressing themselves and their emotions, based largely on notions 
of what constitutes masculinity or femininity within a particular culture. In Europe 
and England, the social construct which links males to anger is based on the 
“warrior values” that for many centuries have been seen as a central part of being 
masculine. These involve “physical courage, endurance, strength and skill, honour” 
as McCarthy (1994:106) writes. The author gives a brief history of the relation 
between men and the “aspirational and normative” (idem) warrior code. In 
England, from the middle ages anger and aggression were linked to chivalry and, 
whereas the reification of these qualities saw a brief and slight decline during the 
age of the Enlightenment, it was back with romanticism which revolved to a great 
extent around the cult of the hero (McCarthy, 1994:114). The fact that people in 
Europe in the 20th century were going to school and could read meant they would 
read the tales of the warriors and in that way perpetuate in their imagination the 
aspiration towards these values.  
   From a biological perspective “one of the best replicated findings in psychology is 
the existence of sex differences in the rate and level of aggressive behaviour” 
(Campbell and Muncer, 1987:489), from a social perspective.  Contrary to falsely 
cited clinical literature, “women do not report suppressing their anger more often 
than men nor do men report expressing their anger outwardly more often than 
women.” (Kring, 2000:217). However “women experience more anxiety about 
expressing aggression than do men” (Campbell and Muncer, 1987:491), despite 
reporting “more frequent and intense experience of emotion than men do” (Lench, 
Flores & Bench, p.838). So even though men tend to avoid expressing a richness of 
emotional experiences when talking to others, they do tend to both report more 
anger and to feel more comfortable reporting this anger than women do. This can 
be best seen as the result of socialization and education on what is considered 
appropriate within culturally determined gender roles (Lench, Flores & Bench, 
p.838). 
“At least three things can be seen to be done via the rhetoric of emotional 
control: It (1) reproduces an important part of the cultural view of emotion 
(and then implicitly of women as the more emotional gender) as irrational, 
weak and dangerous; (2) minimally elevates the social status of the person 
who claims the need or ability to self-control emotions; and (3) opposes the 
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view of the feminine self as dangerous when it is reversed, that is, when the 
speaker denies the need for or possibility of control of emotion” (Lutz, 
2008:65) 
   For men, this assignment of appropriate experience and expression of emotion 
according to gender has been shown to create a gender role conflict, where they 
experience a “restriction of thoughts, feelings and behaviour to appear 
stereotypically masculine” (Cohn, Seibert and Zeichner, 2009). This has an effect on 
how they express their anger and other emotions (O’Neill, 1981). Going back to the 
social dimension of emotions, and the impact they have on the way one is seen by 
his/her surroundings: 
 “Men generally have higher levels of aggression and are more willing to 
discuss aggressive feelings and behaviour (Duncan and Hobson 1972; Frodi et 
al. 1977). A number of writers have even suggested that among males failure 
to react aggressively under certain forms of provocation may lead to negative 
labelling (Toch 1969; Wolfgang and Ferracuti 1967). Aggressive episodes, 
then, are viewed not as a breakdown of control but as the rehearsal of a 
required social performance” (Campbell and Muncer, 1987:491).  
   Given that research already exists in the field, and my emic approach as a male, I 
only used males as participants in order to increase sample homogeneity according 
to IPA principles and gain a more in-depth perspective into how men think and talk 
about anger. “In general, boys learn to conceal their feelings, whereas girls learn to 
more freely express their feelings while also learning how to control their 
expressive behaviour. Thus, the expression of emotion appears to be more heavily 
socialized than the experience of emotion” (Kring and Gordon; 1998:668) 
   When it comes to expressing emotions, men appear to be very limited in what 
they are socially allowed to do. Evidence suggests that “a masculine-relevant 
dispositional factor, gender role conflict (GRC), potentiates aggression in men 
(Cohn & Zeichner, 2006; Cohn, Zeichner, & Seibert, 2008). GRC reflects “a 
psychological state in which socialized gender roles have negative consequences on 
the person and others” (O’ Neill, Good, & Holmes, 1995, p.167), resulting in men’s 
restriction of thoughts, feelings, and behaviour, to appear stereotypically 
masculine, exerting negative effects in intra- and interpersonal domains (O’ Neill, 
2008; Shepard, 2002)” (Cohn, Seibert and Zeichner, 2009:218) 
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   Anger, nevertheless, seems to hold a special place in that limited space. It appears 
that anger (again, its controlled, appropriate expression) is the one emotion that 
makes men appear closer to the stereotype of men to others around them. To that 
extent, other emotions that demand expression come out camouflaged as anger 
(Cohn, Seibert and Zeichner, 2009:219).      
    Reviewing studies on the difference of anger experience between men and 
women, Kring (2000) notes that “in the context of close relationships, the reasons 
why men and women get angry appear to differ. Specifically, women tend to be 
angered by the negative behaviours of men, whereas men tend to be angered by 
women’s negative emotional reactions and self-focused behaviour” (Kring, 
2000:213).  
    Some gender differences in the reports of anger expression have been reported, 
but these differences usually have to do with the manner, not the frequency of 
expression. “Specifically, men report that they physically assault objects and people 
(e.g., hitting, throwing) and verbally assault people (e.g. name-calling, sarcasm) 
more often than women, whereas women cry more often when angry” (Kring, 
2000:218). Hence, the male way of doing anger is one of aggression and 
confrontation and therefore action, whereas the female way is one of withholding 
and inaction. This brings the focus on the importance of shaping the expression in 
a way that brings the individual’s self-perception in harmony with the expectations 
gender roles generate in society. Working with measures of self-report on gender-
role uptakes, “Kopper and colleagues have found gender role differences […] 
suggesting that feminine sex role characteristics are associated with suppressing 
anger and masculine sex role characteristics are associated with outwardly 
expressing anger” (Kring, 2000:218). 
    The act of expressing anger also sees differences in the way the target shapes the 
expression. “Blier and Blier-Wilson (1989) found that men reported more 
confidence in expressing their anger to other men than to women. Moreover, 
women were more confident in expressing their anger to other women than men 
were” (Kring, 2000:218). Once can only speculate about the reasons that cause this, 
but some element of self-awareness as belonging to one of the two sexes and the 
way this expression will be received by the audience and other participating 
members must be in place for this difference to exist. “Both men and women 
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reported experiencing negative consequences following a particularly severe anger 
episode. In the context of close relationships, men reported expecting that their 
partner will display hurt feelings and reject them in response to their anger, 
whereas women expected that they would be mocked by their partner” (Kring, 
2000:221). The direction of anger’s expression therefore also seems to be gender-
bound but the level of relationship with the target of anger is also a central concern. 
“Women are more likely to direct their anger toward a male relationship partner, 
whereas men are more likely to direct their anger toward male strangers […] 
particularly if the object and target of anger are the same. By contrast, women are 
more likely to express anger towards familiar or close others, whether be male or 
female, particularly if the object and target of anger are different” (Kring, 
2000:219). In other words, men are more likely to deflect the anger of theirs and 
their partner’s towards strangers, whereas females are more likely to express their 
anger to their male partners especially if it was brought about by a third person or 
situation. Keeping anger within male circles seems to have been socially shaped to 
safeguard romantic relationships, while allowing women to express their anger to 
men does the same. In the former case, the man turns his anger to someone that 
has been brought up to deal with anger, whereas in the latter case the man serves 
the role of being strong enough to receive the woman’s anger and not retaliate. 
Therefore, there seems to be an element of responsibility attached to men’s anger, 
one that presupposes that in order to do anger ‘like a man’, one needs to be careful 
of the targets he chooses for the expression of that emotion.  
   Campbell and Muncher (1987:503) note that, for men, the equality of the 
protagonist in terms of sex and age was paramount for the ‘appropriate’ expression 
of aggressive behaviour. On the other hand, “there was a general agreement on the 
importance of territoriality in fighting. Men were seen as fighting legitimately in 
defence of their neighbourhood, their friends or their local bar” (idem, p. 503) 
regardless of the protagonist’s identity. 
    Therefore, for men “the form of control was represented as more of a social 
management issue than one of self-control” (Campbell and Muncher, 1987:502) 
The authors stress that, among their sample, “it was generally agreed that fights 
should not be sought out for their own sake” (Ibid., p.505), furthering the link 
between appropriate responses and appropriate masculinity. The authors then add 
that, according to their participants, “fights should be undertaken only when the 
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opponent refused to show sufficient contrition for his offence” (Idem.). What this 
sentence reveals is that anger responses are still very much linked to one’s own 
appraisal of the situation, and that the way one constructs the anger situation in 
his head is usually one where the target has committed an offence. The angry 
person is then brought to the position of the judge – a judge of whether the 
offender has regretted their action enough. This brings back the “ought” of the 
anger that was mentioned earlier but also, when considered alongside to the rest 
of the material in this section, constructs the men as gatekeepers of social order 
and personal/familial/territorial honour.  
   These attributes associated with how each person is expected to attend to their 
anger experiences depending on their gender appear to have formed criteria for 
judging anger expression in others based on their gender. “Men’s and women’s 
anger is also judged differently by men and women. For example, a vignette study 
by Smith et al. (1989) indicated that men rated anger from men and women more 
appropriate than women did” (Kring, 2000:221), whereas it wouldn’t be false to say 
that, even to this day, “angry women are more likely to be called hostile or bitchy, 
whereas men who display anger may be referred to a strong (Shields, 1987; Tavris, 
1989)” (Kring, 2000:223).    
 
 
3.8 Other Inclusion Criteria 
 
    Of course, how one understands themselves, their gender, and anger is largely 
based on the cultural frame they operate in. Therefore, I will limit my participants 
to British nationals or to people that they have lived in the U.K. for a minimum of 5 
years, which is the time that is required in order to apply for naturalisation into the 
British society. 
(As found in:    https://www.gov.uk/british-citizenship  at the beginning of this 
research) 
    
94 
 
   The criterion of living in London comes not so much as an attempt to define the 
way participants may have experienced anger, but mostly as an attempt to focus 
on the way they have learnt to express it. This does service to the study (since I 
support the view that the culture influences the results) and to the city (since it 
brings people from different parts of the planet in geographical proximity and thus 
"forces" them to learn to communicate with one-another). 
   To better understand the universality of the emotion, and to reflect the 
multicultural society of London, I had no exclusion criteria for race, ethnicity or 
social status.  
   The inclusion criteria with regards to anger relate to self-reported anger rather 
than any objective measure. The main inclusion criterion is that anger has a 
prominent presence in the life of the participant. This presence can take many 
forms (and exploring those forms is actually the very question that drives this 
research). Therefore, no objective way of measuring anger (e.g. Sternberg’s State-
Trait Anger Inventory or the BUSS Aggression Questionnaire) can be brought into 
the recruitment process as this would exclude cases of people who experience 
anger in different ways. Consequently, as long as one reported that anger is 
something they have intense and vivid impressions and experiences of, they 
qualified for the interview.  
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CHAPTER 4: ANGER IN THE BRITISH CULTURE 
 
   A community may be tied together through a variety of features its members 
share, like location, language, social and cultural practices, etc. The present study 
assumes a tie among participants that is brought about through the space they 
occupy (London) and the language they employ to communicate with other 
members of the London community.  
   There are always competing discourses that surround core concepts in each 
community. Different institutions address anger from a different angle. For 
example, an English Socialist Newspaper may urge for (justified) anger to be 
directed towards the Capitalist establishment, whereas an English Neoliberal 
newspaper may condemn the (unjustified) anger of those opposing the 
establishment. 
    This chapter presents some of the ways anger is represented in electronic forms 
in the British culture. 
4.1: Google Search 
   The three main themes that arise from the analysis of the top-100 Google-hits 
are: “Help-Control”, “The Faces of Anger”, and “Definitions of Anger”. “Help-
Control” was used as a label to encapsulate the urgings of the websites towards the 
users: the main idea is that anger needs to be controlled at all costs, and the 
underlying idea is that the user is not well-equipped to acquire this control over 
his/her anger by him/herself. “The Faces of Anger” arose as an umbrella-term for 
websites that try to explain how anger might influence one’s life. Essentially, it 
brought together websites that try to present anger under a particular light, with 
views to linking it to notions of well-being and socialization techniques. In other 
words, this theme encapsulates websites’ theories and interpretations of anger. 
“Definitions of Anger”, on the other hand, is a theme that brings together websites 
whose primary goal is to define anger without any reference to consequences it 
might have for a person: a surface-level, dictionary-style presentation of the lexical 
item. Although there is some occasional overlap between themes in single items, 
the prevailing theme is usually easy to identify. For example, search result no.15 is 
a definition of anger from the Cambridge English Dictionary which nevertheless 
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portrays anger as harmful and intrusive (which in turn falls under the “The Faces of 
Anger” theme): “a strong feeling that makes you want to hurt someone or be 
unpleasant because of…”. Despite its clear presentation of anger as destructive, the 
sneak-peek does not urge one to take action or be alert about anger – therefore, it 
would fall under the “The Faces of Anger” instead of “Help-Control”. Since the text 
primarily attempts to offer an explanation of what anger is, however, the item falls 
under the category “Definitions of Anger” instead of “The Faces of Anger”. 
   Purely in terms of quantity, the prevailing theme is “Help-Control”: websites 
giving advice on how and/or why anger can and must be controlled. 50 out of the 
100 Google-items fall within this theme. It is worth reminding ourselves that the 
Google hit-list is shaped by the items people do actually search for, so this means 
that a large proportion of the people in the UK who google about anger are actually 
trying to find something to help them with this state of theirs. At the same time, 
however, this also means that people who google “anger” will be presented with 
an overwhelming impression that anger must be managed and that the individual 
may need help to do that. Therefore, anger is immediately portrayed as a both 
nasty and overpowering state. The label “Help-Control” was chosen for this theme 
to underline the urgency and sense of necessity that comes with these websites’ 
narratives. 
  “The Faces of Anger” brings up 22 items but no concrete description of what anger 
looks like. The label was therefore chosen to highlight the different (and 
occasionally conflicting) information found in the different websites. Most of the 
results’ “sneak-peeks” try to strike a balance between three qualities: “natural”, 
“destructive” and “potentially good”. Therefore anger is conceptualized by this 
Google-list as a state that is hard to explore, accept or use. It is natural (as 10 out 
the 22 sneak-peeks stress) but also destructive (as 13/22 hits underline) and, 
whereas it can be used for good, only 3 items from the list present it in that light. 
So, from a sum of these as they are presented in a list, the person is left rather 
perplexed: anger is a human emotion and therefore feeling angry is natural – should 
they feel guilty about it though? Or maybe proud? Is experiencing the emotion what 
makes anger and the angry person good or bad? Or is it the way the emotion is 
expressed?   
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   It is perhaps because of this perennially-fleeting and hard-to-grasp nature of 
anger that the third theme in this Google-analysis is “Definitions of Anger” 
(although with only 5 out of the 100 hits): people are actively trying to understand 
what anger is and how it can be defined. Presumably, an individual hears about the 
word “anger” and understands that it describes some of his/her experiences and 
so tries to get a definition of the term to see if his/her experiences can be clearly 
labelled as “anger”. Perhaps this search for a definition is in an attempt to answer 
a question posed by one of the previous themes: What is and what is not anger? Is 
there a natural way to be angry and, if so, what is that? Should certain behaviours, 
thoughts or affects be kept in check? Could anger and these behaviours, thoughts, 
affects be helpful? How and where to ask for help? 
 
   A naïve person googling for anger, therefore, will be presented with an idea that 
anger is a natural emotion which however brings out the worse in humans. The 
Google-search will also bring with it a strong impression that people need help to 
deal with anger. Anger is projected as an emotional state that is hard to describe as 
it can take different shapes and forms – it usually ends up in disaster though, 
damaging relationships, making people lose face and leading to a feeling of 
helplessness. Interestingly, the Google-search does not establish a strong link 
between anger and aggression, physical abuse and violence. Instead, the overall 
picture that emerges is one of the angry person suffering from anger, as the effects 
of that state primarily return to the person experiencing it instead of affecting other 
parties.  
 
4.2 Anger Management Centres  
   For this part of the study, I look at how anger, persons and the relationship 
between them are presented in 9 London-based AMCs22. This data was collected 
and analysed early in 2016 (re-touched mid-2018) to inform my understanding of 
the interviews as they unfolded, as well as the subsequent analyses. I start by 
showing how they accomplish the construction of expert discourses and then turn 
                                                          
22 These 9 centres are: Priory, Anger Clinic, The British Association of Anger Management 
(BAAM), The Centre for Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy, Anger Planet, Efficacy, Harley 
Centre, Anger Management London, Beating Anger. 
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to the themes they bring up about anger and the angry person. The process of 
claiming expertise and presenting a (virtually) uni-dimensional take on the 
phenomenon has implications for the way people will talk about this phenomenon 
to a stranger. In particular, I hypothesize that this study’s participants came into the 
interview setting trying to figure out what I expected to hear from them. Given that 
psychology and counselling are bordering on the therapies offered by these 
centres, they would probably expect me to expect them to give similar accounts 
because this is what they thought I was interested in.  
 
  Theme 1: Pathology 
    AMCs are there to help people deal with their problem, which is anger.  The first 
discourse AMCs draw upon to address their clients is that of pathology. Anger is 
presented as a pathological item, either a symptom/result or a cause of cognitive 
and bodily dysfunctions.  
    The theme of “anger as pathology” paints the emotion as a force that harms the 
individual. Anger disrupts mental balance, afflicts the body, and prevents the 
afflicted from communicating that very state in a way that can be understood by 
others. As an extension of that, the angry persons are presented as under the 
influence of anger, unable to think, act or express themselves appropriately (or at 
least as they would in their calm state) and are therefore portrayed as unable to 
help or to conduct themselves.   
    Anger Clinic marks it as an emotion neighbouring to aggression, bitterness, and 
hatred, exclusively. Anger is therefore marked as a “negatively charged” emotion, 
something that gives rise to tensions within the individual and his/her relations to 
other people (since all three imply not only an emotional and cognitive state, but 
also a disposition, a behaviour and an attitude towards others), and something that 
goes hand-in-hand with dysphoria (as expressed through negative thinking). Anger 
is presented as a pathogen here, the advent of which disrupts the person’s 
composure and social relations.   
   BAAM links it to stress (anger fuelled by stress) and states that anger can cause 
somatic discomfort, even illness “such as acid reflux, headaches, anxiety etc.”. 
Stress has a cognitive and a bodily aspect and the two are presented here as 
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forming a vicious cycle: stress negatively affects the mind and body of the sufferer. 
This eventually generates anger (a symptom of stress) which in turn generates 
bodily symptoms23. On the cognitive side, the centre BAAM presents the angry 
person as the victim of frustration, a person who cannot understand what it is that 
sweeps him/her into that type of behaviour. Anger, therefore, is once again 
conceptualized as something that may or may not be based on a valid, real stimulus 
– but is nevertheless a problem of the sufferer’s thinking and understanding of 
situations. Anger is in this way presented as the result of problematic thinking, not 
the cause of it, implying that if it weren’t for these mistaken attitudes, anger would 
have no place in the person’s life. The sufferer must first and foremost correct 
his/her mistaken beliefs and learn how to manage stress in order to avoid getting 
angry.  
 
   The Centre for Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy describes anger as arising from 
extensive stress in the body and leading to a sense (hence cognitive appraisal) “of 
threat, violation, frustration, fear and guilt”. Consequently, the centre furthers the 
link between stress and anger as presented by BAAM to state that the angry person 
will proceed with interpreting their environment in a toxic way and therefore will 
find it difficult to successfully interact with it. All of these hark back to the loss of 
agency and the fear in uncertainty of what the next anger episode will be like – or 
when it will strike. Lack of logic or balance are therefore seen as inherent in the 
state of anger, further highlighting the notion of the individual being swept up in a 
wave of anger instead of working with that anger. The centre states that anger 
stems from “deeper core belief and schemas from early life (up to sixteen)”. Anger 
is thus seen as a symptom of dysfunctional thinking which has been solidified over 
years of repetition of this mode. Examples of the situations that led to this 
dysfunctional thinking can be found in “subjugation, mistrust, punitive parent, 
emotional deprivation, vulnerability to harm from others not [sic] being good 
enough/worthy”. The anger of the sufferer then is linked to dysfunctional 
relationships with others which have crystalized into “underlying non-conscious 
beliefs”. These subsequently give rise to dysfunctional thinking, which drives the 
                                                          
23 Presumably, given what is stated in this study’s introduction about the pre- and post-
monitoring stage of emotion, these bodily symptoms will lead to some appraisal similar to 
fear which will then generate more stress and, therefore, more anger.  
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person to compare him/herself with others and consistently sees her/himself as 
inferior. In other words, it is almost as if the person has created a blueprint from 
previous unhealthy relationships and repeats that in their head, letting it guide their 
future relationships; and thus sabotaging oneself, perpetuating the demise and 
staying out of control of his/her anger. The service user, consequently, is positioned 
as someone who has been damaged by these relationships; someone who has lost 
sight of his/her goals, lost touch with his/her emotions, or even lost his/her sense 
of self. 
    Similarly, Anger Planet presents anger as “a symptom of a wind-up”; hence the 
angry person as having fallen for the emotion’s bait. The control of anger is 
something that is taught, therefore, through tackling the way one approaches the 
world, the way one thinks about themselves and others and the way one’s bodily 
functions contribute to mental health. The immediate measures for anger control 
the centre offers are there to stop people from “destructive temper outbursts”, 
again stressing the person’s loss of control and agency during the anger episodes 
which hint towards a pathological state. “We get stuck in angry behaviour” the 
centre states, implying that once this has been established as a response to 
situations it is very difficult to disengage and to see other ways of thinking and 
acting. 
    Efficacy states that through controlled breathing they can help the sufferer bring 
the whole surge of anger under control. Lack of such control is presented as the 
internal (bodily) triggers of a person. External triggers correspond to reactions to 
situations, therefore cognitive orientations. The centre offers the sufferer the 
chance to “rescript” their internal dialogues and thus change the way they 
understand, analyse and respond to situations. Controlling anger is also portrayed 
as assessing goals and coming up with plans to achieve them. Anger is therefore 
conceptualized as the result of one’s failure to achieve one’s goals and an 
expression of the frustration this brings. 
    Besides bodily and cognitive symptoms, another part of anger’s pathology is to 
be found in the act of communication between the service-seeker and his/her 
surroundings. This becomes most evident when looking at how AMCs suggest they 
can help the service-seekers. By focusing on the ways each AMC offer to help the 
service-seekers manage their anger we learn more about how anger is 
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conceptualized: in order to offer a cure, an understanding of the disease (of what 
it includes, how it manifests and why it comes about) is necessary. 
   Harley Centre focuses on improving the patients’ “communication skills and self-
expression”. The expression of anger consists of two points: the understanding of 
its conception and the transmission of that understanding. How one thinks about 
anger and how s/he communicates it are seen as the two problematic factors the 
sufferer must tackle. This implies again a pathological state of anger in the sufferer 
(probably blowing things out of proportion and taking them too seriously, as 
previous AMCs have presented) and a dysfunctional communication of that state. 
Anger-provoking situations, then, are best managed through “coping strategies and 
tools” which allow the sufferer a more well-designed and functional approach both 
to his/her thoughts during the situation and the way s/he expresses these thoughts. 
   BAAM stresses that, if nothing else, the service-user must learn how to express 
anger cleanly. This is important in its own right, as the centre in that way states that 
anger should be expressed – only in the right way, though. Not knowing the right 
way to express anger is therefore constructed as an integral part of the anger 
pathology.  
   Anger Planet points to the way anger distorts stimuli and reactions: anger is 
presented as arising from a form of blowing (little) things out of proportion, as well 
as a way of engaging with/submitting to negative and critical thoughts. At the same 
time, the message the angry person sends is presented as difficult for others to 
grasp, since the person’s reason and logic have given way to angry behaviour (which 
by analogy is presented as muting the logic of an argument) – the result of this is 
that the person’s message is not heard. Anger therefore is doubly dangerous: it 
leads the person down dangerous and illogical mental paths while distorting the 
message of dysphoria that could be heard by others if anger was not in the way.  
    In Anger Management London’s portrayal anger is a way of expressing oneself. It 
is presented as inherently problematic though, as it is “outbursts” of anger the 
person employs instead of controlled, constructive use of that anger. Anger, then, 
is seen as having a pulse of its own; as a force that sweeps the individual into a one-
way path where anger dictates their thoughts and actions. Moreover, their 
presentation makes it look as if the help-seeker knows no other way of expressing 
themselves than through these outbursts, which conceptualizes the help-seeker as 
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immature communicator. Anger then is portrayed also as the result of one’s way of 
relating to other people, establishing assumptions and implications for one’s own 
self-image, sense of self-worth, self-esteem etc. These assumptions and 
implications are invariably of a negative nature: anger is not empowering the 
individual; rather, it brings their sense of self-worth, self-esteem and self-image 
down. Anger then is mapped as more a problem with one’s own self than one’s 
problems with others. 
    For The Centre for Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy, the destructive nature of 
anger is identified as “outbursts” and “loss of control” and therefore linked to the 
individual’s lack of agency over his/her own actions. The individual’s experience is 
then linked to a sense of threat, violation, fear and guilt. This signifies that what 
brought the person to seek help from them is the destructive (and socially-
alienating) effects of anger which require immediate attention from the calm and 
steady practitioners of the centre.     
   Efficacy extends their ways of helping the service-user manage their anger to 
social terrains, where the centre offers social skills training (to teach participants 
appropriate behaviour and responses) and Assertiveness Training and Conflict 
Resolution, where the sufferer can learn how to project their aggressiveness as 
(“the more acceptable”) assertiveness. Again, anger is constructed as leading the 
angry person towards an unacceptable or fruitless mode of communication. 
   Priory, finally, tailors its programmes according to each sufferer’s needs, but they 
all revolve around “interpersonal communication” and “learning skills of 
appreciating other people’s points of view”. Anger, then, is seen as the breakdown 
of one’s understanding of what the other person asks of them, followed by 
inappropriate communication of their frustration. 
 
 
   Theme 2: Research (Evidence-Based Practice) 
   To pathologize anger, AMCs draw on discourses of “research”. Anger and the 
angry person are treated here as objects of study – a study that the AMCs imply 
they have carried out. Their way of writing is an impersonal one, presenting their 
viewpoints as incontestable “truths”. In their texts, the angry person is presented 
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as indistinguishable from other angry persons. Their voices are presented as a single 
one when the centres attempt to communicate or “quote” what the angry person 
is thinking.   
    Anger Planet states that “once you see “there is light at the end of the tunnel” 
you will start to feel calmer and more at ease”, implying that the sufferer’s 
condition is exaggerated from their problematic thinking which leaves them unable 
to see beyond that and that the centre has had many cases like that one in the past 
– the present service-user will be no exception. Also, the progress from the angry 
and restless state to the calmer one is presented as a certainty. Anger Clinic states 
that their mission is to help the service-user develop an understanding of the 
relationship between negative thinking and anger and how to change it. This 
implies that the centre’s history allows its practitioners to have a general view of 
anger that can be applied to all cases of patients. Moreover, it implies that the 
patients have a lesser understanding of their own anger than the centre has 
through its practitioners’ experience. BAAM states that anger and mischief (which 
go hand-in-hand in the centre’s view) have four purposes that the client has to learn 
and recognize. This statement places the centre in an asymmetrical relationship to 
the client. It presupposes that the centre has carried out research which has 
demonstrated that there are four purposes behind anger and mischief – not three, 
not five. This constructs the centre as an evidence-based practice place, where the 
service-user will learn new things about their own emotional experience. The 
centre builds on this promise of new knowledge by stating that the service-seekers 
usually ignore the “unexpected option” of not picking up the “tug of war” that is 
anger. Therefore, the clients are constructed as lacking knowledge about their state 
and the centre is constructed as the bearer of that knowledge. Anger Management 
London offers that one will “be helped to find other ways to express yourself other 
than through outbursts of anger”. The centre therefore posits that “outbursts” of 
anger is the only way any service-user knows how to communicate their anger and 
positions its practitioners as having superior skills and ready to help the service-
seekers. The impersonal tone also creates the implication that many others have 
been helped in the past. The Centre for Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy divides its 
programme into three stages which presuppose a prior-knowledge of what is 
urgent for the service-seeker and what is going to be the long-term work. The 
necessity for three stages is presumed to have arisen through previous research 
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and practice of the centre; this understanding has come about through the 
practitioners’ previous experience with patients which now informs their practice. 
The first stage offers techniques to bring anger’s symptoms “immediately” under 
control.  
   
   Theme 3: Guidance 
    Finally, the AMCs draw on discourses of guidance in order to accomplish what 
they propose to be doing: offering their service-users ways for managing their 
anger more effectively. Here the AMCs claim expertise both by positioning their 
practice as having a deeper understanding of anger, and by stressing they have the 
ways to alleviate the suffering of their patients. In presenting this process, the 
AMCs construct relationships of power asymmetry between their practitioners and 
the service-users.  
     Harley Centre promises to “work with” the patients to improve their 
“communication skills and self-expression” through “coping strategies and tools”. 
Initially the centre establishes that there will be an element of co-operation 
between their practitioners and the service-user; they will “work together”. This 
does not serve the function of positioning the two entities on the same power level. 
On the contrary, it stresses indirectly that the service-user will have to be actively 
engaged in the process and follow the guidance offered by the practitioner. The 
power asymmetry is further solidified by the fact that it is the centre that will judge 
how much the service-user’s communication skills and self-expression have 
improved. In that way, the centre constructs its practice as holding the key to these 
coping strategies and tools which they offer to the service-user  
   BAAM clearly labels anger as a symptom of maladaptive attitudes and underlines 
that, unless people let the specialists in and allow them to “identify and replace 
their mistaken attitudes”, they are bound to “react and find themselves in another 
anger outburst situation”. Therefore, the centre presents a picture where it knows 
something about the participants that they do not know about themselves and can 
guide them towards the “right” path. The centre aims to help people control their 
“thoughts and mistaken beliefs” and, where it is not possible to do that, to teach 
them “how to manage stress” and “how to express anger cleanly”. An element of 
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teaching and learning is foregrounded, positioning the practitioners and the 
service-users on the two ends.  
    Anger Planet’s approach is “integrative, combining psycho-education with ideas 
from Gestalt, Existential and Body Psychotherapy”. From the start, then, the centre 
projects a number of techniques that are removed from the average person’s list 
of skills, therefore signalling the need for the angry person to turn to them for 
guidance.  The centre’s course content teases some of the ways they will help the 
client, through teaching them the answers to simple questions like “How can little 
things make me so angry?”, “How can I control my angry behaviour?”, “How can I 
get my message across and be heard?” “How does the justice of my message get 
lost in my angry behaviour?”, and “Dealing with negative and critical thoughts”. The 
implication thereby created is that the service-seeker wants the answers to these 
questions that the centre holds; maybe, they need to learn how to ask these 
particular questions, too. The centre is therefore showing them a way they could 
not see until they reached out for the centre’s services.  
   In their sessions, Anger Management London’s practitioners will help participants 
“investigate the relationship you have with people with whom you most often 
experience anger. You will understand what is going on for you in relation to those 
people and how you might relate to them in a way that reduces your anger”. The 
centre’s practitioners are constructed as figures that will (i.e. certainly) lead the 
service-users to understand the roots of their anger and techniques to ameliorate 
its effects.  
   The Centre for Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy divides its programme into three 
stages. At stage 1, “clients often tape sessions which are initially designed to change 
their anger behaviours through specific techniques that are used immediately to 
bring anger symptoms under control”. Stage 1 is consequently designed as a ‘crash 
course’ to the distressed service-seeker by the calm and steady practitioners of the 
centre. Stage 2 of the programme is designed “to challenge negative thoughts and 
beliefs about the self, other people, and their future”. Anger here is portrayed as 
dysfunctional thinking and thus a problem of the person, since the treatment aims 
to discover “what errors of logic are being made” and to substitute them with “a 
more balanced way of thinking”. The unsaid implication here is that the centre’s 
practitioners uphold the standards of logic and of balanced ways of thinking. Stage 
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3 focuses on “deeper core belief and schemas from early life (up to sixteen) which 
are then modified to aid in relapse prevention”. Again, the centre’s positioning here 
is one where they have the capability to undo years of toxic activities and therefore 
as something that the service-user should put his/her trust on.  
   Efficacy conceptualizes anger as a multi-dimensional construct through the 
various different techniques they employ for its control. The first set of techniques 
focuses on one’s breathing. By controlling one’s breathing, one controls one’s body 
and, to some extent, the physiological processes in it. From the get-go, therefore, 
the centre presents its practice as able to help even with matters that might seem 
trivial to the service-user. Responses to external triggers also involve “time-out 
strategies”, where the individual actively removes him/herself from “potentially 
explosive situations”.   
    
   A slightly different approach is offered by the centre Beating Anger. Whereas the 
other AMCs in this list insist that their approach can work as a blanket for all angry 
people, Beating Anger offers “workshops” where the sufferer can “discover [their] 
triggers, anger styles, where [their] anger comes from, why [they] react the way 
[they] do, identify [their] own natural resources (…) identify [their] anger 
substitutes, learn simple coping strategies, deal with trauma (…) and generally beat 
theirs and other peoples anger”. It is interesting to note that, instead of “therapy”, 
this AMC offers “workshops”. Anger, therefore, is conceptualized not as something 
to be cured, but as something to be worked on; an integral part of the human 
experience which the visitor of the centre aims to master. They master this by 
discovering what causes their anger (triggers, trauma); exploring how it is 
expressed (anger styles, why they react the way they do); and by bringing it under 
control. This control is presented as a capacity the person has at their disposal from 
within (natural resources), as a technique (coping strategies), or as something they 
can use in the place of anger (substitutes).  
   Constructions of pathology, evidence-based practice and guidance as outlined in 
the preceding pages demonstrate that the AMCs draw on expert discourses in their 
constructions of anger. The AMCs provide both an explanation of why anger 
manifests the way it does; in whom anger is found; and a sense of what anger is like 
in their effort to construct expert discourses on the matter. They make factual 
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claims/statements about what anger is and how the angry person behaves, offer 
“objective” assessments of situations about how anger arises, and offer “tried and 
tested” methods that will help the service-users to moderate the negative effects 
of anger (that is, what the AMCs present as negative- and therefore in the process 
declaring a knowledge of the difference between the positive and the negative 
aspects of anger, and having the ability to draw a line between them).    
 
   Through their constructions of expertise the AMCs also lay out themes about 
what anger and the angry person is. (i) Anger is seen as a result and a cause of 
problems with one’s mind and body. (ii) The angry person is therefore 
conceptualized as a sufferer in the way they think, feel, and behave. (iii) These, 
combined, give rise to notions of interpersonal problems that await the angry 
person. Notions of violence and relationship breakdowns are found throughout the 
AMCs’ websites.  
   Anger is thus conceptualized as a maladaptive and dysfunctional response to 
situations. The dysfunctional nature of those responses might be down to the 
individual’s appraisal and comprehension of the situation, their bodily responses to 
those, or the communicative tools and strategies they employ to express 
themselves to others. Anger is seen as an “outburst” which leaves little to no choice 
of alternative thinking or action to the sufferer.  
   This, in turn, creates assumptions about the angry person. They are portrayed as 
unable to shake off the blindfolds of anger because within these blindfolds is how 
they have learnt to operate. These blindfolds symbolize the person’s readiness to 
lose themselves in the surge of anger and their roots can be found in the person’s 
psychological damage or distress, dysfunctional attitudes, difficulty in articulating 
their thoughts, lack of self-control, and immaturity.  The people seeking help from 
these centres are seen, therefore, as seeking help in order to re-wire themselves to 
respond more effectively to situations.  
   This version of anger and the angry person is also seen in the non-textual ways of 
communication AMCs employ. The people portrayed in their pictures are either in 
despair or in full-blown rage. For example, Anger Planet shows the picture of a man 
leaning against a wall, covering his face with his hand while also holding a cigarette. 
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This lack of stability (as expressed through his body posture) coupled with self-
destruction (cigarette) is topped by the person covering their face, to indicate 
despair. The edges of the picture are blurred as though to create a sense of lack of 
space and time, a place where this feeling of despair lingers perennially.  
   Everyman Project features a photo of a man and a woman: he has an angry 
expression on his face and has her by the hair, getting ready to hit her as his hand 
pulled back indicates. She is trying to cover her face and looks scared. Anger 
Management London displays a picture of a man in a suit telling off a woman in a 
suit (mapping also on a gendered version of anger where men are the perpetrators 
and women are the victims24). His facial expression is angry and his hand gesture is 
both threatening and accusing (his middle finger is extended while his other hand 
forms a fist), while her expression is one of despair and her hand gesture is one of 
defence. These pictures point to an expression of anger that is destructive: verbally 
or physically abusing the recipient.  
    The colours and non-human pictures used to represent anger are either fiery or 
cold. For example, BAAM features the picture of an elderly man waving his fist at 
the camera with a filter of red and yellow colours; The Anger Clinic shows the 
picture of a fire; whereas Everyman Project shows a man and a woman seated 
before a counsellor who holds a red notebook (where presumably all their anger is 
to be recorded). Anger Planet shows the picture of a planet gravitating towards a 
black hole, a picture of a man crying and covering his face, the colours of which 
verge on black-and-white, and a woman covering her face while staring into 
nowhere, again using the same range of colours; while Priory’s picture shows a 
young man looking sad inside a dark room, staring outside where the sun seems to 
shine. The choice of colours hints towards the understanding of anger as a hostile, 
uninviting and dark place. 
   To contrast with these states and to denote the transformation that is promised 
by the centre, practically all of them have a section where they show their team 
smiling in bright photographs, or calm and non-threatening settings like a green 
field (Efficacy), rays of sunshine shining through the leaves of a tree (BAAM), or a 
path in the countryside in a sunny spot away from clouds in the horizon (Beating 
                                                          
24 A further issue of gender arises here – one pertaining to hierarchy. The suits probably symbolize a 
business environment. Presumably, an inferior within such an environment would not lash out at his 
employers so the woman is portrayed here in her “normalized” role, as the employee of males. 
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Anger). They invite help-seekers to leave the gloominess of anger behind and to 
allow their team to lead them to that bright place.  
   It is interesting to note the differences in face depiction. Most of the “angry 
people” are shown hiding their faces. This might be a way to invite the visitors of 
the websites to see their face there. Alternatively, it may stand for the metaphor of 
“losing face” and experiencing shame because of anger – having to regret the 
consequences of anger. On the contrary, the therapists are all showing their faces, 
staring directly at the camera. Relating to the previous point, the therapists are 
shown as not having to regret losing face. By extension, this practice might be 
inviting the visitors of the centres to try and see their face in a similar angle: staring 
directly at the world, with clear eyes, mildly smiling.  
 
   The visitors of AMCs’ websites therefore are presented with the impression that 
anger is taking over their lives because they have learnt to let it do that: they are 
giving up control of their actions and thoughts while in that state and they get into 
that state because of malfunctioning attitudes and problematic thinking. They see 
themselves as the source of the problem. This damning version of themselves, 
however, brings with it promise that they can change. This change requires 
primarily their own dedication to it, but can only be brought about with help from 
the AMCs – that is because anger directs the people experiencing it towards more 
anger and therefore away from other ways of thinking, communicating and 
connecting with the world. 
 
   Therefore, when one visits the websites of AMCs, one finds their anger defined in 
ways which point to an understanding of anger as a problem that starts from the 
mind and manifests behaviourally. What is interesting is that, presumably, it is 
precisely this link of anger with dysphoria that leads one to visit an AMC website. 
The dysphoric nature of anger is thereby validated and focused upon, while the 
visitor of the website is provided with words and discourses to communicate 
his/her experiences.     
   Of course, AMCs present a very narrow version of anger as a problem because 
they want to sell their services. This version cannot be exhaustive of how anger is 
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portrayed in the British culture – after all, the epic English story of Beowulf revolves 
around anger as something natural that needs to be respected and attended to 
from multiple perspectives. This country is also the birthplace of both Punk Rock 
and Heavy Metal, two music genres that deal with anger on both a musical and a 
lyrical level. Nevertheless, AMCs are one of the few mediums where anger is 
discussed (as opposed to turned to art or activism) and their presence is very 
prevalent in British life, as the numbers of the Google-search (50% of the hits were 
about managing anger) demonstrate.    
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CHAPTER 5: DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGY 
 
   The next four sections examine how the participants choose to speak about their 
experience of anger. What interpretative repertoires do they draw on and how do 
they utilize them? How do they align themselves with particular moral orders, 
restrictions and possibilities that arise from these repertoires? What 
presuppositions and assumptions are necessary for the 
interpretation/understanding of these positions, and what implications do these 
positions create about the objects and subjects of talk?  
   Essentially, the focus is not on the experience but on the portrayal of that 
experience and the way the participants “actively produce social and psychological 
realities” (Davies and Harré, 1990:45). The analysis was carried out after I got 
familiar with the texts my participants produced and started looking for patterns 
between them in what the participants brought to the table regarding their 
presentation of the topic.  
    The four repertoires that came up are seen in the following table: 
Table 1: Linguistic Repertoires and their Sub-Themes 
Repertoire Sub-Themes 
ANGER AND FRUSTRATION Bringing Anger and Frustration Together 
Expressing Frustration through Anger 
ANGER IN AND OUT OF THE 
BODY 
Anger in and out of the Body 
ANGER AS HARMFUL AND 
CHAOTIC 
Chaos 
Harm 
Chaos and Harm 
CONSTRUCTING ANGER AS 
SHAMEFUL 
Constructing anger as shameful 
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5.1 Anger and Frustration 
   This was explicitly brought up by the majority of the participants, and implicitly 
touched on by the rest: the relation between anger and frustration. The link 
between the two states seems to be a strong one, as (8 out of 10) participants tend 
to bring them up as a combination of internal states (i.e. “anger and frustration”) 
that best describes their experience. It is also presented as a cyclical one: 
frustration leads to anger, which then leads to more anger (something that will be 
expanded on in the IPA chapter of “While in Place, Anger is Irresistible” later on in 
the analysis) and frustration. Frustration, the current theme shows, can be best 
understood as not being able to reason with people or situations - especially if one 
thinks, knows, or thinks s/he knows they could do so.  
   This section is divided into two parts: the first is titled “Bringing Anger and 
Frustration Together” and it explores how the participants bring these two states 
seamlessly together in their accounts. The co-existence of these two states in 
almost all 10 interviews is very striking and it warrants a section of its own as it is 
vital in forming the repertoire, as it creates the implication that anger rarely arises 
without frustration. This, then, creates implications for one’s responsibility and 
agency when angry. The second part is titled “Expressing Frustration Through 
Anger” and it focuses on how the participants describe their anger experiences as 
stemming from their frustration, either as an internal state or with the situation, 
and, moreover, as a voluntary or non-voluntary way to communicate that 
frustration and to put it in perspective. 
  
5.1.1: Bringing Anger and Frustration Together 
   The combination of anger and frustration was evident in virtually all of my 
participants’ accounts. It consists of linking the two states (of anger and frustration) 
and presenting them as a unified experience. This was done mostly by bringing 
them together as a single phrase (i.e. saying “anger and frustration”). The 
participants speak of frustration as a source for their anger, thus presenting their 
emotional response of anger as a result of not being able to engage successfully 
with other people or situations. 
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    Participant 3, when prompted in the beginning of his interview to give me 
examples of what it is that makes him angry, starts by telling me about his 
frustrations, which he presents as starting from his encounter with a situation that 
is out of his comprehension and then get internalized, leaving him puzzled as to 
why he feels this way:  
“when I was frustrated and felt that I was definitely out of control of the 
situation (..) […] a::nd that being more so the frustration of not being 
understood […] a:nd uh (..) and as I got older it was the: (.) the frustration of 
(.) having a certain stance and feeling that people were (.) were treating me 
differently to (.) to the way they treated others and therefore ah (.) mm (.) it’s 
incomprehension and (.) in my mind trying to set them straight” (lines 39-45) 
    This account and the prominent point in the interview where it was produced 
(while we were still warming up to the subject) show how his approach to anger 
links the emotion inextricably to this frustration of “not being understood” and of 
being treated differently to others. The participant creates some common ground 
between those two conditions and stresses that he expected something different 
from what he found (i.e. he expected to be understood and to be treated equally 
to others). More importantly, the participant constructs his figure as practically 
unable to change the situation he is confronted with: he cannot make people 
understand him and he cannot convince them to treat him like they treat others. 
He thus constructs his figure as “out of control of the situation”. This perceived lack 
of options is presented as that which generates the frustration inside him. He 
presents it as building up and himself as trying to contain it by means not involving 
communication with others: “in my mind trying to set them straight”. Confronted 
with the inexplicability of the event, the participant presents his reaction as 
blocking out any interaction with the people who brought him to that state, thus 
leaving the question of where the blame lays open. In his account he leaves the 
statement “it’s incomprehension” unexplored; he does not state where the 
incomprehension comes from, whether it’s his or the others’, which makes the 
statement open to both possibilities. In the latter case, it would be the others’ 
incomprehension of his subjective stance that makes him angry. In the former case, 
it would be his incomprehension of the others’ double-standards (i.e. treating him 
differently to other people and not trying to understand him) that causes the anger. 
A combination of these two possibilities in the participant’s account constructs 
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frustration and anger as running in circles: the participant’s frustration is presented 
as stemming from his inability to grasp the others’ incomprehension of his anger, 
and that frustration is presented as generating more anger because he cannot find 
alternative ways of feeling or expressing himself. The participant therefore 
constructs a situation where he is left unable to act or feel any other way because 
the way others relates to him generates frustration and anger in him. 
    
   Participant 4 presents anger and frustration as inextricably linked, too. Starting 
with what it is that makes him angry (page 1 of the interview transcript), the 
participant draws attention to his surroundings and says: 
 “frustrations (.) generally (2sec) um:: I kind of resent (..) that I’m working (.) 
for idiots basically [laughs] serving idiots (.) when I’d much rather be at home 
(.) drinking (.) sitting around in my underwear (.) ah: (..) writing (.) or playing 
music (.) a::nd (.) I wanna do those things more (.) more than anything” (lines 
24-26) 
   The passage constructs the helplessness of him seeing his time going to waste25 
as he works long hours at the bar, serving customers he has no respect for. What is 
worse, he says, that keeps him from spending time the way he would rather do 
“more than anything”: working on music. Holding down a job makes it impossible 
for him to do what he loves, and so he is kept away from his passion in order to 
make a living. This is presented as a frustrating state for him – especially given that, 
presumably, the context involves his customers having a good time drinking at the 
pub while he suffers in silence serving them. Therefore the participant’s account 
here constructs an unbalanced situation, where his suffering is necessary for the 
customers to have a good time (given that they need someone to serve them their 
drinks and he needs the money). This is inserted in the narrative as that which gives 
rise to his anger, which is only accentuated by him being so close to people having 
fun without him being able to partake in that euphoria. The participant further 
highlights, even exaggerates, the degree to which he would prefer to be doing other 
things by making references to drinking and being in his underwear. This 
                                                          
25 In a later part of his interview he describes that feeling as “it just feels rea:lly stressed out (.) really 
frustrated very (.) very angry (.) feeling like time is kinda slipping out of my fingers […] yeah just very 
very stressed and frustrated and kinda feeling like you’re sitting on your hands an:d ah (.) you’re 
waiting for your life to (.) resume as soon as you get out of the door” 
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exaggeration can be read as a reaction to the labyrinthine questions the situation 
brings about, regarding his wants, needs, obligations etc. The frustration is vividly 
sketched out here as the participant draws a distinction between having desires 
and wishes; and needing to work to survive. He thus constructs his situation as a 
regret of not being in a comfortable state (i.e. underwear), doing the thing he loves 
(writing and playing music) but instead stuck in a nauseating (for him) environment: 
this is presented as frustrating and perhaps this exaggeration can be seen as a way 
for him to put forth something he feels very certain about, thus breaking the cycle 
of his internal frustration. He thereby justifies his anger as arising from frustration 
which is generated by the very nature and conflicts of his everyday life. 
   Participant 6, when asked what it is that made him decide to take part in this 
interview, offers: 
“Um:: (2sec) well (2sec) I:: (..) I know* I’ve got a lot of anger […] I do* know 
that (.) a::h (.) and I’ve been thinking about it actually recently more and more 
(..) […] and trying to understand why* I feel this anger and this frustration” 
(lines 5-7) 
    It is worth noting that my initial question brought the topic of the interview (i.e. 
anger alone) to the fore. His reply, however, brings frustration into the discussion 
in a way that presents the combination of the two internal states as very natural 
for the participant. Also, the participant’s construction indicates that his main 
motivation for taking part in this study was to try and untie the knot of his internal 
frustrations, to try “to understand why” he feels this anger and frustration and, in 
that way, to break free from them: the link between anger and frustration is thus 
intensified in his narrative. Lack of understanding is put at the heart of this 
participant’s experience, as he presents himself feeling not understood by others 
as a child26 and he himself also does not understand why he feels this anger. Again, 
here we have a form of “double-incomprehension” surfacing in the narrative: 
others not understanding him, and him not understanding why others don’t 
understand him. This leads to his questioning his comprehension of his own self. In 
the process, the participant implies that he is not fully aware of the internal 
machinations that make him feel this way but also, more importantly, that he 
wishes to learn about them. He thereby lays claim to a process of self-
                                                          
26 The story best illustrating this can be found in lines 238-257 of the participant’s account. 
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understanding which, in his opinion, will bring an end to the internal frustrations 
that generate anger in him. The elimination of frustration is therefore presented as 
going hand-in-hand with bringing anger under control and consequently as a step 
towards reclaiming control over himself. 
   Going further on the relationship between the two states, participant 7 describes 
how frustration brings about anger. In his interview he states that he augments 
negative events in his imagination; what he admits he interprets as a “minor event” 
in hindsight, while it is happening he tends to load it with further significance and 
ideas about what it might mean for his relationship with the others involved. This 
is presented as generating frustrations in him, probably precisely because his 
thoughts cannot be logically supported – so he finds himself making thoughts that 
he feels very strongly about but also doubts at the same time. For example, in the 
following excerpt he describes an evening at his home; during the day he felt he 
was very badly treated by a senior at work (“that woman”) and, when he tried to 
explain the situation to his mother over the phone she could not understand why 
he got so upset over the incident. This leads him to feel that he is not being 
understood and, thus, to frustration: 
““Why are you wronging me as well?” It’s always this (.) impression* that 
everyone is wronging me (.) everybody* (..) 
-mhm 
-you know? It was that woman now it’s my mother (.) ah now my flatmates 
are (.) you know cooking at (.) 10 pm at night and I can’t sleep (.) “oh my god!” 
you know? (3sec) ye:ah very frustrating yeah” (lines 311-312) 
  The participant produced the account while explaining to me how, in his own 
words, he “blows things out of proportion”. The ideas that he blows out of 
proportion appear to translate the others’ stance as an intentional attempt to 
disturb him, thus wronging him. Frustration here is presented as arising from his 
internal state but also from the continuous problematic relationships with others 
(his colleague, his mother, his flatmates), thus giving way to anger with the 
participant’s exclamation “Oh my god!”. This could be read as an expression of his 
anger at others, but most probably also marks his inability to cope with these out-
of-proportion ideas and a passage into angry mode, where the emotion comes 
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pouring out uncontrollably. The question that transforms frustration into anger can 
be traced to his quotation of his understanding of the event at the time: “Why are 
you wronging me?”. This demand to know why something is the way he interprets 
it may be the key turning point in transforming situational frustration to anger. This 
attempt at an explanation is doomed to fail because of the very nature of internal 
frustration which distorts the participant’s judgment and thought. If he could 
disentangle from this frustration in him, he would (presumably) see the incident as 
minor and/or he would be in position to see that the other is not doing it to upset 
him – he simply gets upset because of his own frustrated state and the way he 
interprets the world around him while in that state. The problem then is presented 
as found within the self and the fallacious way of looking at the situation, rather 
than between the participant and other people. The participant presents himself as 
not able to see that while in a state of frustration, and therefore as struggling to 
justify something that is not there to begin with. This attempt is doomed to fail as 
the object he attempts to understand is non-existent. Consequently, anger’s rise is 
presented as providing the participant with a way out of the self-reported ever-
growing feeling that he has no agency over a situation where the others’ sole 
purpose is to displease him. What the participant presents here is his impression 
that everyone is wronging him, and casts it as an exaggeration of the actual 
situations and not based on reality. Nevertheless, he presents it as a state that feels 
very real for him and that informs his understanding of the situations that bring this 
about. He therefore implies that, when calm, he understands that it is frustration 
that brings about anger. However, when angry, the two states merge into one and 
his judgment is clouded and frustration leads anger.  
 
   For participant 10, a source of anger and frustration is offered as arising from his 
surroundings: he finds himself unable to please other people, even though he tries 
his best:  
“I feel like I never do anything (.) properly and I’ve some times I feel like I’m 
giving aw(.) I’m giving away a lot of myself to other people […] ah: to make 
them happy (.) and they’re never happy* (.) and that just makes me (..) angry* 
and frustrated” (lines 320-323) 
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   The participant presents himself as making a plan to please others. Unfortunately, 
however, others are constructed as always finding things to complain about. His 
efforts, consequently, are presented as going to waste and this, in the account, is 
what makes him think that he is giving away a lot, perhaps too much, of himself 
without the desired reciprocity or appreciation. This understanding is presented as 
creating tensions in him, presumably leading him to questions of why he attempts 
to please them, whereas an element of shame is probably also prevalent here: the 
way others disregard his offerings leaves him feeling embarrassed and humiliated. 
His effort to comprehend the other’s lack of desired response constructs his figure 
as “angry and frustrated”. His figure is therefore cast in a light of incomprehension; 
incomprehension both of what he is not doing right, and of why the others cannot 
be at least appreciative of his efforts. Frustration is therefore presented as an 
element of stagnation and misery in his account, since it prevents him from taking 
decisive action to lift his mood.  This indirectly justifies the surfacing anger. If he 
had the means to get the answers to these questions, he would not feel so 
frustrated and consequently he would not feel so angry.  
 
    Participant 8, offers a story where he was arrested for drink-driving. He admits 
that this was his fault, but what he foregrounds in relation to his anger is the 
distance between the legal system’s workings and what he calls “common sense” – 
he presents himself as found trying to explain a situation to people who would not 
understand:  
“once the cops get you and they come after you and they start harassing you 
(.) [claps hands] that’s it (.) it’s [muffled] complete 
-did that* piss you off? 
-yeah I was pissed off but you know the the cops it’s like you’re fighting a brick 
wall you know you fight a brick wall (.) and I had to go and deal with cases and 
judges and (.) I came to realize “my God” (.) common sense* (.) my common 
sense thinking (.)” (lines 703-705) 
   The participant’s figure is presented here in a situation where the discourses in 
operation are others than the ones he masters. In other words, he constructs 
himself-in-a-situation where the common, everyday words he uses were not 
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admissible; he presents himself as lacking the means to defend himself within a 
legal setting, even though his words would be perfectly understood outside the 
legal setting. The tools he has been using all his life to effectively communicate with 
others are presented as not working there. It was this incident, he states later on in 
his interview, that made him start studying law: he wanted to be able to express 
himself within that realm, using the discourses people of that realm comprehend – 
and presumably relieve himself of some of the tension caused by this lack of agency 
he found himself in through this process. The participant mobilizes the repertoire 
of “frustration” here to justify his emotional reaction of anger.  
  
     For most participants, it seems the state of anger is closely linked to that of 
frustration. The two appear together in their accounts, and frustration is presented 
as breeding anger and therefore, by the sheer number of bringing the two states 
together, a co-existence of the two is normalized and therefore implied throughout 
their accounts. The participants present their inability to attend to situations 
maximally and comprehensively as the equivalent of goal obstruction where the 
obstructing agent is unidentifiable and that generates anger in them which might 
be directed to the situation, to the others involved, or to themselves. Their 
constructions present the origin of anger as a non-understanding other (the 
‘frustrating person’, or actor attribution) the behaviour of whose leads the 
participant into anger, or a situation where their social competence and 
performance break down, leaving them puzzled as to why this happens. This is not 
the sole relation that is presented between the two states. As we shall see in the 
next section, internal frustration is often expressed in the form of anger.  
 
5.1.2: Expressing Frustration Through Anger 
  
    In response to a question about the origins of anger, Participant 1 offers: 
“Um, getting frustrated is the first part (.) but then (.) getting angry is a whole 
different step (..) And so, getting angry is I think (.) version 2 of getting 
frustrated and it’s just getting frustrated on another level where you just have 
to take it out on something (.) or you have to say something” (lines 204-205) 
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    Anger, in this passage, is presented as the resolution to maximized frustration 
(“frustrated on another level”). It is also presented as different from frustration 
since it involves the agent taking action: no longer dwelling on the 
incomprehensibility of the logic behind the events but letting it out, either as a 
comprehensible course of action (saying something) or simply as an explosive 
reaction (taking it out on something). Anger, then, is presented as the participant’s 
response to his internal frustration. While angry, he is letting out frustration. This 
automatically creates the implication that the participant cannot be in control of 
his behaviour or thoughts while angry, because these are by their very nature a 
product of frustration, clouded in a mist of incomprehension for him.  
   The way one’s inability to express his frustration turns it into anger is best 
sketched out by Participant 3 in the following excerpt: 
“I never thought about (.) I mean “I want control on people; this or that” you 
know (.) it’s ah: it was always more I wanted to show people how (.) frustrated 
I was with them at that times and I couldn’t express it in any other way than 
just [kicks and punches the air]” (lines 494-495) 
   Discussing how his anger makes him shout at people, he stresses that his shouting 
is not an attempt to control their behaviour or to impose his way; rather, he sees it 
as an attempt to express his frustration with others. The expression it assumes, of 
course, scares people and that extends his internal frustration even further, as he 
still does not get his message across – his interlocutors get a wrong or distorted 
message which he then has to rectify in order to get his real message across. This 
inability to give his internal frustration the expression he would like to is presented 
as resulting in non-communication which is in turn presented in his account visually, 
by pausing his narration and simply gesturing kicks and punches in the air: trying to 
break out of a fishing net of incomprehension which only entangles him further, 
augmenting his internal frustration and turning it into anger - which he then uses 
as a force to keep trying to get out of that net of incomprehension. Frustration in 
this account is presented as the reason why the participant cannot be in control of 
his actions (or the results of those) while angry.  
      The lack of understanding and the shortage of ways to improve things also 
makes its appearance in the following description of the link between anger and 
frustration by the same participant: 
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“it’s obviously a cumulative thing as well cos you know it’s not like I’m always 
impatient with people like that but you know it’s after a certain amount of time 
(.) I wouldn’t say anything at all (.) then you get frustrated for a certain amount 
of time you think “oh bloody hell it’s a normal part of life to be frustrated with 
people” cos I’m not a complete psychopath it wasn’t a complete psychopath 
either but eventually it comes to the point where nothing gets any better even 
though you drop hints etcetera you know in that (.) you know you think that 
the last resort is to get re:ally angry” (lines 117-121) 
   This account was produced when the participant described his relationship with 
a person he used to be friends with. The participant says he was annoyed by some 
things that person did. At first he was saying nothing, telling himself that “it is a 
normal part of life to be frustrated with people”. After a while the participant tried 
to communicate his frustration with the situation to his friend, unsuccessfully: the 
person did not change their ways.  The frustration then becomes more and more 
an internal state, a state where the participant does not know how to express 
himself more effectively or what to do in order to get rid of that negative feeling. 
“It comes to the point where nothing gets any better even though you drop hints 
etcetera” the participant says, highlighting the difference between what he 
expected or hoped to see (change and improvement) and what he found 
(stagnation and misery). “The last resort is to get really angry” he concludes, again 
stressing the direct link between internal frustration and anger, how the former 
works as a catalyst for the latter and how anger is presented as a last resort, a 
clumsy but necessary reaction to get rid of the frustration.  
   It is worth noting that in this passage anger is presented as a conscious choice, a 
conscious attempt to break out of the state of frustration. Essentially, what the 
participant constructs here is the choice of letting go: frustration and anger are 
presented as continuously building up the more he keeps them inside him and so 
his decision to express them is presented as an attempt to put an end to this 
tyrannical crescendo. Even though the action of letting his anger out is presented 
as a conscious effort and thus under his agency, the way in which it is let out is 
presented as shaped and guided by the internal frustration which is there precisely 
because he cannot find any other way of letting others know of his anger.  
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   Participant 5, when asked to give examples of what generates anger in him, 
describes his relationship with another member in one of his bands: 
“there’s a certain member in that band who has been a proper pain in my side 
for years (.) unfortunately he’s ludicrously talented so (..) I cannot just (.) stop 
working with him as he would sort of (..) a lot of (.) the band would lose identity 
if he were to leave the band (.) 
-Mhm 
-Which he has done on numerous* occasions and keeps coming back* (.) the 
main issue is that he is one of the forming members along with me and (.) um 
(.) the band means a lot to him (.) like a (.) I don’t think many other things in 
life mean quite a lot to him than the band (.) as the band does (.) ah: and he’s 
a very very frustrating person (.) um: he’s the kind of (.) he’s very very (.) 
pigheaded in a way (.) or very mule-like in a way that (.) when he decides he 
can’t be bothered to do something he won’t do it (.) even though he’s 
promised* (..) he won’t answer his phone (.) he won’t show up (.) and (.) he 
clearly has seasonal depression for (.) in the winter he clearly has this 
depression and (.) he basically knows this (.) but he refuses to do anything 
about it (.) it’s something that can be dealt with quite easily today um:: but 
basically (.) ah: he decides not to and he makes that (.) not only his* problem 
but also our* problem so I find it very very hard to deal with his* stubbornness 
and his way of not doing things he’s promised” (lines 38-46) 
   The participant’s frustration here is squarely presented as arising out of the 
member’s behaviour. The musician (“a certain member” as the annoyed participant 
presents him in an effort to diminish his significance) is painted as a “ludicrously 
talented” individual, who has been a co-founder of the band. With him comes a lot 
of the band’s identity. These statements solidify him as someone the participant 
cannot easily dismiss or do away with: the musician is an important part of the 
band’s history and identity. He is, however, presented as someone who is very 
difficult to work with: having left the band a number of times only to come back; 
making promises pertaining to the band’s career which he later breaks; and going 
into long periods of not showing up at rehearsals or even answering his phone. 
Most of these, the participant adds, are effects of his seasonal (winter) depression; 
something which everyone in the band is aware of, including the member himself. 
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This is something the participant implies he can understand. The musician is 
presented as “refusing” to do anything about it, even though in the participant’s 
eyes “it is something that can be dealt with quite easily today” (e.g. by going to a 
psychiatrist, as the participant adds later on in the interview). This constructs that 
member’s lack of action as something the participant cannot understand or justify. 
By making this decision to not take care of his depression, the musician’s figure is 
cast as creating problems for the band. It is exactly this refusal from his side to 
explore options that would make his and the band’s life easier (options which are 
clear to the participant), as well as his unstable character, that is presented as a 
source of frustration for the participant.  
   The situation here is that of a band: the band is composed of its members; each 
member has his own life but they all contribute towards the band. When one of the 
members fails to keep up, the band lags behind. If it was something that could not 
be avoided, or if the musician tried to find a way to work through it, the participant 
implies that he would not be as angry. Since there are solutions, however, or at 
least a basic morality of keeping one’s promises which needs to be upheld, the 
participant describes the musician as “pigheaded”, “mule-like” and “stubborn”, 
qualities that signify one as a person hard to work or reason with: a “frustrating 
person”. This relational context, the inability to reason or to have a mutual 
understanding of one-another is presented as the source of frustration for the 
participant; and this frustration is presented here as being internalized and giving 
rise to anger (note that the account was produced when asked about things that 
make him angry, not frustrated). The participant constructs a situation where the 
musician’s behaviour has left him feeling internally frustrated because he finds 
himself powerless to engage with the situation and interact with that person; a 
necessity to keep the band going. Anger is presented as the participant’s justified 
response to finding himself unable to reason with that person and situation: as 
coming in place of what would be a comprehensive conversation and mutual 
agreement with that member of the band but that other member does not 
facilitate.  
 
    Discussing whether anger is a natural state for him, as he “knows” he has a lot of 
it, Participant 6 goes on to say: 
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“if I think about it I don’t think people are born like that I think it’s something 
that has developed in* me because of frustration (.) that’s why I’ve been 
thinking a lot about it recently (.) to try to understand because I don’t think it’s 
normal* I don’t think it’s healthy because it brings you stress (.) you know so: I 
(.) I am pretty sure it’s related to my education um: (.) a lot due to what my 
parents forced* on me (.) um having no freedom” (lines 180-183) 
   In this quote, anger is presented as born of frustration. Frustration, at the same 
time, is presented as instilled in him from his very inability to find his own voice 
among those of his parents. His parents, the participant claims, had a mould for him 
and would not listen to his own wishes about his future. So, a person describing 
himself as having a lot of anger, takes a step back and tells me that the anger is not 
there by itself, but was brought about by frustration generated by his surroundings 
and relationship with his parents: the frustration of his upbringing, where his 
parents “forced” ideas, practices and attitudes on him. Essentially, the participant 
constructs his parents’ figures as ones that never loved the “real” him, but instead 
an image of his that they wished to shape27. This, in his account, is seen as leaving 
him experiencing himself as a child vulnerable to their decisions and unable to take 
control of his own wants and plans, or to even express them to his parents. He 
constructs a narrative where his loss of agency and engagement with the situation 
during his childhood is what frustrated him internally and, since he could not 
express this frustration even to his closest people (his parents), his anger started 
building up. Anger is therefore presented as something the participant is in 
possession of, precisely as a way to counterbalance frustration.  
   Participant 10’s account of his anger experiences largely revolves around his 
frustration at not being able to reason with his girlfriend of many years. When asked 
to give me an example of what his bottled-up anger feels like when exploding, he 
offers: 
“my girlfriend was complaining about her weight (.) for a long time (.) and so I 
kept suggesting (.) do a diet go to the gym (.) to do these things and (.) we (.) 
                                                          
27 “you know (.) the frustration part of them (.) ah (.) forcing* me into one specific way of life (.) 
that* leads to anger but maybe the part that leads to melancholy and sadness is probably the (.) the 
(..) the love (.) you know because basically I’ve I feel that (.) I wasn’t aware of that as a kid (.) but I 
was probably feeling it (.) that (.) my parents weren’t loving* me they were loving (..) an image of 
me or or something they (.) they thought I should* be (.) so they were creating (.) another* person” 
(lines 253-257) 
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you know we started talking I started trying to encourage her and um (..) eh: 
(.) I was getting so* frustrated that (.) I was just like (.) [shouting] “I don’t 
wanna have to say these things again! I keep saying this to you!” or “why 
aren’t you listening to me? I’ve… This is what I’ve done this is what other people 
have done why don’t you just try it might be different than the past”” (lines 83-
86) 
   The situation here is that of a discussion between him and his girlfriend, who is 
complaining about her weight. The participant constructs her figure as a frustrating 
one because of the lack of comprehension between them. He stresses that, in his 
eyes, she does not really want to try and change it because, if she did, she would 
be following the advice he has given her time and again: “do a diet go to the gym”. 
So the way it is presented is that while he is trying to encourage her towards 
improvement of the situation with reasonable arguments (tried and tested 
methods that he and others have successfully followed, as he stresses in the 
interview), she seems more interested in complaining than in seeking any advice. 
The participant feels that his words fall on deaf ears (“why aren’t you listening to 
me?”) and his time and effort go to waste (“I don’t wanna have to say these things 
again!”), so his frustration that is generated from continuously failed 
communication with his partner turns into anger which he indirectly justifies by 
implying that she is wasting his time and testing his patient.  
   
   This inability to verbally get his message across, then, is presented as making 
space for anger to roam and to dictate thoughts and behaviours. Describing how 
this makes him feel, the participant offers: 
“I I’ve never hit* my partner I never would* but um (..) I sometimes I feel like I 
(..) you know (.) not I want to but (.) it’s just (.) there’s a point where it’s just (.) 
I can’t I can’t I can’t (.) express* myself through words anymore (.) and getting 
I’m getting more* and more angry and I don’t know what is (.) I don’t know 
how else to get that aggression that’s boiling up inside” [note: he was banging 
his hand on the table throughout this passage] (lines 93-96) 
   Here the participant appears torn on whether he would want to hit his girlfriend 
as a result of his internal frustration or not. His inability to express himself through 
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words is presented as driving him to find a different, non-verbal way to do so; only 
this time it is not his thoughts, but his emotions that he wishes to express. The 
emotion is constructed as outpouring during the interview as well, as the 
participant was banging his hand on the table persistently while giving me the 
above account. This banging I would interpret as a mirroring of what he was telling 
me at the time – his internal frustration giving way to anger which can be best 
expressed not through words but through actions of destruction, violence and 
oppression so that the participant’s voice can be finally heard. This is presented as 
a shameful reaction, since he implies that he is embarrassed about the way he feels. 
 
   Discussing further whether physical violence, however morally unacceptable, 
might be a solution to the problem, a way of making his girlfriend see his own 
viewpoint, the participant says: 
“I’m getting this* frustrated (.) like th(.) the (.) normally the extremity of it 
would be like me posturing or shouting or doing something that’s (.) that puts 
her on an edge and stops her (.) which isn’t right (.) but her (.) her dad (.) you 
know (.) maybe go (.) have gone a bit further […] on this isolated occasion like 
maybe 2-3 occasions that that’s happened a:nd (.) um (.) I’m like (.) I kind of 
understand why (..) why h(.) why h(..) why: he did that (.) not that I think it’s 
right (.) not that I would (.) I would always wanna stop myself from doing it (.) 
bu:t (..) I get to this point where it’s like (2sec) [bangs hand on table] I’m getting 
so* frustrated that that seems like the rational* (.) thing to do like (.) [raises 
his volume] “can’t explain anymore! Can’t talk anymore!”” (lines 498-505) 
   Physical violence is here presented as something that could bring an end to 
frustration – both the situational one (where his words fall on deaf ears) and his 
internal one (where he does not understand why this is the case). Seeing that his 
girlfriend fails, refuses, or avoids to see eye-to-eye with his own logic time and time 
again, the participant presents himself as beginning to sympathize with the violent 
way her father acted towards her in the past: when words or logic fail, he says, 
violence feels like the only way of putting across one’s point of view. This comes 
screaming out of the account in the same way that the participant ends his account 
with an enactment of how he feels when confronted with his girlfriend’s 
irrationality: “Can’t explain anymore! Can’t talk anymore!”. The frustration of 
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having to explain the same thing over and over to someone who eventually does 
not follow up on it is presented as giving way to anger over this very situation of 
having to waste one’s time and effort on someone who does not understand. This 
account underlines releasing this internal frustration as anger, as an explosive 
instinct, but also that his rational side immediately jumps in and disclaims “not that 
I think it’s right… I would always wanna stop myself from doing that”. Nevertheless, 
his frustration at the situation is presented as creating a bridge between his own 
experience and that of his girlfriend’s dad: a confrontation with a girl who prefers 
to whine than taking action, while simultaneously asking for their help. This 
behaviour of hers, in the participant’s account, creates a frustration which, in the 
participant’s eyes, justifies her father’s behaviour (perhaps the participant wishes 
he could put rationality aside and act similarly himself). In turn, this justification he 
gives to her father’s action is constructed as a further source of internal frustration 
for him: he presents himself as unable to accept that he would endorse this 
behaviour even in the slightest – nevertheless, he finds himself making these 
thoughts. He therefore presents himself as a figure in a situation where he needs 
to acknowledge the fury generated in him, which he cannot rationally embrace 
even though he sees it as justified. In other words, a dialogue inside the 
participant’s head between his moral, ethical and emotional selves is constructed 
at this part of the narrative: the emotional self justifies his desired actions, whereas 
the moral one condemns it. This in itself is given as magnifying the participant’s 
frustration, as he presents different modalities of himself as conflicting with one-
another.  
   This theme shows that anger and frustration go hand-in-hand. What appears to 
be the case for the participants is that anger starts as frustration: the inability to 
comprehend or engage in a situation when they feel they should be able to do so 
eventually causes internal frustration.  
   Frustration is presented as a double process, involving not being understood on 
the one hand and not understanding why they are not understood on the other. As 
frustration grows, the participants present themselves feeling not only out of 
control, but out of touch with the situation; their sense of agency as dissipating; 
and anger as a way for them to express themselves in an effort to break down the 
situation into more comprehensively communicative parts, find and explore a new 
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way of looking at the situation for them and the others involved, and thus make 
themselves understood.   
 
 
      5.2 Anger In and Out of the Body  
 
   When asked about what anger feels like, the vast majority of my participants 
mentioned changes in their physiology as its primary manifestation. They therefore 
construct a repertoire of anger as something that comes in and out of the body. 
This shines through in the metaphors used by the participants to describe its 
presence. 
 
   P.1 for example, when asked what anger feels like, offers the following 
description: 
“Your veins start… For me, I don’t know how other people (.) but for me it feels 
like your veins and your blood (.) rushes more around your body. It feels like (.) 
there’s something in me (.) that’s not me (.) like, it doesn’t feel like it’s me that’s 
in control of my body.” (lines 73-74) 
   The description draws on bodily changes exclusively. Besides the effects of vein 
dilation and blood rushing fervently around the body, the participant also states 
that, when angry, he does not feel in control of his body. He therefore implies that 
it is either him, consciously in control of his body and what he does with it, or anger 
in his place, in the process implying that he cannot be held responsible for his 
behaviour when angry.  
   Even though the anger manifests in the body for this participant, its origins seem 
to be elsewhere. A few lines later, the participant exclaims: “It comes to you. It 
comes to you within an instant” (line 199). 
      In this quote, the participant brings into the discussion a perceived difference 
between internal and external world; i.e. world within the body and outside it. 
Describing anger as “coming to you” means that anger is not generated within the 
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body; rather, it pierces it from the outside. The process is described exclusively in 
terms of space/body, as the absence of time (“within an instant”) denotes.     
   Other participants also describe anger as lingering inside the body – not a 
sensation though, but an entity separate from the experiencer’s body. P.3 explains 
that even after the event that gave rise to anger is over, the leftovers of anger are 
still there: “you get angry and afterwards it lingers the anger stays there” (line 135). 
P.5 also describes the advent of anger in bodily terms, and anger itself as contained 
within his body: “as anger comes it comes like as a wave it feels almost like it’s 
coming from my spine to my head” (line 135). P.7 describes his experience of anger 
as a chemical that floats around his body (“for me it’s (.) in here [points to the chest 
area] (.) feels like some sort of chemical is being released” (line 137)); whereas P.8 
describes anger as a heat wave that travels around his upper body:  
“it’s like something’s boiling from (.) inside me (.) it’s going up my chest and 
it’s like (.) I feel like heat in my chest you know like steam (.) not h not like 
stea:m like I want to burp (.) but it’s not coming out as a burp you know? 
-mhm 
-and then (2sec) you know (..) it’s like it’s in my hands (.) it just goes from my 
chest it goes to my shoulders it goes in my arms” (lines 85-88) 
   In this participant’s account anger is mapped onto many different areas of the 
body, making his description of the transference of heat from one to the other very 
rich and deep. Starting from the chest (where breathing occurs and the heart 
beats), anger is then likened to steam which travels through the participant’s larynx 
“like a burp” and thus flows towards his mouth. The participant then describes this 
steam as taking a detour from his mouth and ending up in his shoulders and then 
in his hands. The participant is thus presenting the whole journey of anger as 
spreading across his body like a steam ending up in his hands, which hints at 
preparedness to take action and to fight. The underlying impression is that anger is 
creating pressure and leads to congestion or over-fullness as this entity of air takes 
up space in an already full body and this creates the grounds for a justification for 
his behaviour when angry – he claims he physically needs to empty up space in 
himself by getting rid of the anger (which happens in anger’s own terms, as the IPA 
theme of “Anger is Irresistible” shows later on in this thesis).  
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   P.9 describes it as: 
 “(.)almost like a hydraulic system I feel* like there’s a well within me” (line 23) 
and stresses that it is elements external to himself (in particular “drama” from his 
partner) that raise the volume of water in that well inside him:   
“-Does this drama make you angry? Or / 
-/Yes it does* (.) it does (..) I take it inside*” (lines 177-178) 
   It is interesting to note how “taking it inside” for the participant marks the onset 
and presence of anger. His body acts like a vessel (this is a metaphor he used himself 
at a different stage in the interview28) where anger is poured and contained. 
Participant 9, in other words, presents his body as a receptor of elements from the 
external world which alter his internal balance (of humours).  
   The whole presentation of anger as an external entity coming into the body leads 
to an evaluation of it as dysphoric. The body feels under pressure and the person 
feels the strain. He therefore implies that anger’s advent is something he does not 
welcome but cannot avoid either.  
    P.3 describes anger “like there’s a heat there (.) and there’s a pressure there a:nd 
you can feel yourself trembling and your heart rates are starting to go up and m. 
you are about to explode” (lines 218-219). Dysphoria is strikingly present in this 
account: anger is presented as a heat that links to pressure (harking back to the 
“boiling” metaphor) which makes him tremble and feel like his body is about to 
explode. Assuming that composure and the ability to diffuse negative affect are 
considered desirable traits in adults and signs of a person who is in control of their 
own body, anger here is presented as a disruptive force for the participant in 
relation to his body and, by extension, his presence in the world. Anger, therefore, 
is constructed as disorientating him and throws him back into an immature state. 
   P.5 speaks of “anger* that’s bursting*” (line 20) and mentions that “the fury is 
just (.) overboiling” (line 64). Again, anger here is likened to a force that threatens 
to break through the very fabric of the participant’s body, whereas fury is again 
compared to boiling water which is about to spill out (thus again hinting towards a 
                                                          
28 “I might be a suitable (.) ah (.) vessel for other people to pour whatever they want into” (lines 
309-310) 
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breakdown of the barriers imposed by the participant’s body, which stands in place 
of the hob here). Similarly, P.6 describes himself when angry as “my blood is 
boiling” (line 92) and anger itself as a “build-up (.) you know and then it explodes” 
(line 405).  
   The notion of explosion is central to the participants’ accounts. With it, of course, 
comes the implication that the participant is no longer in control of his own actions. 
The actions he carries out while angry, therefore, are implicitly constructed as by-
products of the explosion. They are not actions anymore, since they are not wilfully 
executed by an agent, but rather a kind of fall-out from an accident.  
    P.7 compares anger to a wave29, referring in particular to the wave’s intensity 
(that presumably crushes or sweeps the person). This wave is also, the participant 
says, spread out across time and not limited to the moment the angering event 
occurs. Evaluating its effects, P.7 stresses that this disrupts his regular ability to 
focus and proceed with his daily routine and needs:  
“this wave when you reach the peak it starts to go down afterwards but of 
course uh (.) this (.) wave could last several days (..) um:: certainly yeah (.) 
eating (.) performing normal bodily functions is difficult (.) don’t wanna eat (.) 
don’t wanna drink (.) can’t sleep (.) can’t read” (lines 711-713).  
   Describing in more detail how he understands this experience, the participant 
stresses the unpleasant nature of that wave with references to his body: “it 
manifest itself (.) with a terrible (.) feeling in your chest (.) something there which 
you’ve (.) got to get rid of (.)” (lines 608-609). Anger here is firmly located in the 
chest and the participant stresses that there is a desire to get rid of it, to take it off 
his chest. P.7 also described anger “like an oaring sensation” (line 182). This evokes 
simultaneously the effort from the side of the person who oars to go against the 
pressure of the water; and the vertical up-and-down movement the boat is led to 
by sea-waves. Therefore notions of pressure, strife, and imbalance come together 
to describe the experience of anger. This metaphor links well with his use of the 
“wave” (whereby the participant struggles to navigate amidst the waves of anger) 
but also signifies a sense of nausea that comes along with anger.  
                                                          
29 “just like a wave you know… because it’s a (.) it has intensity (.) that’s why I think a wave describes 
it so it’s like (.) the intensity can grow you know even after the effect you know?” (lines 198-202) 
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   Bringing the notion of anger as extra (and unwanted) weight back on the table, 
P.8 states that “you get angry and angry (.) the more you get angry the more it gives 
you (.) pressure” (line 710) while describing anger as a “pile-up on you” (line 45) to 
underline the uncomfortable feeling that comes with it. These two quotes reveal 
how the pressure induced by anger is perceived as constraining by the participant, 
congesting his body and making movement difficult. 
   P.9 also brings up this notion of piling up by referring to anger as “seething”:  
“It seethes it kind of (.) it builds up* (.) it’s almost like a hydraulic system I feel* 
like there’s a well within me (.) you know and I try to keep the levels down but 
every now and again sometimes some extreme* (.) overflows occur” (lines 23-
24).  
   His choice of the term “extreme overflows” to describe angry outbursts points to 
an unpleasant and uncontrollable outpouring of anger, implying that the 
participant then has to go back and metaphorically clean up the mess caused by 
this outpouring. It is also interesting to note here that outpourings, like explosions 
(as mentioned in other participants’ accounts), are destructive events which can be 
best conceptualized as accidents instead of deliberate actions. Hence, the notion 
of agency (of lack thereof) makes its way indirectly in the participant’s account here 
too.   
    P.10, along similar lines, refers to anger as “that aggression that’s boiling up 
inside” (line 96) before expanding into a variation of a widely used metaphor: 
“people use the: (.) the example of a kettle [bangs hand on table] you know like 
going going going and then like (.) exploding” (lines 75-76). The participant probably 
refers to a “pressure cooker” instead of a kettle: a cooking hob that starts a 
whistling sound while water turns to steam and eventually the tap shoots out 
unless the pressure cooker is taken off the fire. It is interesting to note how the 
kettle eventually switches off instead of exploding, when enough steam has been 
produced. The way the participant portrays it here though brings destruction 
(through explosion) to the metaphor. The metaphor is one of pressure building 
inside him and then leading to an uncontrolled explosion if not attended to.  
   In line with this description of anger as inside and outside the body (anger present 
and anger gone, respectively), P.7 described the act of expressing his anger as 
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“letting it come out” (line 51), whereas P.4 described it as “getting it out” (line 81) 
and “putting it out” (line 164). Despite the different representations of the person’s 
power over anger in these two accounts (the former represents the person as a 
passive host of anger whereas the latter as an active agent in how anger is shaped), 
the phrasal verbs both used point to moving anger from inside the body to outside 
it. Both hint at a level of discomfort: “Letting it come out” hints at a strain while the 
anger was in, whereas “getting it out” denotes an active effort to no longer have it.  
   Anger, then, gets out of the body when it is expressed. This is something that most 
of the participants brought into the conversation – again, mostly through their 
language use itself, instead of detailed descriptions of their experiences.   
   The distinction between internal and external takes on further significance when 
it comes to expressing anger. P.2 for example, to describe what expressing his anger 
feels like states that “once it’s out, it’s gone* it’s out of you, you don’t have to, you 
don’t have to carry it around with you anymore” (line 123-124). The organization 
of the discourse here follows a clear pattern where “in the body” means “angry” 
and “out of the body” means “calm”. Contrasting the process of relief from anger 
with the lack thereof, the participant describes the angry person as “carrying anger 
around” with them. Similarly, the same participant mentioned in a different part of 
his interview that, when not expressing his anger, “the feeling is still there, it’s still 
manifesting inside” (line 150). Here, too, the participant clearly locates anger as 
inside the body. Participant 2, then, describes anger as a concrete entity that has 
weight, separate from him and his body that, when manifest, he carries around 
with him and inside him.  
  Freeing up space in the body by diffusing anger is brought up by other participants 
too. For P.3, anger “bursts out” of the body when expressed:  
“normally it doesn’t bother you but then one day you decide that it does and 
[snaps fingers] burst out” (lines 156-157).  
P.6 speaks of “getting it out” (“yeah I wanna punch something sometimes I feel like 
that (.) and I just (.) yeah I wanna get it out (..) but I I rarely do” – lines 544-545), 
whereas P.7 stresses that expressing his anger is an effort to “get rid of” that 
terrible feeling in his chest generated by anger (“it manifest itself (.) with a terrible 
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(.) feeling in your chest (.) something there which you’ve (.) got to get rid of”- lines 
608-609). 
   All of these accounts evoke an image of anger as something that possesses the 
person; something like a wild animal or an alien force that the person needs to 
discard from their body in order to feel calm again.  
 
    Getting rid of the anger, therefore, is a “release”. For P.9, anger and “the need to 
let it out” are both seen as “forces” of human life: “it’s a real force of human life (.) 
aggression and the (.) the need to (.) let it out” (lines 561-562).  
    P.4 describes it perfectly when he speaks about writing lyrics to his songs inspired 
by his anger: “it feels like an urge and part of that is getting (.) releasing all that 
anger and getting it down onto (.) to paper” (lines 82-83). For P.4 then, anger 
follows a course of a build-up which then makes him look for a release (a release 
he manages to get through creative and artistic activities): 
“if this is all the build-up and the ah: the tension (.) then the release of all that 
wherever (.) you know if I’m playing live or if I’m in the studio or even if I’m just 
writing and I’m alone (.) um (..) it does feel like a physical release” (lines 73-
74).  
The participant describes the need for release as an urge brought about by anger’s 
build-up. 
   Interestingly, when it leaves the body anger is passed on to others. When 
prompted, P.6 theorizes the very nature of anger as a type of energy that can be 
transmitted to people: “I think it’s something you can pass on to people” (lines 737-
738), later on explaining that if someone is angry in a room then others will absorb 
this negativity and get angry or irritable themselves. P.10 explains how arguments 
with his girlfriend pass her anger on to him (“or maybe it will just be ten (.) five 
minutes of me going “mmm” you know “whatever” and like it will just stay with her 
(.) like instead of passing on (.) to me”- lines 369-372). What the participant was 
talking about at that stage is the arguments he and his girlfriend get into. He 
proposes that, in instances where his partner initiates the fight, he could stay out 
of the argument (by “going “mmm””) and let her anger stay with her. As soon as he 
engages in the argument, however, he feels anger seeping into his body. In other 
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words, if he stays away from that radiant anger she brings to the table, he will not 
be infected by it.  
   This closes the circle of anger as in and out of the body, showing how others can 
make one angry and, in turn, this one person also makes others angry. As energy 
cannot be destroyed but only moved or be transformed, so does anger have to be 
moved somewhere or turned into something else (like words on paper or music). 
 
   Anger is talked about as having weight, even substance of its own. This invades 
the body and brings the sufferers under its possession, compromising their control 
of their actions, thoughts and feelings. Conceptualizing anger in that way brings 
about further implications for both the thing described (anger) and the ontologies 
discussed (the participants). The body is presented as a defined space. This helps 
outline anger’s arrival and departure, making the event a highly distinguishable 
one: the person is or is not angry. Anger may take some time to diffuse, or it may 
explode, overflow or burst out. After it does, the person returns to his normal, calm 
and composed state. The participants, then, are presented as aware of their own 
state and thus able to say whether they are in control of the situation, or whether 
anger has taken control of them. By employing this theme, therefore, the 
participants present anger as a passion (in Averill’s terms) which takes over the 
individual and leaves him/her no other option but to follow anger’s commands. The 
participants therefore make excuses for their behaviour while angry (which tends 
to be harmful and chaotic as the next theme shows) by stressing that anger’s advent 
is a physiological process and they cannot stop it or control it better.  
 
  5.3 Anger as Harmful and Chaotic 
  The participants of this study used metaphors that construct anger as chaotic 
(disruptive of reason and patterns) and harmful (to the self and to others) 
extensively. This section explores how anger is portrayed as leading to chaos within 
and without the person; how anger can cause harm unbeknown to the angry 
person; and how chaos and harm form a cycle of disruption, distress and 
destruction. These accounts link well with the theme of anger as a pathogen as 
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presented in the AMCs (see chapter 4), having damaging consequences for the 
person’s mental balance and physical health.  
 
5.3.1: Chaos  
   The notion of chaos as the disruption of established norms is branded onto the 
participants’ narratives of anger.  
   For example, P1 describes the process of letting anger go as follows: “regain 
composure, become yourself, and then, you carry on with whatever you do” (line 
95). This implies that, while angry, he is lacking composure and is unable to “carry 
on with whatever” it is he does: anger has taken this ability away from him. It is 
interesting to note that the participant also includes the phrase “become yourself”, 
implying that while angry, it feels like he is not himself anymore. “The self” for this 
participant, therefore, revolves around notions of composure, continuity and 
agency. All of these are shattered by anger’s arrival. The participant here justifies 
his stance towards anger as a definitely “negative emotion” (as he states towards 
the end of his interview) by saying that it is him, first and foremost, who suffers 
from anger’s effects.  
   Along similar lines, P.3 explains how anger leads him to behave in ways that leave 
those around him gobsmacked. He explains that, while in that state, he tries to 
explain to others what it is that made him so angry but the state itself creates a mist 
around him and leaves him unable to accomplish that explanation until after anger 
has died out:  
“The explanation will come but th (.) why I was so angry will come () A:nd but 
it was always too late () So (..) because man I used to get rea:lly* angry (.) like 
(.) fucking irrationally swearing and screaming at the top of my voice angry 
and you know throwing shit about” (lines 85-92). 
  Chaos here is depicted not only through his reported inability to control his 
thoughts and express himself assertively and calmly during the anger episode, 
(which illuminate chaos as the force that disrupts his mental and verbal faculties), 
but also through his description of himself as throwing stuff around and screaming 
at the top of his voice: anger leads him to create chaos around him in an attempt 
to express this anger. Finally, the participant describes his reaction as “irrational” 
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which highlights his inability while calm (like during the interview) to relate to that 
state of anger, but also brings up irrationality as a trait of anger. The notion of 
shame is very prevalent here since “the explanation… was always too late” and this 
is used by the participant in order to mark himself as apologetic for his behaviour 
when angry.  
   Chaos, anger and the suspension of the ability to make calm and rational decisions 
are presented as going hand in hand in my participants’ accounts. For P.9, the 
surfacing chaos inflicted by anger is what sets things off course. Anger appears to 
cloud his rationality and judgment; this led him in the past to actions that were out 
of control, to the extent that the police had to intervene:  
“I was so* angry that (.) you know (.) my decision-making was (.) was (.) limited 
to the extent that the authorities had to get involved you know? I was not able 
to make rational choices” (lines 33-34).  
   The participant presents his anger as a barrier in his logic, therefore as a gateway 
to chaos. He constructs his figure as running out-of-control into a harmful situation 
and therefore implies that he does not welcome anger and he would rather retain 
his rationality30.  
 
   P.7 too makes a connection between anger and the disruption of his self-control, 
describing how there is always a good reason to make him angry but the effects the 
emotion has on his thinking lead him to chaotic mind paths which he struggles to 
keep under control: “there’s always a truth when I say I’ve been wronged there’s 
always a truth in it (.) it’s just I blow it out of all proportion” (lines 323-324). He 
continues by saying that when he takes a step back from the situation he sees that 
his initial thoughts are not logically supported but he cannot help making them:  
“and actually I’m sure that’s not the case right? I take a step back I’m sure 
that’s not the case (..) but it doesn’t stop my mind from thinking like that and 
trying to put everything together into some grand story (.) some grand horrible 
story” (lines 169-170).  
                                                          
30 This is challenged later in his interview (in the IPA theme of “Anger Can Be Positive” 
when he welcomes anger as a gateway for him to take action and therefore reclaim some 
of his face and agency.   
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   The participant here “takes a step back” to signal that during his interview, when 
he was in a composed state, he can see that anger brings about the disruption of 
logic and that his account of how he thinks when angry entails exaggeration. Anger 
leads the participant to extrapolate from a tiny fragment of logic that he can justify 
into out-of-control spiralling thoughts that he himself could not justify in his calm 
state. Chaos reigns supreme over logic when he is angry, consequently.  
   This tension between anger and logic is something that other participants have 
drawn on. P.4, for example, explores how anger dictates a different kind of logic 
than what he would employ in the absence of anger. Early in his interview the 
participant mentioned that, when customers at the pub where he works “cross a 
line” and start insulting him or other staff members, he feels “justified” to respond 
in an equally insulting way. Later on, I asked him if he only feels justified to do that 
or if he actually does it: 
“Mmm (2sec) you mentioned before that in other pubs you’ve worked that you 
were allowed to say “fuck off” to people and stuff like that (.) have you ever 
done this actually? 
-Yeah (.) yeah a few times (.) um: but I would (.) I would like to think not without 
good reason” (lines 36-38) 
 
   His anger, therefore, is a “good reason” for him to be rude to people. Anger, then, 
for this participant is a form of logic. The participant here creates an excuse for 
himself stepping outside the social boundaries of not insulting other people 
(especially when these are supported further by work boundaries of not insulting 
customers) by saying that it was them who brought about this reaction in him, 
whereas he only used his anger in order to justify this reaction and carry it out.  
 
   Chaos expands as anger is transmitted to others and disrupts their calm as well. 
Participant 6 says: 
 “if you’re angry you’re you get up (.) you’re angry you go and take your car 
drive and being upset on the ro:ad and piss off other people that person might 
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have a good day started his day well but then you got him upset he gets to 
work and gets his frustration on someone else*”  (lines 746-749) 
It is important to note that, in this passage, the reason for the anger changes – 
mutates, one may say. Person A was angry about something and acted chaotically, 
then Person B got angry at Person A acting chaotically, Person C sees Person B’s 
frustration and gets angry as well etc. It is essentially presented as a domino effect 
of anger, internal frustration and situational chaos in which any reason or logic is 
lost very early in the process. Interestingly, the participant employs a road with cars 
as the setting for the example he gives; roads are governed by strict rules and any 
violation of these rules may cause harm or, at the very least, chaos. Therefore, his 
option of a setting highlights chaos as prominent in anger. 
   Anger is therefore chaotic as it destabilizes the norms and smoothness of 
everyday life, even the sense of agency one has over his own self. Chaos, therefore, 
represents the opposite of reason (in the sense of rational behaviour) and by 
bringing the two together the participants justify or excuse their behaviour when 
angry, as it is attributable to the anger and not to the romantic view of their “true 
selves” (see Potter and Wetherell, 1987:99-101 passim).  
 
5.3.2: Harm  
   Harm is commonly associated with anger, especially through anger’s relation to 
acts of aggression, as the thematic analysis on Google-search has revealed and 
literature amply supports. The participants orient towards a discourse which 
constructs “anger” and “aggression” as closely linked. They all seemed to be aware 
of that construction, as they all stressed that they do not physically attack other 
people – at least not unless the others start first. Nevertheless, harm finds its way 
into their construction of their experiences in two ways: as an intent (to cause 
harm); and as an element of anger that backfires (causing self-harm).   
   P.8 presents his take on the harmful nature of anger in the following extract: “I’ve 
seen the kind of way that anger* is kinda eating people around me” (lines 28-29) 
he uses the verb “eating” to describe anger’s march: a violent expansion that leads 
to conquest, defeat and consumption of people in general. So here anger itself is 
personified and constructed as the aggressor (who is ‘eating people’). It is 
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interesting to note how (relevant to the “transmission of anger” as discussed in the 
previous section) anger here has not one source – it is presented as manifesting on 
all people simultaneously, for a different reason in each one. The participant here 
portrays himself as having witnessed the effects of anger, and therefore knowing 
of its harmful nature, implicitly marking the emotion as a negative force to be 
avoided.  
   P.7 describes how anger harmed him and his mental stability:  
“it was such a difficult period for me that extreme anger if you like and I ended 
up (.) suffering* from depression and I was put in a: (.) a hospital for people 
with mental health problems” (lines 2-3).  
   The story here is one of a difficult period full of suffering and sadness. The 
participant presents the case without distinguishing between his anger and the 
source of his problem: his anger was his problem, although the source of his anger 
lay elsewhere. Regardless of what caused his anger, it was the anger itself that 
harmed the participant.  
   Continuing with the theme of harm, participant 6 presents anger as a force that 
drives him to cause it:  
“I really wanna break the bike [laughs] I really wanna break the bike (.) well 
take (.) you know take it out or do* something”; “yeah I wanna punch 
something sometimes I feel like that (.) and I just (.) yeah I wanna get it out 
(..)” (lines 67-70).  
   Anger, then, is expressed through harm and destruction, which is simultaneously 
a way for the participant to “get it out”; anger therefore is constructed as some 
kind of negative energy that the participant does not want to keep inside but 
cannot get rid of in any way other than allowing it to take control of his body and 
unleash its wave on the world through him. Harm is one of the processes anger 
needs in order to feel satisfied (as the IPA chapter of “Anger is Irresistible” shows) 
and therefore the participant here creates an excuse for his violent desires when 
angry, implying that it is only natural under these emotional circumstances, as the 
laughter signifies. 
   Anger and destruction seem to go hand-in-hand for P.9 as well. While stating that 
he has suppressed the desire to break things (which he explicitly identifies as a 
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desire that follows anger) in his everyday life, P.9 stresses that he would still give in 
to it if he had a chance to do so in a controlled, legal and safe environment:  
“it makes me (.) agitated (.) I wanna (.) I wanna smash shit up (.) I mean that* 
impulse has been suppressed () but if I were in a room with plates and a 
baseball bat I would have so* much fun smashing shit up” (lines 557-559).  
   Destruction for him is presented as a joyful way of letting his anger out. Anger, 
therefore, is intimately linked to destruction in the participant’s account. The 
participant here clearly labels himself as being in check of his behaviour in social 
relations (“that* impulse has been suppressed”) and no longer being a threat to 
himself and to others. The nature of the emotion is presented as such that it creates 
this violent urge in him. The participant attempts to make no excuses for this violent 
urge, celebrating it instead for the pleasure and fun it can lead to when performed 
in isolation. 
   Nevertheless, P.9 does not proceed with the intent to destroy things. Instead, he 
takes the anger inside of him – and that leads to self-harm: 
“-And is this the source of anger? This internalization? 
-Ye:ah:! (.) it f (.) it feeds into like (.) risk-taking behaviour you know if I decide 
I wanna like (.) take some drugs or (.) take* an overdose or maybe I’m suicidal 
you know all of those things come from that amount of continual absorption 
of of (.) of affect* that warrants an a reaction but I don’t I don’t have the right 
or I don’t have the space to react” (lines 184-188).  
   The violent urge and pleasure that comes with it (as discussed in the participant’s 
previous quote) are also constructed here as a road to self-destruction: a calculated 
drug overdose and suicidal thoughts that are brought about by anger’s build-up. 
Anger therefore is constructed as a double-edged sword: expressing it leads to 
deterioration of relationships, while keeping it inside leads the participant to risk-
taking behaviours in an effort to relieve himself of the negative affect anger brings 
about. It is interesting to note here that the participant presents the hypothetical 
situation of his overdose as a conscious decision to take an overdose – therefore 
anger here is seen not as a suspension of logic, but as a force that penetrates the 
participant’s logic, making the prospect of an overdose (and therefore possible 
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death) seem like a plausible, and possibly good, idea. Therefore, anger is presented 
as distorting the participant’s logic and thereby leading to harm. 
  Whereas P.9’s  account hints towards the self-destructive activities anger might 
lead to, P.10  presents it as bad for one’s health: ““it kills” it kills people you know 
(.) not just like someone gets so angry that they kill someone but so angry that (.) it 
(.) affects their health” (lines 310-311). The participant here presents what is 
constructed as “a fact”: “anger kills people”. By doing so he distances himself from 
any accusation that he might welcome, or potentially enjoy the emotion. Anger 
here is presented as the cause of death for the people experiencing it; it is 
something that affects not only the way they feel, think and act, but also the way 
their bodies operate. The participant, then, constructs a personified version of 
anger as a killer, something/someone one ought to stay away from.  
 
5.3.3: Chaos and Harm 
   Chaos and harm are present in the participants’ accounts and each of these is 
addressed as having specific results for the individual. There are parts in the 
interviews however when the two come seamlessly together, creating a blizzard of 
negativity.  
   P.2 gives a description of how his anger can hurt the ones close to him (here he 
speaks about his girlfriend in particular) in ways that he is unaware of:  
“I don’t intend* to make her (.) you know, sad or hurt in any way… ah (.) I mean 
I suppose (.) the very rare time when we are arguing, you know, I can, I’m also 
just expressing how I’m feeling at the time (.) which can some time be anger 
(..) but even then, I’m not intending* to hurt her or anything” (lines 38-40).  
   Anger, in this account, is presented almost as an entity with its own agency; a 
force that takes over its host and spreads negativity to those around the 
participant. The participant paints himself as fully aware of the dynamics of the 
relationship and the boundaries within which he needs to remain in order to avoid 
hurting his girlfriend. The need to express his anger, however, is projected as his 
excuse for occasionally doing so. Going further, the participant offers examples he 
sees in the world of how anger can be harmful. These range from fairly negligible 
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harm to people when one does not conform to social norms of behaviour; to acts 
of abuse, tyranny and life-shattering acts:  
“Ah:: it can manifest itself into (.) um (.) just a general kind of um (.) ill-
treatment whenever you’r. you’re out in public um when you’re buying 
something at the store you can snap* to the (.) at (.) at the cork Um (.) I mean 
one can say that it even could even manifest itself into being a very* abusive 
person and you can end up like physically or even sexually abusing a child (..)” 
(lines 467-471).  
   It is important to note that the participant may or may not have witnessed acts 
like this in person. Indeed, he stresses that what he mentions about child abuse 
stems from a conversation he had with his partner about her country of origin and 
the way children are treated there. The fact that he chooses to attribute such 
actions to anger, however, points to his perception of it and the way he apprehends 
it. Having realized the extent of the harm anger can bring about, including the 
troubles that follow bottling it up (as we shall see in the IPA theme of Hell is Other 
People), the participant stresses that one should “try to let it out in appropriate 
ways, you know… in safe, non-hurtful kind of ways” (line 126). All these point to 
anger as a potentially harmful force. Chaos is also a major component in it too 
though. As the participant goes on to say, “it’s just a moment31 of being out of 
control” (line 180) and, in that way, he brings chaos into play as well: anger can 
inflict harm but also temporarily suspends the participant’s self-regulatory abilities 
when angry, thus taking him in a state of confusion about his intentions, thoughts 
and actions. Chaos suspends the participant’s self-control and reason, thus opening 
the gates for harm to flood the space between him and the persons near him. The 
participant attempts to excuse himself for behaving the way he does when he is 
angry, as he constructs his figure as being in control the overwhelming majority of 
the time; this one moment he can’t stay in control however, and this when anger 
takes control.  
   P.6 describes how anger makes him want to bring harm through chaos in the lives 
of others:  
                                                          
31 “it could be seconds it could be minutes it could even* be an hour or two” (lines 183-184) 
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“For example (.) in my studio I’ve got control of the power supply of the (.) quite 
a few studios around here and if someone else (.) who runs the studio next door 
is being annoying and ah (2sec) behave in a way that is ah not acceptable* (.) 
according to me (..) I’m thinking I can switch off their electricity to piss them 
off (.) that’s* some sort of revenge (.) you know I [laughs] you know” (lines 52-
56). 
   Chaos ensues from the disruption of the smooth running of people’s business 
(since functioning electricity is the norm in that studio) but, within a recording 
studio setting, where the vast majority of the equipment is electrical, it can also 
bring harm (e.g. the musicians/producers might lose any work they haven’t saved, 
and the client will have to wait until the electricity comes back on). The participant 
here presents himself as motivated by anger to bring about chaos and harm to the 
people who generate that anger in him. The way he negotiates this desire, by 
stressing that the way they behave is not acceptable and laughing after that desire’s 
expression can be seen as an attempt to frame his words in a way that I can 
understand as justified. Moreover, it is framed as something the participant feels 
ashamed of, since his laughter indirectly marks the desire as childish.  
   Participant 3 offers an account of how and why anger (or rather, the unchecked 
expression of it) is unacceptable in social settings:  
“It’s been a problem for me becau:se it’s (..) alienate a lot of people in my life 
(..) And it’s a problem for me (.) e:h I came to realize that it was (.) not (.) a 
normal* reaction to have to things” (lines 10-13).  
    Essentially the participant presents anger as a force of alienation of others 
because it is not a “normal reaction to things”.  A “normal reaction to things” is a 
social construct, as people in different places and at different points in time 
consider different reactions to be normal. For the participant, expressing himself 
without the filter that society would impose has led to the alienation of people from 
his life. The disruption of social norms that anger (through chaos and harm) brings 
about inflict severe social sanctions from people who have grown accustomed to 
this normalcy, which in their turn cause further harm and chaos.  
    The above considered, it should come as no surprise that the participant states 
that he does not like getting angry; rather, he does not like the things that make 
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him angry but he likes himself when angry even less, precisely because he finds it 
hard to justify his reactions to himself and to others. Discussing a story when he got 
furious at a friend32 and bandmate when, after a show, the latter was too drunk to 
carry the equipment, he says:  
“and I remember uh: after that (4sec) um:: yeah (..) not feeling very happy 
about it (.) I mean I was pretty unhappy about having to do this shit but I was 
pr.I was even more* unhappy that I got that angry” (lines 247-248).  
   Anger, therefore, is something that frightens33 people (through its chaotic and 
harmful nature) and, given the social nature of human beings, this has a backlash 
to the person who brings anger with them. By bringing this into the conversation 
the participant assumes responsibility for the irresponsible way he acts when he is 
angry, and further signals his regret for that.  
 
    P.8 proposes that alcohol facilitates anger, precisely because it allows for chaos 
and harm to erupt by overcoming expected social norms:  
“chemically cos once it gets in you (.) alcohol is like fuel innit? it’s just pure 
energy (.) you know? And then the problem with it is that you know (.) alcohol 
is the perfect* drink for people who want to get angry and mad… if you want 
to release your anger and you want to go crazy you drink alcohol (..) cos alcohol 
is fuel (.) it burns so it’s (.) a lot of energy (.) then it like (.) it shuts down part of 
your brain (.)you know (.) so you can (.) so you don’t have any (.) what are they 
called? Inhibitio:ns (.) you just do whatever you want (.) drink it and go mad 
and break and destroy everything”34 (lines 513-520).  
   The participant here presents himself as seeking a trigger in order to unleash his 
anger with the intent of causing chaos and harm. The qualities he highlights are loss 
of inhibitions, increased energy, and destructive mania. Chaos comes with the 
combination of these, as everything is presented as floating partly within but also 
                                                          
32Participant 8 too states that the harmful nature of anger has harmed him, as a host of anger, as 
well: “I lost a lot of friends because I was a bit too (.) too quick to anger” (line 552)  
33 P.6 does evaluate this drive as something “frightening”: “you see adults being angry swearing 
probably being violent (.) you know in a state of anger (.) can be frightening can be scary” (lines 568-
569). 
34 P.4 seems to agree: “it causes me to kind of (..) be short with people and a bit (.) bit aggressive (..) 
maybe if I’ve had a few drinks as well that definitely* opens up (.) dialogue:” (line 192). 
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partly outside of reach of the participant’s control. The participant goes as far as to 
describe the option to drink alcohol as a way to evoke chaos and anger. Anger and 
the expression of it, therefore, are constructed as a conscious effort, a project: a 
state that is engineered, deliberately brought about with the help of alcohol. The 
participant presents the ‘madness’ of chaos and harm as a choice: he opts to drink 
in order to unlock the possibility of ignoring the social norms and boundaries and 
therefore giving himself to anger.   He describes himself under the influence as 
fuelled up but with a part of his brain switched off; hence full force with minimal 
thought. Alcohol therefore, gives him permission to be unreasonable and in that, 
to indulge in his emotion of anger.  
 
   Anger is therefore seen here as a personal as well as social phenomenon. Its 
experience and expression lead to harm and chaos which are generated in the 
individual but also carry consequences with them.     
    
5.4 Constructing Anger as Shameful  
   Discourse analysis focuses on the discursive actions of speakers and the 
construction of their subjectivities as much as it does on the things that are talked 
about. Action orientation sees the narrator not only constructing the objects of 
discourse but also positioning him/herself towards that construction. Given the 
interactive context in which the interviews were produced, it is interesting to note 
a discursive strategy employed by all participants. They would suspend any 
narration or evaluation of stories (including characters, events, thoughts and 
actions) to give me a (brief or not) still of their self-presentation. This self-
presentation is not about the person in the story or in a particular context, but 
rather hints towards a description of stable, unchanging personality traits. These 
appear to be traits that distance the person from the stereotype of the “angry 
man”, as it is presented by anger-management centres; the popular depiction of 
anger in the UK; and the themes previously discussed in this thesis.  Thereby they 
construct a repertoire of anger as shameful and distance themselves from that 
shame. 
 
147 
 
   P.1, throughout his interview, refers to a technique to control his anger he picked 
up from a therapist: “if you’re standing up and you’re angry, sit down… if you’re 
sitting down and you’re angry lie down. And then the anger should go away after a 
bit” (lines 45-46). His explorations of times he felt angry are invariably followed by 
an assertion that he did that in order to diffuse his anger. He underlines that, by 
doing that, he feels that he is “in perfect control” (line 60) – a desirable trait and 
one that establishes a distance between him and the irrational, uncontrollable and 
chaotic person he becomes under the influence of anger. Towards the end of the 
interview, when I ask if he has anything he would like to add, he responds with a 
“that’s really it to be honest” (line 265) (signifying that he has told me all he had to 
say about anger), before adding the affirmation “I’m a peaceful guy” (line 269). This 
is the picture of himself he chooses to end the interview with, highlighting that 
although he did take part in an interview about his anger, that anger is only a 
circumstances-bound state and that he is not a violent or hostile person in general 
or by nature.   
 
   Starting the interview with P.2 I asked him what made him decide to take part in 
this study. He responded with “I wouldn’t say that I’m an angry* guy but I can* have 
a bit of a temper” (line 8). He therefore distinguishes between being an angry 
person (unchangeable, stable trait, defining a person) and having a temper 
(occasional, circumstance-bound and non-definitive). Further in his interview, while 
discussing how his occasional temper might “put people on a back foot” (line 30) as 
he calls it, he states “I mean I’m also very (.) tend to be a very friendly guy, a 
personal guy, a caring guy” (line 27). By lining up these adjectives one next to the 
other, the participant seems to attempt to forge a shield against the notion of an 
“angry person”. He is friendly, so open to people; he is personal, implying that he 
devotes time to his loved ones; he is caring, signifying that he brings with him 
compassion and warmth. Note how these traits are presented as stable personality 
traits of his. In that way, he implies that his occasional “temper” is not sufficient to 
alter these. It is interesting to note that the participant here utilizes a “three-part-
list”, a discursive feature that has been identified as a strategy to achieve a sense 
of completeness and, as a result, present a more convincing account. The 
participant may or may not be doing  this intentionally – either way, he has picked 
up the technique from its use in society (e.g. advertising, political speeches) and 
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this technique makes its way into his narration and self-presentation. This gives a 
sense of exhaustive self-presentation and “triangulation” of his good nature.  
 
   Towards the end of his interview, I asked P.3 whether he would like to add 
anything. His response was very animated, both physically and verbally. The 
participant leaned closer to the recorder and said:  
“I would like to add (.) for the record that these days I cope with it a lot lot 
better than I used to [laughs] and I very rarely get angry” (line 844-845).  
   Him leaning towards the recorder marked this point as one of vital importance 
for him; he wanted to make sure that the recorder gets his words, he wanted to 
make these words sound louder than his previous narrations, and he wanted to 
signal to me (being in the same room as him) that what he is about to say is 
important. He states that what he adds is “for the record”, hence stressing further 
its importance and implying that this is his status quo these days. “These days” 
marks a break from his earlier self (delving in irrational anger) that he had been 
talking about throughout the interview. He quantifies his improved coping with 
anger twice (“a lot lot better”) to stress that he has come a long way from that 
irrationally angry version of himself. He follows it up with a laugh which hints 
towards a sense of exhilaration, euphoria, liberation, or ridicule towards his earlier 
self who could not cope with that anger. Indirectly, the participant thus puts a 
distance between how he used to be (irrational and angry) and how he is now 
(coping well and rarely angry). The distance between the two selves is presented as 
so great that the current self can laugh about the former (angry) self, which has 
ceased to be a threat and a source of shame. He ends by saying that he “very rarely 
gets angry” nowadays, thus presenting a firm statement of his current position 
which paints his current reactions to events as far removed from the instant anger 
of the past.   
 
   The distinction between an earlier version of himself as given to anger and a 
current, more composed self, seems to be of central importance for P.4 as well. 
Contrasting how he used to get absorbed into negative thoughts, violent fantasies 
and depressive mindsets when he was younger, he states: “I don’t waste time 
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thinking about that stuff anymore (.) now I know how I can funnel it channel it” 
(lines 140-141). The participant here presents the act of dwelling and ruminating 
on anger as a “waste of time” and that, instead, that anger should be funnelled and 
channelled into appropriate and/or creative activities (“and it’s just yeah [bangs 
hand on the table] waiting to get into the rehearsal room or writing it down when 
I get home after the shift”- line 143). This implies a level of self-control which, in 
turn, creates the implication that the more mature the participant gets, the less 
given to anger’s ways he is. Maturity (and self-control) are thus presented as stable 
traits of the participant nowadays, whereas outbursts of anger are presented as 
circumstance-bound, temporary and fleeting. The instances of anger can therefore 
be omitted from his self-presentation. A variability in his account comes shortly 
afterwards, however, when he admits that despite what he says, he still does not 
feel unashamed about his behaviour.  
    The effort to strengthen this control over himself and his anger are presented as 
qualities he aspires to, and a motivation for the participant to sign up for the study, 
because sometimes his own wits are not enough as he says:  
“like I was telling my girlfriend before (.) coming here to speak to you today 
that this is sort of like a prelude to my therapy (..) sometimes I do think I might 
need to speak to someone cos when (.) yeah when I can’t funnel it channel it 
into writing and rehearsing (..) I don’t know what to do” (lines 170-174).  
   He therefore stresses that his techniques of funnelling and channelling anger are 
not yet perfect but he also presents himself as someone thinking of going to 
therapy, therefore someone who wishes to improve and stabilize his anger 
situation. It is also important to note here that he ends the statement by saying 
that when his techniques fail him he does “not know what to do”. Therefore, he 
presents himself more internally frustrated by his anger than helpless against it, 
further signifying his will to change his ways. By saying this, the participant achieves 
a further strategical discursive move: he constructs himself as a responsible agent 
who has the ability to reflect on his experiences even when they are challenging; 
thus, not giving away his sense of agency to a vague, indeterminate notion of anger. 
     Towards the end of the interview I point out to him that, for someone who 
experiences anger often and intensely, he is a very smiling person. He responds by 
saying “I try I try to keep a sense of humour and try to remind myself how (.) 
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absurd* life is and how absurd it is to (.) get frustrated and angry at it” (lines 494-
495). In that way, he projects humour as his antidote to anger and thus paints 
himself as someone who is (finally?) more eager to laugh at the absurdities of life 
than to get angry at them.  Again, the participant is thus constructing himself as a 
rational, reasonable self, looking at and reflecting on his angry, unreasonable self. 
Agency and responsibility are therefore under his control.  
 
   The interview with P.5 started again with me asking what made him decide to sign 
up for the study. His reply was: 
“In general I wouldn’t consider myself an angry* person but I would say that 
I’m someone who (.) does experience anger and is quite (.) ah (..) is almost 
annoyed by the fact that I get really angry”35 (lines 2-3). 
   From the get-go, therefore, the participant engages in a method of self-
presentation and draws this distinction between stable traits and emotional states. 
He “is not” an angry person, but he “does experience anger”. In other words, he is 
a calm (and rational, as he often states in his interview) person who gets afflicted 
by anger “and is almost annoyed by the fact” that this is happening. The participant 
thus constructs a sense of shame in his account for his anger, stressing that he 
would rather not feel this way; he is annoyed at his own emotional reactions. Anger 
is therefore portrayed as an invasive force which the participant cannot repel but 
does not welcome either. Ending this act of self-presentation which he offers as a 
reply, the participant says “I’ve definitely had my battles with anger” (line 4). Here 
he clearly constructs the invasion of anger as something he battles against and 
therefore signals himself as an opponent of anger (an opponent who, 
unfortunately, is defeated quite often). Anger, therefore, is clearly placed outside 
of him and constructed as not a part of him. It is something that comes and goes, 
as the theme of “Anger In and Out of the Body” explores.  
                                                          
35 The participant reiterates that at a different stage of the interview, where he says: “I’m not (.) 
actually (.) an angry person (.) I’m just (.) angry (.) when (.) the I have these few triggers which I (.) 
just can’t stand that they’re there” (lines 289-290). 
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   In a later part of his interview, after he has established that he generally does his 
best to refrain from unfair comments and violence (and the shattering of these 
efforts is one of the reasons he does not welcome anger), I mention it to him:  
“-So you overall try to refrain from ah (.) unfair comments or (.) yeah violence 
as you said 
-Ye:ah (..) yeah I mean I try it myself* I don’t see why other people can’t (.) but 
yes some people they (.) they seek out these things I mean I have a friend who 
(.) who will go to sports games mainly to get drunk and shout abuse at others 
(.) starts fights and you know I ah: I talked to him once and asked “why are you 
doing this? Can’t we just watch the game?” and he said “no, that’s the bit that 
I enjoy most, being a loud-mouthed cunt”” (lines 210-213). 
   He starts by confirming that he does refrain from unfair comments and violence 
and adds that more people should be doing this, therefore implying that this is the 
right way to behave. Perhaps the way he starts his account with the words “I try it 
myself I don’t see why other people can’t” hints to his own perception of himself: 
a rational person who likes to remain calm but is often tortured by anger’s attacks 
– nevertheless, he goes against these unwanted intrusions and keeps himself under 
control. If he can do it, certainly others who have much less intrusive anger patterns 
should be able to do so, too.  
   To illustrate his point that not enough people are striving towards this considerate 
and self-controlled behaviour, he reports his habit of watching football games with 
a friend of his whom he depicts as exactly this inconsiderate type of person. By 
bringing this story of his friend to the table, the participant marks himself as the 
opposite of that type of behaviour. The way he presents his comments to his friends 
clearly reveal his disapproval at the anger and unnecessary violence/abuse his 
friend brings with him. “Why are you doing this?” the participant asks, indicating 
that he sees no reason for these actions. “Can’t we just watch the game” he 
continues, showing that the way his friend behaves detracts from the enjoyment of 
watching the game while constructing himself as a reasonable person who 
questions that behaviour and calls people up on it. The way he reports his friend’s 
reply also points towards the participant’s disapproval of this behaviour: “Being a 
loud-mouthed cunt”. The figure of the friend is therefore constructed as 
embarrassing and shameful. Whether or not his friend did use these words (i.e. 
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whether or not his friend recognizes that he annoys his “enemies” and friends 
alike), this word makes its way into the participant’s narration. The participant here 
accomplishes a surprising discursive positioning: he attributes this type of 
behaviour to a person he would label as “a cunt” and therefore something he 
refuses to do himself.  
    P.6 is someone who, throughout his interview, stresses that anger is very 
prominent in his life. His response to my question of what made him sign up for the 
study he offers: “I know* I’ve got a lot of anger” (line 3). It is interesting to note 
here, too, how the participant refers to anger as something that he “has”, not 
something that he “is”. He presents it as a weight on him, mentioning several times 
throughout his interview that he considers anger to be “childish” and “immature”, 
implying that he wishes to break free from that state and that he regrets having so 
much anger in him. Indeed, this construction maps onto Scheff’s (2004:397) 
description of shame as “regressive, that is, childish”. Therefore the participant 
expresses shame about his angry behaviour. This becomes explicit and clear 
halfway-through his interview, where he discusses the symptoms and 
manifestations of his anger. The participant suspends the narration to exclaim:  
“and I don’t want that to happen actually you know (.) I wish* I could just be 
maybe someone like Ghandi or you know just (.) ca:lm and don’t say anything 
and accept everything and (..) but I cannot* (.) it’s very difficult” (lines 102-
105).  
   Here the participant underlines that he is not comfortable with that state and 
emphasizes that he wishes he could be like Gandhi. The image of Ghandi here 
evokes qualities like calmness, acceptance and an overall state of peace and 
harmony, which the participant immediately goes on to explicitly spell out: to be 
calm, to not pick up fights and to accept everything (hinting perhaps to the Stoic 
school of thought, too). The participant almost laments the fact that he cannot get 
to that stage – instead, he is left to observe his own angry responses in dismay and 
shame, since he does not want his responses to be of that nature. Moreover, 
however, the figure of Ghandi invokes the notion of actually taming one’s anger 
and accomplishing strategic feats instead of either pretending the anger is not there 
or staying paralysed because of that emotion. This statement consequently 
constructs the participant as someone keen to demonstrate his resolution to 
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disown that angry and uncontrollable part of himself in favour of composure, 
calculation and determination.  
 
   P.7 goes to great lengths in his interview to state how his anger “turns inwards” 
to himself and morphs into sadness. The participant experienced a heartbreak a 
few years ago; this caused a reaction that started as anger but ended up in 
depression (in the clinical sense of the term). Describing the event, the participant 
offers:  
“it was such a difficult period for me that extreme anger if you like and I ended 
up (.) suffering* from depression and I was put in a: (.) a hospital for people 
with mental health problems (…) for like two months (.) then gradually I sort 
of recovered* from that over like two years (.) but still I find myself suffering 
from anger” (lines 2-7). 
   It is interesting to note how the participant describes both depression and anger 
as something he suffers from. This implies that the way he experiences anger is as 
crippling for him as depression was and highlights how the participant wishes to be 
rid of anger, or “recover” from it. Anger is constructed here as an affliction or 
disease (not unlike depression) and, therefore, as something that plagues the 
participant and disrupts his normal, calm state. 
   Later on in his interview, P.7 describes his reactions when angry and how he was 
taught to bottle up his emotions. In that excerpt, he includes the following snippet: 
“I don’t hit people I haven’t (.) I’ve never been to prison or anything (.) when I get 
angry at people I don’t hit them you don’t need to worry about that” (lines 41-43). 
The participant starts by stressing that he refrains from violence and that he has 
never been to prison – he thus marks himself as outside the sphere of chaos (prison; 
disruption of freedom) and harm (hitting people) that anger brings with it. Then 
there is a repetition of the “rule” that when the participant gets angry he does not 
hit people. This indicates that he does get angry (so he is not trying to deny that 
emotional state), but more importantly that he feels an obligation not to lash out 
in anger and that he has mastered the technique of holding back. He then ends his 
disclaimer by saying that I need not worry about that. There are two possible 
interpretations in this statement. On the one hand, he could be addressing the 
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researcher who might be scared that disclosure of violent attacks or prison time 
might flag the participant’s account as unsuitable for the research. On the other 
hand, he could be addressing a person of the public who would be relieved to know 
that the person opposite them has the ability to restrain himself as he brings back 
painful memories and enraging events.  In the process, the participant has 
constructed the stereotype of an angry man as someone who cannot control 
himself and ends up beating people or even spending time in prison. With his 
account he positions himself in a distance from that stereotype, flagging up that he 
is not one of these people, thereby discursively deflecting the shame that comes 
with being labelled as an “angry person”.  
   Further, the participant underlines that he is not looking for reasons to feel angry:  
“I think there are some* people (.) it’s probably not my place to say (.) some 
people who (.) go out of their way to look* for anger when nothing’s* 
happened (.) I wouldn’t say I’m one of those people (…) you might see them 
trump people deliberately start fights and they might deliberately try to create 
a reason to be angry” (lines 336-337).  
   The way the participant stresses that “nothing has happened” while these people 
(who are different from himself) are looking for reasons to be angry paints him as 
someone who understands the difference between having a reason to be angry and 
not having that reason. Thus the participant expands on his stereotype of the angry 
man and constructs a group of people who look for trouble, which then allows him 
to position himself firmly outside of that group. It also harks back to the question 
of stable traits vs. circumstance-bound reactions, where the participant contrasts 
his momentary, circumstance-bound anger to the stable trait of remaining 
reasonable and staying away from trouble. 
 
   P.8 does not offer an explicit presentation of himself in terms of stable traits vs. 
temporary reactions.  It is interesting to note that he stresses he nowadays drinks 
less, when he has earlier (p.144, in the “Anger as Harmful and Chaotic” theme) 
described alcohol and its effects as harmful and chaotic. The participant had stated 
that in the past he used to drink a lot but now he refrains from that, opting for small 
quantities of expensive alcohol over large quantities of cheap alcohol. This implicitly 
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marks his transition from someone who wanted to get blinded and violent to 
someone who refrains from both and cherishes self-control and calmness instead.  
 
   P.9 is another participant who draws on the distinction between stable traits and 
circumstance-bound reactions:  
“I am certainly not* a violent pe:rson but (.) if people push me or if I feel under 
attack or threatened or I feel (.) injustice* there have been times when I (.) I 
just used that* as an excuse like n (.) nothing (.) nothing will matter (.) my life 
wouldn’t matter (.) I will fight* for the principle” (lines 53-55).  
   In this extract, he presents himself as reacting angrily when situations call for it; 
he even uses situations as “an excuse” to express his anger (presumably including 
supressed or bottled-up anger from earlier events, too). It is equally important to 
note that he starts this self-presentation with a statement that he is “certainly not 
a violent person”, thereby marking his reactions as justifiably tied to the events 
surrounding him and unrelated to his personality traits. The co-existence of this 
description as “certainly not a violent person” and the use of situation as “an 
excuse” to act violently points to a tension in the participant’s account. He portrays 
himself as not-angry but also as someone who needs to not keep anger inside and 
looks for opportunities to express it. Again, the underlying assumption is that his 
stable personality trait is not expressing anger unless the situation calls for it – but 
the type of situations that call for it is reserved for the participant to decide. 
Therefore, he describes anger as a response to a moral threat and not as a 
personality trait; at the same time, he acknowledges that he does have anger inside 
him but stresses that he only vents it at the right time and on the right people.    
   The above is further highlighted by the self-presentation the participant offers 
later on in his interview:  
“while I only have compassion for myself and what I’ve seen I have no qualms 
with the amounts of anger and aggression and (.) and violence that is within 
me and I am quite proud of myself for the (.) amount of control I have (…) for 
how soft-sounding I might be and how caring and compassionate I can be to 
other people (.) I just have no interest in opening myself up to anyone’s (2sec) 
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interests”. In this quote, the participant clearly describes himself as someone 
with great “amounts of anger and aggression and violence” (lines 305-311).  
   He explains that these were hailed into being from previous experiences of his 
(particularly from the household in which he was born, where violence was 
commonplace) and implies that he feels sorry for himself for being in that state; he 
has “compassion” for himself. He presents himself as beaten down by fate and 
therefore justified in having these amounts of anger and violence inside him. 
Moreover, he explicitly states that he is proud of the control he has over these 
states, which implies that as long as he does not let his instincts run wild, he sees 
no problem with having them. Besides, as the quote continues, these instincts 
protect him against interests which run contrary to his own. He presents himself as 
“caring and compassionate” which show a high level of interest for other people’s 
wellbeing. If something or someone seeks to take advantage of him, however, he 
states he will not open up himself to their interests. Nevertheless, he also asserts 
that this is reserved for certain situations only and his usual approach to people is 
one of openness, not confrontation. Anger, therefore, and its controlled 
expression, is something the participant embraces as a barrier between him and 
injustice. Anger is thus constructed here as a protective mechanism against being 
taken advantage of and treated unjustly.  
 
   P.10 refers to his partner throughout the interview as the major source of his 
anger. His account is filled with examples of how they attend to situations and their 
emotions differently and what problems this generates for him. It comes as no 
surprise, consequently, that his account is filled with instances of tension between 
them, leading either to a confrontation or the active avoidance of that.  
   Reporting their confrontations, the participant says: “I’m the taller person I can 
(.) I can* have a loud impressionable voice if I want to (.) but it’s not something I 
use cos I know* that it’s (.) scary (.) you know” (lines 86-87). Here the participant 
establishes that, if this confrontation was to explode, he could defeat his 
“opponent”, or scare her away. He therefore acknowledges his physical traits that 
would put him in a superior position if aggression was to break out. He stresses that 
he chooses to diffuse the situation and not to use that weapon though, as he 
“knows” that it’s scary. What the participant is saying here is that he understands 
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how he may be perceived by his girlfriend and, as a result of that, he restrains 
himself in order not to scare her. He therefore constructs himself as a considerate 
and sensitive person, while at the same time he is reminding the listener that he 
could “use” this threatening presence of his if he so chooses. The participant is 
portraying himself as having knowledge of his physique and the advantage in 
aggressive behaviour it could provide but actively chooses not to lose himself to 
anger’s voracious appetite, hence extra-considerate and extra-sensitive (since if he 
did not have that physique he would not pose a threat to the “opponent”).  
   Further down, he describes how his partner was a victim of violence from her 
father when she was younger. The participant says:  
“(.) I kind of understand why (..) why h(.) why h(..) why: he did that (.) not that 
I think it’s right (.) not that I would (.) I would always wanna stop myself from 
doing it (.) bu:t (..)” (lines 502-504).  
   The participant can understand why his girlfriend’s father acted that way 
(although he underplays his understanding with the use of the diminutive “kind of”, 
thus implying that he does not understand it completely and therefore distancing 
himself from the image of the man who would not think twice before exerting 
physical violence on women). This is explicitly stated in the beginning of the quote. 
He continues by stressing that, although he can relate to her father’s reaction, he 
does not think it is right, he would not do it himself and his wish would be to always 
be able to stop himself from doing that. The strain is high, in other words; he feels 
the urge to respond with violence but holds back – and the reason for that is that 
his moral values tell him that it is wrong.    
   The moral values seem to be a restraining force for this participant, even though 
he does not discuss what it is that makes some actions right and some others 
wrong. One could argue that this draws from a moral discourse because within that 
type of discourse, the desirability or not of an action (or thought) is self-evident. 
Later on in his interview, he offers how he often thinks violence or aggression will 
help him get his point across to his girlfriend but this moral discourse holds him 
back36:  
                                                          
36 This raises questions about the relationship between discourse and action, which will be explored 
in the Discussion chapter. 
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“I’m getting so* frustrated that that seems like the rational* (.) thing to do like 
(.) [raises his volume] “can’t explain anymore! Can’t talk anymore!” (.) “can’t 
come up with ten different ways to say the same thing. Can’t keep battling” 
(..) and (.) that (.) like (.) so (.) violence seems like a (.) like “this will stop her!” 
(.) you know (…) “this will show what I mean” (.) this will mean (.) this will be 
like (..) “listen to me” you know? (…) ah (.) and that’s quite scary (.) thing to 
like (.) a thought process to go through and (..) be like “woooah! Don’t do 
that!” [laughs] like “that’s awful” (.) you know (.) and (.) I (.) I’ve never done 
that and I don’t want to do that (.) you know” (lines 504-511). 
   In the beginning of the quote, the participant offers the distortion of his logic that 
arises from his girlfriend’s reluctance to take his advice or to see his point of view. 
He explains that her refusal to listen makes violence look like “the rational thing to 
do” and he attributes this distortion to the frustration that comes from his 
discontent at his girlfriend’s behaviour. This situational frustration then becomes 
an internal one and this is what he spells out through the reported speech that 
follows that statement: he draws from the well of his experience to go back to his 
way of thinking while angry.  The participant then pauses to evaluate that urge. He 
labels the whole thought process as “scary” and reports again an inner voice (his 
internalized morality) that is telling him not to do it because the use of violence, 
especially against women, is “awful”. By using reported speech here he brings to 
the picture the people who taught him that such behaviour is wrong; and he 
emphasizes that he has received social training and is therefore more than an 
animal following his urges and instincts. The gendered dimension of social 
responses is also foregrounded here, as the participant essentially states that he is 
aware of the divide between the two genders when it comes to the use of violence. 
Men don’t attack women; and him saying that further supports his self-portrayal as 
someone who knows how to conduct himself (and thus avoid shame and losing 
face).  
    So he seems to be constructing different parts of himself which are in conflict 
with one-another (very much along the lines of the ‘calm’ vs. ‘angry’ self). By giving 
the different parts their own voice (through the instances of reported speech he 
uses) he achieves both to emphasize one’s independence from the other but also 
to underline their ability to communicate with one-another. The different parts of 
himself are all his and they make him who he is, but he recognizes them as 
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independent of one-another and is in control of them and their expression. The 
participant ends the excerpt by saying that he has never acted aggressively towards 
his partner and, more importantly, he does not want to do that. He wishes to 
remain forever peaceful towards her, even though his body and mind are 
occasionally telling him to shatter the peace and act violently. In that way, the 
participant firmly constructs himself as a person whose personality is not one of an 
“angry man”.    
   It is interesting to note that the personality traits the participants  choose to 
foreground are presented as ones that set their owner apart from the harmful and 
chaotic nature of anger (as previously discussed in this chapter) and from anger as 
irresistible and taking control over the person’s thoughts and actions (as will be 
further discussed in the next chapter). The participants therefore position their 
calm, composed self as taking a stance against their own anger (and the angry self 
this evokes) in their narrations and therefore the participants claim a nature for 
themselves that is removed from anger.  
   It is worth noting, finally that all my participants systematically tried to ensure 
that me and them are ‘on the same page’: they would frequently use phrases like 
“you know”, “you see” – or indeed their respective questions “you know?”, “you 
see?” - to invite my participation. While this can be interpreted as a standard way 
of engaging audiences in English, I interpret it differently in light of what this theme 
shows: I think it can be seen as a way to invite my participation and to have me 
reassure them that they are not irrational, thus assuring that they are not heading 
towards a situation of frustration in case they realize later on that what they have 
been telling me seems incomprehensible to me. In the process, they probably also 
try to avoid a situation where they would feel ashamed for the information they 
have shared with me and the light they painted themselves in.  
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CHAPTER 6: INTERPRETATIVE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 
   This chapter examines how the participants explore and make sense of their 
experience of anger. The participants are invited to explore their experience and 
present them as clearly but also as truthfully/accurately as possible. The next four 
sections are about how I make sense of the participants making sense of their 
experience. 
   The superordinate themes and their respective subthemes discussed in this 
chapter are presented in the table below, while a more elaborate version closer to 
IPA’s outlines can be found in Appendices A and B.  
 
Table 2: IPA Themes and Sub-Themes 
Theme Sub-themes 
While in Place, Anger is Irresistible  The Wild Joy of Anger  
The Punishing Thoughts of Anger 
When it’s Over, Anger is Regrettable  Anger is a Bad Adviser 
Anger and Relationships 
Seeing Themselves in the Eyes of Others 
Anger Can Be Positive A Blessing and A Curse 
Welcoming Anger But Hoping for Better 
Control 
Hell is Other People The Others 
The Parents / Social Forces 
Confronting the Other and Claiming 
Moral High-Ground 
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6.1 While in Place Anger is Irresistible  
 
    This superordinate theme encompasses themes where participants describe how 
they cannot escape anger and angry reactions once the emotion has been sparked. 
Essentially anger is experienced as a reaction to situations that the person perceives 
as offensive, threatening or unjust. Here my participants explore how anger’s 
effects permeate different aspects of their being, as well as their inability to control 
its influence on these aspects.  
 
6.1.1: The Wild Joy of Anger  
   The symptoms of anger can be described as manifesting in different parts of one’s 
activities, thoughts or body. Participant 7 explains:    
“well for me it’s (.) in here [points to the chest area] (.) feels like some sort of 
chemical is being released (.) and it’s an odd feeling cos it’s a feeling of rage (.) 
you know and wanting* to something to take action* (.) right? Like “I wanna 
do* something” but at the same time it’s a feeling of sadness* (..) and being 
wronged at the same time and it’s (.) it’s a (.) not pleasant feeling and wanna 
be out of it (.) wanna be out of it (..)  and my body is telling me (.) I suppose it’s 
a bit like adrenaline (.) “the way to get out of this terrible feeling is to do* 
something” you know (.) [bangs hand on desk] to scream (.) slam the table 
whatever it is eh (.) and it’s something I want to escape* from” (lines 138-148). 
   Participant 7 chooses the term “chemical” as a metaphor for anger and anger’s 
bodily manifestations. This choice creates several implications for the nature of 
anger in this particular person. The description establishes a sharp difference 
between the presence of this chemical and the absence of it. Therefore, there is a 
clear distinction between the angry and the calm selves brought forward here: a 
chemical is assimilated into the body’s vital functions, changing the person’s usual 
behaviour. So, as there is a clear distinction between the presence and the absence 
of the chemical, once the chemical is activated its effects cannot be escaped – the 
chemical affects and even directs the participant’s physiological and mental 
functions.  Of course it could be argued that what the participant describes here is 
the feeling of constriction and shortened breath that other participants have 
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associated with anger. Him not mentioning those effects and instead pointing to 
the chest area (where vital organs such as the heart and lungs are located), 
however, underlines the vigour with which anger manifests.  This chemical is 
depicted as almost controlling the very nature of this participant’s being.   
   To underline this further, the participant describes it as a negative feeling, one 
that he wants to escape from. Nevertheless, under the influence of anger, the only 
options his body dictates are angry ones – “scream, slam the table, whatever it is”. 
Therefore, anger is something he does not enjoy but while angry, he can only think 
and act as an angry person, thus empowering the angry self and letting his calmness 
and composure drift with it. The comparison to a substance and its influence is 
literally spelled out here, where the substance has to take its route and bring about 
its behavioural and mental effects in order for it to then dissipate from the body. 
Anger is therefore both the problem and the solution to this problem in this account 
and, while the participant reports not enjoying the state of anger, anger itself 
appears to enjoy taking control of the participant. 
   Prompted to discuss anger’s arousal, Participant 5 discusses how anger’s 
evocation spells its unavoidable dominance over calmness: 
“as anger comes it comes like as a wave it feels almost like it’s coming from 
my spine to my head I can fee:l it and it just engulfs* (.) ah (.) it takes over the 
head completely* (.) ah (.) and it sort of ends in my frontal lobe (.) I can feel my 
frontal lobe just s (.) shattering you know not shattering but I can feel the 
pressure on the frontal lobe very strongly and (.) you know (.) it’s just there* 
and it takes over (.)” (lines 198-201) 
   The metaphor here is that of a wave – a wave that slowly but steadily engulfs the 
skeleton of the participant, ending up in his frontal lobe. Again, there is an obvious 
comparison with the physiological manifestation of anger as pressure in the head; 
this is a common, folk representation of anger’s effects, one that many of my 
participants reported. The very fact that the participant describes anger as ending 
up in, and engulfing, his head creates further implications. The head is where the 
brain can be found, arguably the primary organ in controlling the body and the 
thoughts. Therefore, what the participant is describing here is how anger conquers 
his thoughts, intentions and actions and how he can do nothing about it. The 
anger’s effects make the participant feel his frontal lobe shattering, through which 
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he emphasizes the intensity of the emotion. Of course his skull is not shattering but 
the pressure caused by the wave is so strong that he feels he can hardly contain it. 
To round it off, he describes anger as a wave which, once done engulfing his head, 
“is just there” and he cannot get rid of it. Underlining his helplessness against this 
wave, the participant adds that anger then “takes over”, thus elaborating on the 
contrast between the calm and the angry state. The two are presented as mutually 
exclusive and when a clash erupts anger is, for the participant, habitually dominant 
–it leaves him unable to operate notwithstanding its commands. It is also important 
to underline that the participant does not link the above account to any particular 
context or situation; rather, he presents it as a habitual and unsurprising model of 
anger attacks. When anger is prompted, it “takes over completely” and does not 
allow any space to calmness.   
   Besides purely physiological symptoms, anger appears to be irresistible when 
looking at the participants’ behaviour, too. Participant 2 stresses: 
“I swear. Um, I mean I kind of swear anyways but certainly when I’m angry I 
swear because I’ve just learned that, for me (.) um (.) often the, the (..) the 
feeling, it needs the right word[…] And (.) when I say that when I’m angry, if, 
then the anger feels a little satisfied. It’s like I’ve, I’ve um (.) I’ve just given that 
(.) that feeling its, its (.) the expression that it needs.” (lines 137-155) 
   The participant personifies the feeling of anger in his account. It is there, 
demanding that the person uses the right word to express its urge. The participant’s 
account is almost like presenting a creature craving satisfaction. Anger is inside the 
participant like an itching that needs to be scratched or a thirst that needs to be 
quenched. The use of the swear word is not something that appeases anger, nor is 
it a spell to ward it away; rather, it is presented as an item that partially and only 
momentarily soothes and satisfies the angry feeling inside the participant and one 
can almost see the creature manically moaning in pleasure before asking for more. 
It is worth paying attention to the choice of words by the participant. Anger “needs” 
a certain word to be satisfied. Anger, then, is driving the participant towards that 
word, leaving no space for negotiation: it is not an option but a mandate that draws 
the participant’s “calm self” into anger’s realm with the sole purpose of satisfying 
the emotion’s demands.  
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   When anger takes the reins, swear words are one vocal expression it assumes. 
Another is the urge to scream incoherently, as participant 5 explains:  
“but basically just screaming (.) scre:aming trying to (.) just nothing that (.) no 
words just out of sheer fury” (229-230). 
   Anger here is seen as a force that pushes the participant to produce loud noises 
with his mouth and, in that description, anger is a key to regression. He regresses 
away from his ‘civilized’, ‘educated’ nature into a primitive, perhaps infantile state 
while losing himself in the emotion. The participant, in that way, becomes the 
vessel for the emotion and thus gives it space to dwell. In doing so he also gives it 
voice – and the voice anger here chooses is one of “no words just sheer fury”. 
Notice how the participant begins to describe the action as “trying to…” before 
cutting himself short. What I read here is the participant trying to make sense of 
the experience. At first he is under the impression that, while screaming, he tries to 
do something. Upon the narrative’s unfolding, however, he understands that he is 
not really trying to do anything – he is already doing it. The incomprehensible 
scream is the action.            
    Similarly, P.10 offers: “I* know that my anger’s taken like control of me when I (.) 
eh:: (.) I (.) shout really loudly” (line 89). In this short passage, the participant 
presents himself as losing control when anger strikes. His control of himself is 
presented as actually being handed-over to anger. The participant then finds 
himself in a situation where he recognizes the anger that has taken him over, from 
the level of his volume and this again is presented as a generalized effect, not tied 
to any specific context or situation: it is an unmistakable sign of anger’s advent. 
   In that sense, when anger strikes it puts the person under its spell. Anger comes 
with a demand and the person has to both channel and satisfy this demand. If they 
don’t then they are only suffering from it. If they do, they commune the wild joy 
that the expression of anger brings. This wild joy comes across most vividly through 
the participants’ description of violence. In their descriptions, 3 and 6 celebrate 
violence as something that felt good in its own right.  
   Participant 6 describes how he got into a heated incident with another driver 
while on the road, which led to the other driver following him to his work’s parking 
space and starting a fight with him as soon as the participant stepped out of his car. 
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He punched the participant and then went into his car to get away from the scene. 
The participant then avenged himself by punching the guy through his open 
window and made him bleed, which the participant describes as making him feel 
good. 
“and he was driving back trying to run me over (.) I stepped to the side a and I 
saw him and I had all those thoughts (.) like it was quite fast but I had all those 
thoughts I described37 (.) I had all those thoughts in 5 seconds and I was like 
“this guy is gonna go” (.) you know “go away unpunished” and I looked at him 
and through the window I punched* him [laughs] like (.) re:ally hard (.) I made 
him bleed actually (.) I opened his his eyebrow (..) and it made me feel good (.) 
oh yeah [laughs] yeah I’m telling you I felt good* (.) it was (.) I don’t know it 
felt like re::ally good (.) because also I think he was taking a punch for the other 
guy (.) at the other story before um and you know went unpunished (.) I think 
he was taking a punch for both so (.) it felt good but he didn’t like it obviously” 
(lines 306-314).  
   This good feeling of his regarding this action stems first and foremost from the 
feeling that justice is being somehow restored through this punch; not only did the 
other driver punch him first, but that was also a repetition of a similar incident as 
the participant described earlier in his interview. Therefore, the participant feels he 
is correcting an earlier wrongdoing against him, as well as the present one, with his 
punch. That past event that he makes relevant here, one where a similar thing had 
happened, can perhaps be seen as having left a residue of shame, since the 
participant did not manage to reclaim his face or his right then – from that 
perspective, that past instance fuelled the “shame” in the “shame-anger spiral”, 
intensifying the participant’s anger in the story he recounts here. Interestingly, the 
other driver was also caught up in a shame-anger chain-reaction himself, since my 
participant had ‘flicked the finger’ at him and it was that event that escalated to the 
fight. A triple-spiral of anger and shame might be in place here too, with each of 
                                                          
37 The thoughts the participant is referring to here revolve around the issue of having proof of the 
assault he suffered and finding justice for it. The participant said: “I was like “shit what’s going on? 
That guy’s gonna go I don’t even know if those cameras have seen anything if I can…” and the 
problem is that I (.) I’ve had another issue maybe like a month before with another guy and in my 
head (.) in my head straight-away I thought “ok, this guy just punched me and he’s (.) going away I’m 
not sure I’ve got his plate if I go to the police station it might be (.) nothing* might happen (..) um: 
last* time I did that I didn’t do anything to the guy I went to the police station they didn’t said 
nothing, they did nothing because the camera was not working there was no proof or anything I was 
like “that’s happening again. No way!”” (lines 300-303). 
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the two participants caught up in an intrapersonal feeling trap while a loop is 
formed between them.  
    It is worth noting how the participant either talks about feelings of rage, or about 
the acting out of his anger but not both together. He does not establish a link that 
would bring together his perception of his emotional state and his actions. This 
leaves a gap between the two which, the quote implies, is filled up by the emotion 
itself: it is not the (calm, rational self of the) participant that is in control anymore, 
but  anger (that has infiltrated the participant’s existence).   
    Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting the pleasure of engaging in violence in itself 
for the participant, even while remembering it at the time of the interview. Notice 
how the narrative flow breaks to accommodate the action and the participant’s 
description of it. He freezes the storyline to explain that he punched him really hard, 
made him bleed… and then he tries to explain the feeling he got out of it. However, 
after three attempts at it which only contain the confirmation that it felt good, the 
participant stops trying to explain it further and simply states “I don’t know it felt 
rea::lly good”. This overwhelming pleasure cannot be explained in any other terms, 
it simply has to be accepted (embraced) as it is. He stresses the discomfort and 
unpleasantness of this action for the other driver while highlighting his repetition 
of “it felt good” – “but he didn’t like it obviously”. This damage to the opponent 
seems to be a vital part of the pleasure induced by violence and stands in stark 
contrast to the “controlled” accounts of other participants who stress that they 
refrain from physical violence and only opt to punch pillows, doors and other 
inanimate objects instead. The participant here is given completely to the emotion 
which arose out of the other driver’s wrongdoing and therefore the punishment of 
the other driver seems to be the best way to satisfy this emotion. The moral side of 
the story might, however, just be inserted in his interview to make himself not look 
like a bloodthirsty individual. Anger is sketched as the force that possessed the 
calm, rational person that is the participant, and made him take joy from that act 
of violence. Further highlighting the gendered dimension of emotional expression, 
it is worth noting here that the participant probably feels comfortable with sharing 
this story because his aggression was directed at another male. His account comes 
with no excuses or attempts to present a more detailed context for his response. 
Letting out his anger in that way towards another male is acceptable, since physical 
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combat among males is part of establishing oneself in the social hierarchy as an 
alpha.  
 
   Similarly, Participant 3 presents the following story which took place in the 
fencing club he was a member of in his late teens, where another member was very 
confrontational towards him: 
“A:nd one day you know like we’re doing training again and he’s doing the trick 
where you’d slap the epee like that on your arm [slaps his arm] without scoring 
a point it just really hurt* (.) I said “stop doing it” (.) instead of being rational 
and say “that’s it we’re not fencing anymore” and go to the coach and say “hey 
listen, it’s not for me it’s for this guy [code name] Uffe cos he’s a (.) he’s a real 
bitch” I just fucking screamed “cunt” in Norwegian I called him “hinte” [repeats 
word in Norwegian] and I slammed my epee to his chest (.) broke the blade in 
half (.) see I actually hurt him but that was just cos he was physically hurting 
me (.) but it was in the context of fencing and I just completely lost my shit with 
him (.) dude I broke the thing in half and broke two of his ribs a:nd (.) my 
fencing coach (.) funnily enough he was on my side he saw the whole thing 
happen and he sent Uffe home and blacklisted him from the fencing club (..)” 
(lines 431-439). 
   The participant starts by explaining how the other person was annoying him. The 
annoyance came from two sources. The first is that the other person was slightly 
bending the rules of the game, not to win (since his actions would not confer him 
points) but precisely to annoy the participant. The second is that the other person’s 
actions caused physical pain to the participant. The participant explicitly states that 
“instead of being rational” he went down anger’s path, thus drawing a sharp 
distinction between reason and anger (not dissimilar to what the theme of “Anger 
as Harmful and Chaotic” in the previous chapter highlights). He started with a verbal 
insult and he went on to harm the other person with his epee. The narration freezes 
here too, to allow the participant to delve into the memory of the emotion. He 
“completely lost” it as he says, which again points to the very irresistible nature of 
anger which strips the individual of their sense of agency and responsibility. What 
the participant says here is that he was no longer his normal, calm self; instead, he 
had been transformed by anger and obeyed anger’s directives. He then repeats 
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almost triumphantly that he broke the blade in half, given to the passion for 
violence anger generates. He ends his narration of the complicating event with a 
statement that he broke two of the other person’s ribs. And so anger got its way, 
giving a sense of wild pleasure to the participant – one which is further embedded 
in the account through the participant dwelling on how he screamed “cunt” thus 
creating a distance between himself and his opponent, firmly placing himself in the 
attacking side. Focusing on the presentation of the event, it is also interesting to 
note how the participant (like Participant 6 earlier in this section) describes the 
actions the way they unfolded without any reference to his intentions or thoughts 
at the moment. In that way, perhaps unknowingly, the participant takes an 
observer position to his own actions, reinforcing the idea that anger had taken over 
and he was no longer in control of himself – it is almost like, at the time of the 
interview, he is watching a film and describes what is happening in the screen; like 
watching himself at the time of anger as a different person, inside the mind of 
whom he cannot gain access. 
   Of course, this account is given against a backdrop of morally justifiable 
behaviour, both generally (as when the other person initiates violence one is 
required to respond by fight or flight) and specifically (as the fencing coach’s 
reaction marks the participant as being in the right). This is included in the story as 
the result of the conflict between the two fencers: the other person’s expulsion 
from the club for being an annoyance to my participant, indicating that the coach 
also believed my participant was in the right. The fact that his aggression was 
directed towards another male makes it justifiable on the gender dimension too, 
since violence and physical combat is acceptable when among men as discussed 
earlier. Earlier in his interview, the participant had stressed that he never engages 
in physical violence. Upon reaching this point in his narration, however, he revisits 
this to correct it and tells me that this has actually happened but only a handful of 
times and that it was always the other person who started it. This revision of his 
actions points to the fact that he has now (upon telling me this story) revealed the 
pleasure that physical violence brings. In a sense he feels empowered at that stage 
to tell me that he has actually engaged in physical violence, a pleasure that could 
not be admitted earlier on in the interview while the participant was still exploring 
the socially acceptable limits within which he could operate.   
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6.1.2: The Punishing Thoughts of Anger  
 
   Besides guiding their actions, anger is also described as irresistible when it comes 
to taking over the participants’ thoughts. Only on this, there is no wild joy but a very 
punishing persistence. Participant 5 has offered that “I find that there are two sort 
of ways one is the one that lingers and it’s there all the time and one which is just 
fury”. The latter maps onto what was discussed in the previous sub-theme of the 
present section, whereas the former describes what is discussed in the current sub-
theme: anger’s persistence and weight that blocks the participants from finding 
calmness and composure.  
    Participant 3 offers: 
“you get angry and afterwards it lingers the anger stays there (.) the 
frustration which is long-term keeps on going and afterwards you get to the 
point where (.) you know you burst out in anger and after you’ve taken that 
one step and afterwards the mood you have anything for that person is always 
constant* anger” (lines 135-138)  
   Participant 3 here presents the case. Anger can be compared to a seed in his 
account; a seed that is initially planted and then grows and grows until it blossoms 
into a “point where you burst out in anger”. What makes this type of anger different 
to the expressions of anger discussed above is that anger does not go away even 
after it has been expressed. The person who angered the participant remains in the 
participant’s mind as a constant reminder of his anger, very much like a thorn in his 
side.  
   Discussing anger and how it dominates his thinking, Participant 5 states: 
“it’s just there (.) it lingers and it takes (.) chains you to this thought which (.) 
like an earworm like a song just won’t go away from your head it’ll just (.) it 
goes in circles and it comes back and returns and (.) whenever you have a 
moment when you don’t really think about much (.) for example you just walk 
into the station or something (.) to go to work in the morning and there’s like 
nothing in your head besides of “let’s get this routine over with let’s go to the 
station” it’s still* there it’s (.) that’s exactly* when it strikes when you’re not 
thinking about anything else” (lines 68-72). 
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    The participant here describes himself as chained to the thought that makes him 
angry. This metaphor portrays him as a prisoner of this thought, unable to break 
free from it. The thought that angers him is constantly there, preventing him from 
moments of peace and calm. In other words, for as long as anger is in operation, 
the participant is constantly preoccupied with it, like a thorn in his side. The 
participant describes anger’s movement here as a cyclical one, where it “comes 
back and returns”. Notice how this description does not involve the anger ever 
going away – there are variations in its intensity, but the thought is always there.  
    
   Asked how he would define anger in a few sentences, Participant 7 starts by 
calling it a combination of extreme rage with sadness before moving to its 
manifestation in the person. In his description, Participant 7 too presents this 
lingering aspect as one of anger’s defining features:  
“it manifest itself (.) with a terrible (.) feeling in your chest (.) something there 
which you’ve (.) got to get rid of (.) and it’s that same feeling which is both 
driving* that (.) anger (.) and which for some reason you think by being angry 
you get rid of that feeling of course I’m not sure if it’s true* (.) that by being 
more angry you alleviate yourself of that feeling I don’t know if that’s true at 
all but of course this (.) this angry feeling on the inside (.) it’s telling me [shouts] 
to go crazy! To throw this up in the air! To shout and scream because I’ve got 
this terrible feeling and I wanna get rid of it!? and to get rid of it that feeling 
says “you can get rid of me by being more angry! Be more angry!” (lines 608-
619). 
    Here anger is squarely presented as an irresistible force, both in nature and in 
intensity. By its very nature, the participant claims, it is designed to augment and 
to find satisfaction within itself. This self-feeding loop leads to the strange situation 
where the participant wishes to alleviate himself of anger but anger, guiding his 
thoughts, tells him that the only way to do that is to get angrier. In that way anger 
creates a self-feeding loop. A nice way of visualizing the participant’s account is to 
think of anger as a tunnel. The participant is trapped within that tunnel and he does 
see light at the end of it. The only way to get to the light is to traverse the tunnel 
but, the further in he walks, the longer the tunnel gets. In this visual representation 
of the participant’s account, anger is both the tunnel and the light. Throughout the 
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process anger is summoning the person towards it and makes him feel like this 
process is the best and only way for them to get out of there, back into the calm 
state of being and thinking. The participant therefore keeps getting deeper and 
deeper into the tunnel in the hope that he will get out of it. In that way, anger is 
presented here as a perfect trap.    
 
    Both outbursts and lingering sensations are presented as anger’s way of 
possessing them. Nevertheless, the one is not described as mutually exclusive with 
the other, but as its natural continuation: even though both are evoked by anger, 
neither dispels it completely. Anger is there before and after the outburst, as the 
situation is not rectified. 
   It is interesting, finally, to note how my participants accounts of surrendering to 
anger are designed to contrast their normal, calm selves. They portray their calm 
selves as rational, disciplined, friendly and constantly trying to improve their 
behaviour and stance towards other people. Anger comes along, however, and 
turns them into hot-headed, one-track minds, chaotic, rude and obnoxious 
characters. This is where the next superordinate theme (“When it’s over, anger is 
regrettable”) comes into play…  
 
 
6.2 When It’s Over, Anger is Regrettable  
 
   This superordinate theme points to the feeling anger leaves once its effects 
disappear. Anger, like all emotions, brings about changes in physiology, cognition, 
attention and judgment. As the previous section highlights, then, anger leads the 
person to act, think and feel different from what they do when they are in their 
calm state. It feels as if anger sets in on them, taking control of their bodies and 
minds. Consequently, after anger has subsided, the angered person looks back at 
the state s/he was in and tries to find an evaluation and justification for that. The 
person then recognizes himself as the agent in, and owner of, these states. 
Nevertheless, the person rarely stands behind these states of acting, thinking and 
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feeling, as the present superordinate theme reveals. Participants here describe 
anger or, more accurately, their own selves when angry (the “angry self”), as the 
cause for regrettable actions, compromised relationships, doubting the self, and 
embarrassment.  
 
 
6.2.1: Anger is a Bad Adviser  
 
   Looking back on their anger and trying to make sense of their state, my 
participants almost unanimously classify it as an immature and inappropriate 
manifestation of internal frustration. They use adjectives like “childish” and “silly” 
to describe it and they contrast it to the proper, “grown-up” way, in their opinion, 
to deal with situations: this revolves around notions of calmness, composure and 
self-control, in contrast to the tantrum-like nature of anger. Because of this, they 
find it hard to make sense of their anger when they are not angry and to accept 
that part of themselves as unproblematic.  
 
Participant 6, for example declares:  
“yeah* I find that very silly* (.) it’s um (3sec) I mean (.) the story with the car 
(.) me putting my car right next to (..) 
-mhm 
-I could have just (.) there was enough space for me to still park my car in my 
parking space (..) um (.)  a mature way of dealing with it (.) and that’s what I 
wanted to do and now I remember (.) is to write a (.) you know a note and put 
it on the windscreen but (.) and again it’s unjustice coming into play (.) I felt 
“why::* should I waste my time going up (.) to my flat (.) find a piece of paper 
and a pen (.) think about writing you know something (.) without letting my 
anger out (.) because even on a piece of paper you can let your anger out ‘you 
piece of shit what are you doing on my parking space?’” cos that’s how I feel 
but I’m trying to control it because as I told you I’ve been thinking a lot about 
anger recently and try to (..) evolve (.) try to be more mature that’s why I’m 
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saying “silly” I was like “that’s the way to do it and you should do it” and I was 
like “no… I’m wasting my time because that a(.) that punk* was like parked on 
my parking space” was like “why!?” you know? (..) and (.) reacting that way is 
stupid (..) 
-mmm 
-it is (.) it’s not mature (.)” (lines 581-594). 
   The story he refers to takes place in his residence’s garage, where another person 
had parked their car in a way that blocked half of the participant’s parking space. 
The participant then lifted the windscreen wipers of that car in order to 
demonstrate his dissatisfaction. He stresses that he is aware of a “mature” (as he 
calls it) way of dealing with the situation which would involve him writing down his 
complaint on a piece of paper and leaving it on the other car’s window.  He then 
goes on to say that he opted not to do that as a further act of revenge against the 
other person. He believed that the “mature” option would be a further waste of his 
time and that holding back the anger would be too nice towards the other person: 
they did not deserve it. The participant had already set in his head that he is dealing 
with what he presents as his stereotypical image of the person who has no concern 
for his fellow-citizens. He thus decided that he wouldn’t waste his time on such a 
type of person.  
   Taking a step back to evaluate his reaction, however, he explicitly describes it in 
the interview setting as “silly”, “stupid” and “not mature”. By employing these 
terms he signals himself as not proud, rather ashamed, of his state when in anger. 
There seems to be an archetype of a “mature person” that the participant adheres 
and aspires to. By trying to bring himself closer to that archetypical behaviour he 
aims to “evolve”, partly by breaking free from anger or at least learning how to 
better control it. Anger and the irrationality it brings along seem to stand in the way 
of that desired evolution: remember, throughout the whole story the participant is 
motivated and mobilized by nothing else than a) the perceived injustice towards 
him (which he recognizes as exaggerated by acknowledging at the time of the 
interview that “there was enough space for me to still park my car”) and b) by the 
image of the other driver he had formed in his head without any credible evidence 
for it. The participant, then, implicitly describes his thoughts during the incident as 
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unjustified and over-dramatic.  To this extent, he sees himself as less mature than 
he would like to be, for letting anger get in the way of his thinking and acting.    
    
  Anger can make someone irrational and over-dramatic in many ways. One of them 
is that it pushes people to great efforts over meaningless and futile activities, as 
some participants stress. For example, Participant 6 recalls the incident where he 
got home after a long day at work and tried to phone the delivery company that 
had failed to deliver a package he had ordered. It was late in the afternoon and 
their offices were closed, but he still “wanted to try”: 
“it was a silly move I should have just (.) give up and sort all that in the morning 
because I knew* at that point there was nothing (.) else I could do but I still 
wanted to try 
-mhm 
-I wanted to shout at someone! I wanted to say just [laughs] “you’re wrong, 
you’re rubbish!” you know or “you’re crap!” you know I wanted to say that to 
someone” (lines 424-428). 
   Anger here is presented as the driving force, demanding that the participant 
expresses himself to the people who wronged him. In hindsight, he labels that move 
a “silly” one as he knew at the time that no-one would pick up the phone and that 
he should wait until the morning instead. Anger, however, pushed him to try and 
keep trying. Presumably, anger was growing in him the longer he stayed on the 
phone and the longer he confirmed he would get no answer before the morning. 
Anger, therefore, had gone into its self-feeding loop, using the participant’s effort 
and time to grow and to become fiercer. The participant had surrendered to anger 
and was therefore happy to waste more of his time engaging in this meaningless 
task. In the context of the interview, where he revisited his behaviour, he saw the 
silliness of it. He (or, more appropriately, his calm self back then) “knew” that there 
was nothing he could do but his angry self would not let up. Now that his calm self 
confronts the angry self, however, he is perplexed by what it was in him that pushed 
him in that direction and why he didn’t stop it. It is presented almost as a hostage 
situation, where the angry self has taken hold of the calm self and forces him to 
spend more time and effort in the task while he (the angry self) laughs manically.  
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   Consequently, the dissonance between the angry self and the calm self surfaces 
when the calm self attempts to justify the actions and the wild joy felt by the angry 
self. For example, Participant 5 offers:  
“but I wanna punch things but (.) most of the furniture in this house is mine 
-[laughs] 
-my own property and sort of (.) I built it myself (.) most of it (.) you know from 
IKEA packages and stuff so I don’t wanna break anything but (.) but there is 
there is this nee:d to (.) well I once punched a cupboard door (.) broke in half 
[laughs] I was so angry 
-Wow (.) did it feel good? 
-Yeah it felt* (.) no it just hurt [laughs]” (lines 234-240) 
   The account starts with a demonstration of the participant’s reasonable and 
rational nature. He states that he often finds himself wanting to punch things but, 
he stresses, most of the furniture in the house is his property, things he’s spent 
money and time on. Why would he damage them? Then again, once he was “so” 
angry that he punched a cupboard door and broke it in half. His angry self overrode 
rationality and acted on the principles of anger. When asked whether it felt good, 
the participant seems to momentarily go back to the angry phase and pick up on 
the wild joy he felt while doing it, expressed in the quote both through the initiation 
of his response (“Yeah, it felt…”) and by his laughter. He immediately cuts himself 
short, however, rewinds to the calm and composed state he is in during the 
interview and evaluates the action as “no, it just hurt” before rounding it off with a 
laugh. What he does with this re-working of his answer is he inspects his anger from 
the calm state he is in naturally. Not only did he go against his principles of working 
things out rationally and dialectically; not only did he annul the time and effort he 
put into the cupboard by breaking it; he also hurt himself in the process. Therefore 
he paints the image of his angry self as a very foolish person. More importantly, he 
now (at the time of the interview) laughs at this person’s reaction, indicating that 
he does not want to associate with that.  
   For Participant 7, his suicide attempt was a case he now finds hard to justify: 
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“I mean ultimately it was all fu- futile it was all pointless it was all a waste of 
time (.) me being angry (.) for six months at the hospital (.) didn’t achieve 
anything  
-mmm 
-didn’t (..) make me a better person I mean (.) if anything I just wasted six 
months of my life you know (.) I could have been working or studying cos I was 
supposed to be (.) at Cambridge at the time” (lines 476-480) 
   The participant believed that he was on the road to forming a romantic 
relationship with someone but he soon found out that this person was simply 
leading him on, exploiting him and his resources. The participant’s angry response 
to that was to try and take his own life. He doesn’t discuss much about his rationale 
for doing so, but it appears to be a combination of sadness for the relationship he 
was denied and, consequently, a form of revenge: perhaps he thought that killing 
himself would make the other person feel sad; that they would regret not 
honouring their relationship with him; and guilty because they would realize that 
their behaviour led the participant to this action.  
   Looking back on his action now, the participant struggles to decipher what his 
rationale was. He appears to fully regret that decision – it might not have cost him 
his life, but it did cost him spending six months under sedation in the hospital. He 
stresses that he should have been studying at Cambridge (where he had a place at 
the time) instead of being at the hospital and he evaluates the whole experience by 
saying “didn’t achieve anything… didn’t make me a better person”. The participant, 
therefore, is at present finding it very difficult to relate to the person who felt this 
anger and acted out its irrationality. What makes it even worse for him is that from 
his current place, outside the energy-field of anger, he ranks the event as “quite 
minor” and he therefore cannot understand why he took such extreme actions: 
“in retrospect as someone who’s recovered from it now (.) I think it was quite 
minor [laughs] my reaction was ridiculous* but (.) anyway that’s what 
happened” (lines 395-396). 
   Eventually, his anger turned to himself for having been that angry over a minor 
issue: 
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“it was coming back to this idea of hating myself for putting myself in that 
situation and wanting to change (.) things (.) so going back I would never meet 
that person I’d never lend money to people I’d never (..) I’d never actually do 
this that or the other (3sec) [bangs hand on desk] and it (.) became all about 
me 
-mhm 
-I’d be constantly thinking over the situations that had happened (.) thinking 
over how (.) I’d let myself (.) it was nobody else it was all about me (.) anger at 
me and thinking how (.) fucking stupid I was (.) what a fucking idiot I was and 
blah blah blah (..) that’s (.) self-hate I suppose (.) when I was sick for about six 
months (..)” (lines 418-425). 
 Anger, therefore, fed on anger and erected a monument of self-hate when the 
participant tried to explain to himself why he had acted the way he did. What he 
describes here is how he could not comprehend what pushed him to these actions. 
The reasons for his initial anger were strong enough for him to get angry, but his 
reaction was “ridiculous”. With the realization that it was his own angry self and 
no-one else that led him to that way of thinking and acting, he finds his own 
absurdity and over-reaction atrocious. This quote is also a testimony to his regrets 
over his actions prior to the onset of anger, though. He describes himself as naïve 
in thought (since he fell for that person) and in behaviour (in lending money). This 
extends to colour anger as the wrong course of action which he further regrets.  
 
 
6.2.2: Anger and relationships 
 
   Anger arises out of a perceived offense. The person’s response might be directed 
to that particular offense but it may also be let out to other people; similarly, the 
response/reaction is hardly ever likely to match the intensity of the offense itself. 
More often than not, the angry person reacts much more severely than expected 
in terms of volume and time. Once anger has passed, they find it hard to justify this 
reaction. Therefore, anger is the path to treating others the wrong way. 
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   Jokingly, Participant 5 says that these days he tries to get away from people when 
he is angry to avoid making them sad:  
“actually these days I just  try to just get away especially from my wife so I 
don’t say anything bad to her for no reason you know  
-Mhm 
-There’s been a few occasions you know ah (.) of course I’d never (.) I never 
bring any violence or anything like that just (.) just you know say a really shitty 
comment about something (.) I think I once got angry when she put butternut 
squash in my favourite meal [laughs] I hate* butternut squash [laughs] but 
that was when I had when my anger issues were worse than they are” (lines 
202-208). 
   He admits to making “shitty comments” towards his wife. The choice of the 
adjective “shitty” denotes that he (his calm self) does not approve of these 
comments and that he regrets making them. Nevertheless, he does make them 
when he is angry and he cannot deny that. To underline the absurdity of his 
comments and the awkward situation these lead to, he mentions an instance when 
he got angry at his wife for putting butternut squash in his favourite meal – adding 
with laughter that he hates butternut squash. So essentially, he is telling me that 
now he is looking back on this very minor thing and he cannot justify the levels of 
anger in his response. Furthermore, he understands that this reaction of his must 
have made his wife feel sad.   
    
   Similarly, Participant 4 narrates how when he gets drunk his anger gets out of 
control. This feels good while it lasts but the next day is usually an exercise in regret:  
“We:ll you know you wake up the next day hangover and you go over 
everything you said loudly and obnoxiously and you know how (..) how over 
the top (.) you were” (lines 449-450). 
   What he essentially says here is that he was a nuisance to his company the night 
before and he very much regrets it. In a similar vein, the same participant explains 
that his negativity spills over to areas he is sharing with friends and fellow-
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musicians. Losing control of his ranting appears to be a source of regret, especially 
when it comes to considering the impression he gives to others: 
“So um (.) so around certain people I hold it at certain times I will hold the 
anger yes* (..) um (..) and I’m trying to hold it now because I’ve realized that 
(..) for example (.) well I keep coming back to this example cos it’s a big part of 
my life (.) if I’m in a rehearsal room with three other people (..) it’s not pleasant 
for them to listen to me for four hours yell about this or yell about that and 
occasionally play a song with them [bangs hand on table] 
-I see 
-So (.) I need to ah: I’ve learnt to kind of restrain myself the:re (.) I’ve learnt to 
restrain myself (.) around my girlfriend because to me* it’s just normal to me 
(.) I’m obnoxious and (.) loud and opinionated so (.) I’ll just yell at trivial things 
at home (..) and I did don’t always see how that can be kind of (.) jarring or 
exhausting for (.) people around me” (lines 238-247) 
   As he explains here, after having done this a few times, he now understands that 
he is not always a pleasant person to be around. He presents the case of being in a 
rehearsal studio with his band and, instead of playing music (like a band in the 
studio is supposed to), they all end up listening to him “for hours yell about this or 
yell about that” – notice how his description signifies that it is hardly ever anything 
really important he is yelling about. He then explains that the rehearsal room is not 
the only place this happens – at home, too, his girlfriend often has to put up with 
listening to his complaints. “Jarring and exhausting” is how he describes his 
behaviour and he goes on to describe himself as “obnoxious and loud and 
opinionated” – all these are transitive qualities in the sense that they directly affect 
the other person.  Shame is therefore the main emotion that accompanies anger in 
this account of the experience.  
   Participant 7 presents an account of how anger sometimes throws relationships 
off-balance; this example is also rooted in lack of understanding. He explains that 
he felt wronged and hurt by a lady at his workplace who made him feel 
embarrassed by not picking up the present he had bought her for secret Santa. As 
he was telling his mother the story, she couldn’t understand his anger towards that 
lady. Then, as he says, he snapped at his mother for not understanding him: 
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“my family’s always been very supportive and loving (.) so they don’t deserve 
me to be rude to them (.) you know they’re the ones who help me in life (.) this 
fucking* (.) lady who was rude to me she doesn’t deserve anything from me 
she’s* not my kin she’s not my friend she’s not my (.) anything* she’s just a 
very* rude lady (.) if anyone deserves me to be rude to them (.) she* does (..) 
-mhm 
-not* my family (.)  but I ended up being rude to my family (.) and particularly 
to my mom (..) yeah” (lines 536-541). 
   The participant was angry at that other woman at work when he started a 
conversation with his mother. His anger towards the other lady drove his 
interaction with his mother and, the longer she did not understand his anger, the 
angrier he got. The participant, therefore, was angry and tried to explain his anger 
to a third person. Anger therefore was present as both the affect and the topic of 
discussion with his mother and, the more he talked to her about this emotional 
state of his, the more the emotion intensified. Eventually he directed the affect 
towards his mother and, at the moment of the interview, he strongly regrets this 
expression. He describes his family as very supportive and loving and stresses that 
“if anyone deserves” him to be rude to them it’s that lady at work. Anger here, 
consequently, got out of hand. His mother ended up receiving the expressive 
delivery that was intended for that other person because the participant could not 
control himself while he was angry.  
   Anger, indeed, seems to spill over from one field of life to another quite easily. Its 
furious and uncontrollable nature makes it hard to contain and to direct it 
appropriately. As a result of this, one is highly likely to find oneself apologizing to 
people who were exposed to his/her anger without it being their fault.  
    
    Participant 6 offers a somewhat different account. He explains how his girlfriend 
attracted his anger to her after a very difficult day for him. But, whereas the 
previous account by Participant 7 explains how he sees snapping at his mother as 
his fault, participant 6 does not apologize. Whereas participant 7 snapped at his 
mother for not understanding his anger, participant 6 describes his girlfriend as 
augmenting his anger by not acknowledging it. As his previous quote (see p.156) 
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suggests, he went home after a day where a few things went wrong and he was 
trying to resolve a delivery issue over the phone while his girlfriend kept asking him 
to put the phone down and eat something first. It is important to note that he 
interprets this as her own desire to eat, which she disguises as a concern for his 
wellbeing. Therefore he shouted at her, leading to an awkward night between 
them. He evaluates the story as: 
“-I should feel bad about it (.) you know taking it on my girlfriend (.) who 
cooked dinner that’s how (.) I mean um (..) consciously or or if you know if I 
think about it like (.) like that I should feel bad but I don’t because it’s more 
complicated I mean I’ve got (.) relationships are never e:asy or straightforward 
there’s (.) there are older stuff that piss me off with my girlfriend that’s 
probably also (..) ah: linked to why: I (.) I reacted like that towards her 
yesterday   
-I see 
-but (.) obviously it’s not (.) right (.) you know to (.) but I (.) I think I needed to 
let out something (..) you know? And then she was trying to (.) problem is there 
is no communication as well (.) communication doesn’t work sometimes (.) I 
try to tell to tell her something and she doesn’t get it! 
-mhm 
-you know I just wanted her to leave me alone* 
-like you said 
-yeah (2sec) um:: (3sec) if* she had just left me alone I think I wouldn’t* have 
(.) you know I would have kept angry to that man but she almost like (.) I mean 
that may be unfair for me to say but almost like she attracted my anger to her” 
(lines 438-451). 
 
   It is interesting to note how, in his evaluation of the reaction, the participant 
keeps a check on himself and his role in the story. While he has established that she 
did make him angrier as the night went on, he keeps wondering whether it was 
simply his own disposition that is to blame for his rage. He mentions that he should 
feel bad about it, that he should have kept the anger to himself and that perhaps 
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he was being unfair. On the other hand, trying to make sense of the situation and 
his reaction, he also contemplates on how previous problems with his girlfriend 
may have surfaced during that episode, how she often does not understand his 
perspective, and how she could have helped prevent this reaction if she had 
granted his request to be left alone. Therefore, he establishes the space in which 
the two figures (himself and his girlfriend) interacted that night and he tries to make 
sense of the dynamics in it during the interview. Although he finds his anger was 
justified and is able to understand its origins and escalation within the context of 
the relationship, he also appears to be bewildered by the intensity of it and realizes 
that this may poison the relationship or at least put an extra strain in it without him 
realizing.  
 
   Anger, then, also acts as a gateway for a flood of further anger. Older problems 
may find a good opportunity to come to the fore (like with Participant 6) or new 
problems may arise because of the wild nature of anger and its uncontrolled 
expression (like with Participant 7). Like an avalanche, anger breaks barriers in 
behaviour and communication and brings out earlier or current dissatisfaction with 
people in general (not only the person responsible for their anger). This often leads 
to “taking it out” on one’s loved ones, over-reacting and being overall difficult, 
which translates into troubles for relationships (familial, friendly or romantic).  
   The participants say that, when angry, it feels like they are driven by a primitive 
force. If other people don’t understand this force or don’t give it what it needs for 
whatever reason, the participants might take out their anger on them even though 
these people are not to blame for instantiating that anger. It is as though anger has 
possessed their mind, speaking and acting through them. Irrationality, when 
viewed from the calm person’s perspective, is therefore very prominent in angry 
people and, as a result of this, the participants find themselves lost for words when 
they try to explain their behaviour after anger has subsided.  
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6.2.3: Seeing themselves in the Eyes of Others  
 
   The previous sub-themes bring up the calm self being critical of the angry self in 
two main ways: regarding the self-image the participant is faced with; and 
regarding the strain it puts on personal relationships. The combination of those two 
leads to the present theme: how the participants see their angry selves in the eyes 
of others.   
   Discussing how his girlfriend reacts to his way of talking and acting, Participant 2 
presents the following:  
“You know, I mean generally people tend to like me but there are times when 
I think they just get a little bit (.) on the back foot. I mean like, my, I mean my 
girlfriend* (.) does sometimes tell me to, you know (.) to (..) um, tone down 
voice a bit and, you know (.) and (.) and certainly when I’m upset and that (.) 
um (.) she’ll tell me that I’m shouting and that (.) and sometimes she’ll even 
[laughs] tell me that I’m shouting at her and I’m (.) not even intending to but 
(.) I am anyways haha… you know what I mean. It’s a (.) like, I think it’s just 
my, my volume can (.) really (.) go up. Ah:: I mean I do have a trem(?) voice and 
(..) it’s naturally a powerful one anyway so, between the two, um: yeah, it 
doesn’t take much for me to get loud.  
-Mhm (5 sec. pause) So how does it make you feel when, for example, your 
girlfriend tells you to tone down? 
-Ah:: (3sec. pause) Slightly (.) Slightly embarrassed (..) um… and also, slightly 
ashamed I mean… I don’t intend to” (lines 29-40). 
 
   The participant here describes how he sometimes loses control of his tone of 
voice when annoyed and angered by something. His girlfriend then tells him to tone 
down. This, as he explains, leaves him feeling embarrassed and ashamed. 
Essentially, the whole passage is a portrayal of him feeling ashamed and 
embarrassed. Notice that in the first part of his narration he describes things as if 
they slightly get out of hand for him and then magnified by his girlfriend. He starts 
by establishing that he is a nice guy and people tend to like him. Therefore, he finds 
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it uncomfortable to relate to the image his girlfriend sees of him. In his account, the 
participant then laughs at his girlfriend’s accusations that he is shouting at her when 
he is angry. This laughter is trying to be sympathetic, like he is trying to show me 
that he finds it sweet how off the mark his girlfriend’s judgment of his behaviour is. 
Nevertheless he immediately recognizes that this is actually how it appears to the 
other person, even though he might not be aware of it: “I’m not even intending to 
but I am anyways”. Then he stresses that he has a naturally powerful voice and that 
when he’s upset “the volume can go up”, so as to make an excuse for actually doing 
what his girlfriend complains about. Notice how in this description he does not 
appear as an active agent of increasing his volume – like the previous superordinate 
theme demonstrates, he views himself as a puppet of his anger.  
   Having positioned the figures of the story in that way, the setting comes across as 
one where he does raise his voice and it is this that is then misunderstood by his 
girlfriend. They are both right, the way he presents it. Then, however, he confirms 
that this misunderstanding makes him feel embarrassed and ashamed and he 
recognizes that the fault lies (mostly) on his side: he is hurting her with his way of 
speaking, even though he does not intend to. Therefore he feels responsible for her 
getting “on a back foot” and this makes him understand his experience of anger 
(and the expression this assumes) as the source for his embarrassment and shame, 
but also as putting his relationship at risk. As a result, he realizes he gives his 
girlfriend a nasty image of himself - one that he doesn’t approve of either, as his 
use of diminutives, adjectives and laughter indicates. With these he creates a sense 
that he is trying to present the episode in passing, to excuse himself and to prevent 
it from becoming a central piece in his self-presentation. Along a similar line of 
thinking, there is an interesting use of the diminutive “slightly” in both cases, it is 
almost as if he is downplaying the feelings of shame and embarrassment in an effort 
to defend himself by implying that it is never as serious as it might sound – and here 
too, the participant sees himself in the eyes of someone else: the interviewer 
   Going back to Participant 4’s account of his jarring and exhausting behaviour:     
“So (.) I need to ah: I’ve learnt to kind of restrain myself the:re (.) I’ve learnt to 
restrain myself (.) around my girlfriend because to me* it’s just normal to me 
(.) I’m obnoxious and (.) loud and opinionated so (.) I’ll just yell at trivial things 
185 
 
at home (..) and I did don’t always see how that can be kind of (.) jarring or 
exhausting for (.) people around me” (lines 244-247). 
  It is interesting to note that these are the same qualities he attributes to the 
people at the bar who annoy him, as he offers at a different part of the interview:  
“yeah it causes me to kind of (..) be short with people and a bit (.) bit aggressive 
(..) maybe if I’ve had a few drinks as well that definitely* opens up (.) dialogue: 
(.) ah: (5sec) yeah (.) yeah If I’m in one of those depressive (.) states where I 
feel that everything’s kinda pointless and futile (..) and then I go out and I (..) 
um (..) I end up talking to someone who’s just [bangs hand on table] (..) you 
know (.) obnoxious (.) dominating the conversation it’s a one-way conversation 
they’re just chatting (.) bullshit at me that I have no interest in hearing (.) um 
(..) if I’ve had enough drinks and I’m depressed and I’m frustrated I::’ll just snap 
at them (.) because I (.) I feel like they’re wasting my time and they’re not (.) 
you know (.) elevating the mood” (lines 192-199). 
   He therefore, perhaps involuntarily, presents himself as perceived by his friends 
the same way he presents people who annoy him. Therefore, it is safe to assume 
that he would not endorse his angry behaviour when calm. This is presented here 
through the interplay between his perception of other people and the perception 
of himself by his friends. He thus foregrounds the notion of shame by recognizing 
the events that lead to it; ‘by-passed’ shame nevertheless, since he does not 
explicitly express the emotion as part of the episode.  
      Participant 5 describes how, when he gets angry at his friends he has taken up 
the habit of writing a letter to them but not sending it. This is his way of letting out 
steam while not allowing for irrational behaviour to reach its intended recipients, 
which would most probably cost him a friendly relationship: 
“it’s quite professional if you will because I find that (..) that you know big 
capitals or (.) big exclamation marks and swear words don’t really have the 
effect that a very deep (.) trying to reach down to their sou:l and trying to grab 
it out and explain to it why it’s such a (.) why it’s being so unreasonable (.) so 
yeah I mean I usually delete those because otherwise (.) you know (.) they 
might find them and you know (.) these are people (.) these are pretty much 
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always people I’ve known for 15 years (.) my nearest and dearest” (lines 381-
386). 
  He starts off by saying that, for these letters, he adopts a “quite professional” tone. 
The first point to be made about it is that he thus establishes some emotional 
distance between himself and the recipient. Instead of using swear words or any 
other “warm” approach, he instead shifts to “cold” methods. More importantly, the 
participant clearly lays out his intentions, which are to “reach down to their soul 
and grab it out”. He appears to be aware of the sadistic nature these intentions 
border on and he understands how upsetting this must be for the intended 
recipients who, as he says, are usually people he’s known for many years, his 
“nearest and dearest”. He realizes that this is anger blowing his annoyance out of 
proportion; he sees uncalled-for malice in it and is stunned by it. Therefore, he 
habitually proceeds to delete these letters in order to avoid the embarrassment, 
awkwardness and negativity they might bring about if they are ever discovered by 
his friends. Awkwardness because they will see what he has thought of them; 
negativity because they might get angry because of this; and embarrassment 
because he will not be able to rationally justify this emotional explosion. He is 
viewing himself through their eyes and it is this that makes him understand how 
hurtful this expression of anger can be. Thus, through the practice of writing but 
not sending, the participant expresses his anger, directed at the person who made 
him angry, but without making it known, as he has learnt that it is very likely that 
he will regret it afterwards. Through this process, he confronts his own angry self 
by portraying his anger and witnessing what the intended recipients would witness 
if he did express it, acknowledging the shame this would bring about but not 
allowing to materialize.  
 
   Participant 3 discusses how colleagues and friends pointed his anger issues out to 
him and how that made him feel:  
“I never really gave it much more thought than that until it came to the point 
especially at work where I’m just getting really really angry and (.) I just had to 
(.) I had to justify myself and then I’d realize I couldn’t really justify it (.) I realize 
that they (.) you know you can’t justify (..) being balls obviously it’s a 
professional setting and obviously that’s kind of a hint that there’s a problem 
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there (.) somewhere (.) you know and then bit by bit people (.) friends would 
open up to me and (.) not bit by bit but every once in a while my friends would 
tell me “man, you really got to control your temper” and shit like that you know 
so (..)  
-I see 
-Mmm (.) so yeah that’s how (.) I came to realize (..) it wasn’t exactly (.) 
exactly* normal” (lines 24-34).  
   Here he describes his behaviour as abnormal and by that he means that it puzzles 
others. He explains that the others’ reactions is what made him realize how 
irrational he appears to them. It is interesting to note that, the way he presents it, 
it worked as an indication to him that there is “a problem” there – hence why he 
calls it abnormal. Notice how his choice of the word “normal” to describe what is 
absent from his behaviour is something that is socially constructed and defined; in 
other words, ultimately judged by others. By adhering to this concept, he embraces 
the criticism made by others, implying that he understands why they see what they 
see in his reactions. As his colleagues say, the main problem is his lack of control 
over his temper. His reflections therefore probably unfolded with him thinking how 
this appears to other people, which made him feel ashamed; and that was the 
catalyst for him to take steps towards changing his ways.  
   The same participant also offered the following example, where the relationship 
between how he sees himself in other people becomes more explicit:  
“knowing this dude here made me actually reflect on myself quite a lot (.) this 
was about 2006-2007 (.) 
-Mhm 
-That’s when I first started becoming aware of my (..) issues you know [laughs] 
by this guy I mean like “oh my God this guy” you know let’s call him (3sec) Fred 
(.) so Fred, right? He’d always (.) he’d get so fucking annoyed you know and 
get like (.) with himself* not necessarily other people most of the times with 
himself he’d just throw shit around and I complained to the rest of the band I 
was like “fucking hell, Fred man, he fucking loses it all the time!” they’re like 
“man, shut up, you* lose your shit all the time” I’m like “no I don’t” they’re like 
“yes you do!” I’m like “hmm yeah yeah I do actually”” (lines 671-679). 
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   In this example, the participant is talking about a former bandmate of his. As he 
says, he was bewildered by his bandmate’s angry behaviour to the extent that he 
“complained” to the rest of the band about him and his anger. The other band-
members then turned around and told the participant that this is something he 
does as well.  The way the participant presents the dialogue, he was not aware of 
it and he found it hard to comprehend at first (“no I don’t”). When the bandmates 
insisted though, he started realizing that his anger is witnessed by them. Following 
on from his need to “complain” about the other person’s anger, it can be assumed 
that he, at that point, saw himself in the eyes of his bandmates as an annoyance. 
That was when he “first started becoming aware” of his anger issues. 
 
Going further in the theme of expressing anger appropriately in front of others, 
Participant 1 offers: 
“Yeah, I mean (…) one of the things I always think about is, when you wanna 
kick something or punch something you’ve gotta think about other people as 
well. So (..) it just wouldn’t have made sense if I had punched the wall or kicked 
the door or something.  
-So you were in a public space. 
-Yeah. 
-And (.) how do you think others would have reacted to that? 
-I think that they’d have just been shocked. I mean (.) a stranger (.) I’m a 
stranger to them and they don’t know me and (.) but (.) but (.) not (.) I don’t 
mean to sound rude but I don’t really care about their opinion (.) if that makes 
sense but (.) it just wouldn’t have been a nice thing to do… like, if someone did 
that and I was looking (.) I would have been (.) and something happened to me 
because of it (.) I would have been a bit upset so… when you consider other 
people (.) you should always kind of consider other people first.” (lines 31-41). 
   The participant here describes a hypothetical unrestrained expression of his anger 
as potential (psychological and physical) harm for others. He says that something 
could happen to them in case he sets his anger free; at the very least, they would 
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be shocked. “It wouldn’t have made sense” and therefore they would be witnessing 
a spectacle they do not understand. What is contrasted here is the two ways of 
acknowledging, understanding and expressing anger: the composed, socially-
acceptable, learnt way on the one hand; and the chaotic, anti-social, innate one on 
the other. Notice how this participant too describes his own experience as it would 
be interpreted in the eyes of the public: he sees himself in their eyes and identifies 
this uncontrolled expression of anger as inappropriate, which would confer shame 
upon him. Even though he stresses that he does not “really care about their 
opinion”, the very fact that they are there witnessing his expression of anger makes 
him reconsider the significance and the appropriateness of his reactions. 
Alternatively, perhaps his insistence that he does not care about others’ opinion 
may reveal a fear of his: aware that the image he sends out to them is not one he 
would himself embrace when calm, he tries to tip the balance a little bit to his 
favour. If the others are not worth taking into consideration, then surely their 
perception of him must be insignificant for him. This would make the task of 
embracing his angry self as part of his personality a little easier. Nevertheless, he 
recognizes that this way of presenting it is exaggerated and that how others see 
him is how he sees himself in others. Society and the learnt way of expressing anger 
set the tone whereas he, blocking his uncontrolled expression of anger, aspires to 
this; aspires to grow up and to mature and to not trouble people with his behaviour.  
   Participant 4 discusses how he goes to the pub but is not happy with the people 
there:  
“yeah you know sometimes (.) sometimes you’re out and you just (.) your mind 
can’t click and you’re in this fog of (.) depression and (3sec) you can’t relate to 
a lot of people you’ll be out and you’ll feel (.) a little bit separate like you (.) 
you’re on an island (3sec) and at the time you’re just thinking “well these 
people they’re just idiots, they’re stupid” and you’re not (.) cos you’re in the 
middle of this (.) you know you’re in the eye of the storm and afterwards you 
think (..) what an asshole you are [laughs] and you don’t really understand 
where (.) that anger has come from or why and it’s quite depressing” (lines 
130-134). 
   Here the participant presents his thoughts as the source of shame. Anger clouds 
his judgment and makes him short with people (as he says in a different part of the 
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interview). He uses the expression “in the eye of the storm” wrongly, to convey the 
feeling of being unable to act any other way: whereas in the eye of the storm one 
is actually safe for a few moments, he uses it to describe the feeling of being 
maximally swept away by the winds of anger. Therefore, according to his account, 
the thoughts that race through his head while in that state are negative thoughts 
about others around him, making him angrier and throwing him within a tornado 
of negativity. Once the storm of anger has passed, however, he looks back on his 
reactions and cannot comprehend where this anger came from. Eventually he ends 
up calling himself an “asshole” for having been swept into this storm of anger, thus 
foregrounding the shame that follows anger. Going further into why he is “an 
asshole” according to his opinion, the participant offers: 
“I don’t wanna be angry and snapping at people around me (.) even if they’re 
(.) you know dominating conversations and being obnoxious you know I (.) I 
chose to come out and I should just leave and go to the other end of the bar 
[bangs hand on table]” (lines 427-429). 
   In this account he stresses how he is a person with a free will and who, as such, 
should be taking responsibility for his actions. He is the one who chose to come out 
and, since he does not like it, he should try to make it better (even by simply moving 
to the other end of the bar). Therefore, one may say that, while angry, the 
participant neglects his responsibilities and his agency in spending his time the best 
way he can. Also, the way he appears to others is not the way he would like them 
to perceive him. Therefore, as soon as he goes back into his calm and composed 
state, he regrets having previously lost his focus in the middle of the storm.    
   Participant 3 describes how his expression38 of anger habitually leads him to 
feeling sad: 
“-A:nd after this (.) anger has been (.) expressed if you will 
-mhm 
                                                          
38 “would never actually hurt anyone or want to hit them or anything like I (.) I would* want to but I 
would always have enough self-control not to do it you know cos I knew (.) at least I knew that I 
have (.) limits I’m not going to (.) I don’t wanna harm people physically whatever (.) I feel that you 
know harming people psychologically is enough (..) so I never really go beyond just screaming 
banging my fists throwing shit about if it really gets bad (.) throwing shit about is de.is like the last 
level of anger that I get” (lines 189-192). 
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-how does it feel? 
-I feel very depressed 
-Oh really? 
-Yeah (.) it’s a (.) after that I just feel really like (..) things got a lot more 
complicated and (.) I invariably blame myself for it as well because eh (..) eh:: 
I feel like I made a fool of myself (.) you know it’s like when you start acting 
quite irrationally like that it happens and afterwards you sort of eh (.) it’s the 
(.) it’s catching yourself (.) and the thing is my problem in the past was always 
I’d catch myself afterwards* (.) when I was for.when I (.) when I was trying to 
manage my anger it’s to catch yourself in the situation (.) before* it happens” 
(lines 195-208). 
   His expression of anger to friends (he draws this distinction between friends and 
strangers explicitly later on in the conversation) involves him losing his temper. As 
he explains, as soon as it’s over he feels “very depressed” because he has made 
things between him and his friends a lot more complicated. This complication arises 
from the fact that they witnessed this beast that was barely under control – so he 
has to explain how this side of himself co-exists with his calm self. Depression 
(which can be best understood here as unacknowledged and undischarged shame) 
therefore arises out of his seeing of himself in the eyes of others; he sees how 
others see him and that makes him sad. The participant stresses that this makes 
him feel like he has a made a fool of himself with his irrationality and lack of control. 
He subsequently stresses that a great part of his mental exercises to manage this 
anger revolves around detecting the emotion arising in himself and suppressing it 
(or giving it a   prettier face) before it comes out – therefore saving his friends the 
bafflement and himself the embarrassment. 
 
 
   Anger is understood as leading the participants down paths they might regret 
when they think back on their actions. Putting relationships at risk, engaging in self-
harm and behaving exhaustingly feel natural while angry; the “angry self” has taken 
over and his wild joy comes (to a large degree) through these activities. When the 
“calm self” has to face the consequences, however, the participants find it hard to 
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justify why they did what they did. When they understand how they must have 
looked to others during their anger episode, they feel embarrassed and confused. 
Therefore, the participants describe themselves when angry as childish, helpless 
and immature39: they believe they should have had better control over themselves.  
   Consequently, what the participants present here is an extension of what Scheff 
calls “shame”. As the author describes it, drawing on Darwin’s notion of blushing as 
a sign of heightened self-awareness (Scheff, 2004:398), “the basic shame context is 
seeing one’s self negatively in the eyes of others” (Scheff, 2003:743). However, the 
version of my participants comes from a slightly different angle. Instead of 
presenting unacknowledged shame which leads to anger in their accounts, they 
rather present a state where anger leads to shame. They therefore reverse the 
shame-anger spiral to begin with anger: “anger-shame spiral”. They find that, when 
bursting out in anger, they then have to rectify the damage they did and then, as 
participant 5 says, even find themselves angry at themselves for being angry and 
inflicting this shame on themselves. This is a shame they acknowledge and cannot 
overlook and it is constructed as habitually following their anger outbursts. 
   
 
6.3 Anger Can Be Positive  
 
   The previous theme focused on the negative consequences of anger. When the 
participants discuss the long-term effects of their anger, however, they explore 
(sometimes to their own surprise) a different angle - that anger propelled them at 
one point of their lives or another to take action: to hone their skills, to correct their 
behaviour, to sharpen their discipline and to do whatever it takes in order to stop 
themselves from coming close to the source for their anger again – be that another 
person, a situation, or a trait of themselves. This theme discusses anger as a force 
for self-improvement. This quality of anger appears to be something the 
participants did not have in mind when they attended the interview; they mostly 
discuss anger as a negative force but, at parts, their accounts lead them to a 
                                                          
39 This is also how Lewis describes the experience of shame: “The self feels small, helpless 
and childish” (Lewis, 1971:430). 
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realization that, through and because of this negative energy, they ended up in a 
better place than before.  
 
6.3.1: A Blessing and a Curse 
   This theme addresses the participants’ presentations of anger as a motivating 
force that can be used constructively or destructively.   
 
Participant 3:  
“Again it’s (.) I mean you’re dealing with it still in a very angry way cos all you 
do is complaining and (.) not talking about it in full re.you know ranting* (.) 
not* coming up with solutions () 
It’s just perpetuating it (.) the slow-burn anger is like that and sounds like you 
express it a lot like that like you’re always being negative about stuff (.) or that 
particular thing that has (.) that thing that made you (..) go from frustrated to 
angry (.) well not the thing but the thing you are frustrated with first and then 
angry with afterwards you know () 
So you always talking you know and you just let that eats you and then 
eventually you just cut that person off your life (..)” (lines 306-317). 
 
   Improvement in the case of Participant 3 is finding the logic to come up with 
solutions and the strength to implement them. As the participant describes, anger 
may take its time distracting you from everyday activities and productivity, but 
eventually it will lead to coming up with solutions. Indeed, initially the anger seems 
to be that distracting and self-eating force that was described in the theme “After 
it’s Over, Anger is Regrettable”. However, the participant here refers to an 
accumulation of this negative energy which, building up over a period of time, 
eventually resolves into taking action to separate himself from the source of that 
anger. It is through this build-up, where the person can no longer bear to live with 
that anger, that the (one) solution appears to them. This gradually appears over 
time but once it is made it is sharp and leaves no space for negotiation: “you cut 
that person off your life”!  
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   Participant 7 explains how he was mistreated by his boss at work: at a secret-
Santa exchange, he felt offended by her leaving the present he had bought for her 
behind. First of all, it is worth noting here that there might be a triple-spiral of anger 
and shame unfolding. His boss was diabetic and, since the participant was not 
aware of that, he bought her chocolates. This, supposedly, made her feel ill-treated 
– maybe she saw it as a joke on her condition. Her response was an angry one: not 
picking up the present because the very act made her feel embarrassed. This was 
received as an offence by the participant, who felt embarrassed in turn. This 
embarrassment then turned into anger and, presumably, each would be angry at 
the other because of that misunderstanding which made them both lose face. The 
participant’s immediate response was to go home and spend two hours crying, 
swearing and punching a pillow. In the long run, however, he gathered power from 
his rage: he devised a plan to remove himself from that environment and found the 
moral strength to implement it. His plan was to get to a place where his boss could 
never get. Given her age, level of education and computer literacy, the participant 
concluded that she would never be able to become a computer programmer40. 
Therefore, after submitting his resignation notice, he signed up for a course to 
become a computer programmer. This would secure him a working future better 
than the one he had in his previous job. More importantly, however, it secures him 
a working environment where that particular lady (or anyone like her) could never 
find herself. 
 “and you know I thought “god, it’s very... rude” I was being so angry (.) with 
myself* for being in the same situation that I thought you know “I’ve got to 
get out! I’ve got to make sure my skills are so much better than hers…” I hated 
her so much at that point (.) so I did (.) I knew about [institution] that it’s very 
respected (.) it was at that point that I actually (.) signed up for the course (.) 
thinking cos I want to upskill you know and get better (..) 
                                                          
40 “I mean serious anger (.) serious anger and actually part of that (.) the reason I’m here at [name of 
the educational institution he attends, where the interview took place] I’m taking a short course as I 
said in my e-mail in Programming and one of the reasons I’m doing that (.) in fact my main 
motivation (.) is basically (.)  this woman she might be successful but she’s very* old (.) she can’t use 
a computer she certainly can’t program I don’t wanna be rude bu:t she’s not particularly clever she:: 
(..) you know she neve:r (.) in her day they did any A-levels which is like (.) GCSEs today she never did 
anything beyond that (.) she never went to university etcetera etcetera” (lines 99-104). 
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 a:nd (.) yes it was that anger that motivated me (..) absolutely (.) and there’ve 
been other times (.) like this in my life (..) 
anger has motivated me to make a (.) positive difference actually (.)” (lines 
106-115). 
    In that way, Participant 7 distances (and secures) himself from the source of his 
anger: he is upgrading his skills in order to move to a different field, far from her 
reach, and over which he is far superior than her. It is interesting to note how the 
participant describes this whole process as making “a positive difference”: he does 
not focus on retribution towards the offender, but instead aims towards his own 
self-improvement. This positive difference stems from his anger towards the other 
person and towards himself for sharing an environment with her. 
    
Participant 5 offers how his disappointment at bandmates has pushed him to 
become a better musician so that he can fill-in the parts they are not doing: 
“and and that’s somethi:ng (.) that’s just there (.) that sort of the anger and* 
the disappointment breed the anger (.) eh: cos you get so angry that this 
person has had the cheek or whatever to do this to go here a:nd to let you 
down to this degree cos I’m someone who really works and believes that (.) 
hard work should be rewarded and it’s very hard for me to deal with (.) the fact 
that someone has not done their part cos cos I’ve I always try to do my bit I try 
to learn to use different (.) let’s say if again for music I try to use different music 
programmes so I can (.) if the drummer isn’t doing something I can program 
the drums (.) 
-mmm 
-I learnt to become a ten times better guitarist in a few years just cos (.) 
someone wasn’t writing the songs so I* had to write the songs and you know 
(.) I find it (.) really annoying for example when (.) because I’ve gone to these 
lengths that someone then wouldn’t for example write any songs (.) because I 
can do it you know” (lines 341-350). 
   Anger is instigated by disappointment at the bandmates’ laziness and their lack 
of commitment to their parts, the participant says. He also explains, however, how 
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these emotions spur him on to build a new setting where he is not dependent on 
his bandmates: he now is a better guitarist than them, writes the songs they don’t 
write, and can even replace the drummer’s work with some programmed drums (a 
skill he also appears to have picked up lately). The fact that the participant feels he 
has been “let down to this degree”, then, makes him struggle to make things as he 
wants them to be, even if this means the other members of the band do not follow.  
 
  Participant 6 touches on the theme of his parents trying to force him down a 
different career path than the one he wanted to follow. This he describes as a huge 
source of anger in his life and as something that hurt him very deeply. However, 
when I asked whether anger can be anything other than negative, he replied: 
“so far the way I’ve described it yeah (.) because maybe it’s it’s ah: what I’ve 
been focusing on within me (.) right now like that specific anger (.) but no it’s 
not necessarily* negative I would I would say (.) anger can drive* you as well 
-do you maybe have an example of that from your personal life or:: 
-um (.) not especially I mean just like not like a clear* example (.) but um (7sec) 
I’m very* determined person (.) I’m very driven (.) and I’m wondering i::f you 
know that frustration and anger I’ve got due to my parents’ education (..) 
 has uh helped me being where I am now (.) achieving what I’ve achieved […] 
so:: maybe* it’s all that frustration and anger that (.) you know (.) drives me 
as well ()ah: and help me (.) carry on (..) tell my parents “fuck off! I wanna do 
music, I am a musician, I love it, I will find my way” you know and and (.) so 
anger is not necessarily negative um (..) don’t know if I can think about 
anything else um (5sec) I would* say anger is mostly* negative in general um 
(5sec) but it can help (.) sometimes um:: (..)” (lines 633-662). 
   For Participant 6, it was anger that made him break the chains his parents had 
imposed on him through their way of raising him (what he calls “education” in the 
quote). Upon realizing that his life is going in a different direction than the one he 
wanted, he plucked up courage amassed from his anger and went against his 
parents’ wishes. He expresses this anger in the interview through reporting that he 
told his parents to “Fuck off!”, thus denying all and any help they would offer him, 
197 
 
and stresses that anger helped him “carry on”41. Anger, then, was like a refuge for 
him, leading him to reject a life on his knees and aim for a fulfilment of his desires. 
He rounds this off by saying that his move was a successful one and that he now 
runs his own business doing what he loves. Thus, anger helped him get to the place 
he always wanted to be but was obstructed by his parents.  
  
  Throughout his interview, Participant 4 talks about the way anger drains him of 
energy and leads him to situations that make him feel miserable and helpless. 
When he starts describing how anger relates to his musical endeavours (his great 
passion), however, he recognizes that anger drives him to spill his guts on the guitar 
or on paper. This, for the participant, is a necessary condition for the creation of 
honest music. He therefore exclaims: 
“anger so it’s [laughs] it’s a blessing and a curse (2sec) it’s nice (.) when you 
can use it” (line 120). 
 
6.3.2 Welcoming Anger But Hoping for Better Control  
   In the majority of cases I found a right spot to ask the participants whether they 
would classify anger as a positive or a negative emotion. Either I would take a lead 
from something the participant said, or I would ask as an autonomous question 
toward the end of the interview. The only two who classify their experiences as 
definitely or entirely negative are participants 1 and 5 – and these are the two 
participants who find themselves being very unproductive when angry. Participant 
1 states: 
“Definitely negative. Um… Yeah. I mean (.) some people would say it’s positive 
in the sense that it probably spurs you on to do more. If you’re angry at yourself 
and you’re at work, you want to (.) do more work (.) and then, you won’t be 
angry. But (.) when I’m angry, I just sit. I’m (.) I’m not productive, I can’t do 
anything until I’ve calmed down for like 5 minutes…” (lines 219-223). 
                                                          
41 “yeah I could have just accepted it (.) my parents forcing me to take one way and (.) you know (.) 
just study and be (.) become whatever you know but not my (.) not who I am” (lines 651-652). 
198 
 
   Participant 1 presents himself as tied down by his anger, unable to do anything 
until the emotion has subsided. It is interesting to note that the participant blurs 
the lines between voluntary and involuntary behaviour in his account. Earlier in his 
interview he makes the case that when he gets angry, he chooses to go and sit down 
and refrain from any activity or interaction with other people. In the present 
passage, however, he presents a rather different take on the situation: that it is 
anger itself that paralyzes him. The way it is experienced for the participant, then, 
appears to be a combination of the two – maybe not even he is sure which one is 
more prominent. It can be said, perhaps, that anger clouds his judgment and takes 
hold of his behaviour; upon realizing this, he chooses to sit it out in order not to 
embarrass himself or regret his actions later. Paralysis according to this 
interpretation relates more to the inability to control oneself and less to the 
inability to move. Unable to control himself, the participant realizes that he needs 
to cease any and all activities in order to avoid destructive behaviour.  
   Participant 1 also presents his idea of how other people might make use of anger, 
and his impression actually fits in quite well with how other participants described 
their experiences, as we saw earlier in the text.  
 
   Participant 5 evaluates his experience as follows: 
“-is anger a positive or a negative emotion? Or neither? Or both? 
- The way that I (..) the way that I experience it is very negative 
-negative 
-yeah it’s (.) I don’t* really get angry beyond (.) you know I usually get 
disappointed I usually get saddened (.) anger in the way that I experience it the 
way it links is highly* disruptive for me (.) because I don’t want* to be angry 
I’m not* an angry person (..) but anger just comes in these waves that I (.) I 
don’t* control (.) and I find it really really disruptive” (lines 489-495).  
 
   Read at face value, what the participant finds negative about his experience of 
anger is how it distracts him from his activities, just like Participant 1 says. He finds 
lack of control over the emotion frustrating (therefore the situation of finding 
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himself under the passion of emotions makes him internally frustrated) and its 
effects disruptive. What seems to be the core of the problem, however, makes its 
appearance as the explanation of the experience: “because I don’t want* to be 
angry” he says. So anger throws him in a state he does not enjoy and he cannot 
bring himself out of it.  He then confirms that he is “not* an angry person”. Perhaps 
then anger makes him question his own identity as someone who values reason but 
cannot help but surrender to the wave of anger. In a sense, this double existence 
of the calm and the angry-self might be a difficult thing for participant 5: one is the 
identity he endorses and desires; the other is an identity he disdains. Both are found 
within the same body however and acknowledging both seems to bring about a 
tension in his understanding of the experience. His state of anger breeds more 
internal frustration, then, as he finds it challenging to comprehend what it is that 
makes him feel and act in that way.   
   This reading can be best understood when read alongside the participant’s quote 
in the previous section, where he describes how his anger spurred him on to 
become a better musician. After all, a little later in his account he offers: “I find it’s 
amazing* for my music but I find it really* (5sec) makes me angry [laughs]”42 (lines 
508-509). Even though Participant 5 states time and again that he does not like 
getting angry, he also states that something good comes out of anger: music-
making. Given that music occupies a very special place in this participant’s life, one 
can assume that the positive weight of anger is quite important for him. The reason 
why he does not explicitly embrace anger, then, is that he finds it very hard to 
control it. Essentially, the way he presents anger as being “amazing for his music” 
confers no agency to himself; it is spelled out almost as if the musical piece is writing 
itself. Anger as a force for improvement is present in this participant’s account but 
                                                          
42 “is anger a positive or a negative emotion? Or neither? Or both? 
- The way that I (..) the way that I experience it is very negative () yeah it’s (.) I don’t* really get angry 
beyond (.) you know I usually get disappointed I usually get saddened (.) anger in the way that I 
experience it the way it links is highly* disruptive for me (.) because I don’t want* to be angry I’m 
not* an angry person (..) but anger just comes in these waves that I (.) I don’t* control (.) and I find it 
really really disruptive if () 
-aha 
-so um you know so in a way anger is really very negative for me I find it really unproductive I find 
anger doesn’t really do anything ah: and there is no time where (..) when I was doing something 
angry that I wouldn’t have done it better* if I wasn’t if I’d calmed myself down and did it so:: 
-aha 
-yeah I find that I get rid of so: much anger with my music that I don’t need it for anything else (.)” 
(lines 489-509) 
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he does not “want to” apprehend or consciously endorse this because it throws his 
sense of identity off balance.  
  
   When prompted to give their opinions on whether anger is an overall positive or 
a negative emotion, the other participants picked a third option: that it can be 
either; that it is a natural state; and that it is the way you use it that makes it a 
positive or a negative presence.  
   Participant 2, for example, says:  
“-Is (..) would you say that anger is a negative or a positive emotion? 
-I would say anger is never negative (..) I would say what you do* with your 
anger can be negative () If you use your anger to (.) to physically assault 
another person that* is a very* negative (.) ah (.) thing (..) but the feeling is 
never (.) um (.) negative (..) not in a (.) not in the sense that I think that you’re 
talking about I mean (.) as in bad as in (.) um (..) shouldn’t be felt shouldn’t be 
expressed (.) Ah:: you know as in “sinful” (.) not* in that kind of way (.) I mean 
(.) um (.) you could say that there’s a (4sec) a (5sec) [laughs] (..) you could say 
that there’s light and heavy emotions and that there’s there’s emotions that 
really (.) um (.) emotions that light you up (.) that free you up that ah: that fee:l 
quote-unquote positive and then there’s emotions that (.) really feel like 
they’re weighing you down like they’re (.) they’re constricting you like they’re 
making you (…) and that you can say is quote-unquote negative (.) But (..) even 
then it’s the (.) heavy emotions are not bad 
-OK 
-Sorry, no, actually, let me rephrase it 
-Please 
-Yes there are positive and negative emotions 
-Mhm 
-But positive / negative just simply mean (.) meaning like (.) in an electrical 
charge type of way (.) not in a good and bad kind of way (.) there are no such 
things as bad emotions” (lines 516-537). 
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   Participant 2 describes emotions as “electrical charges” and divides them into 
“light” and “heavy” emotions; the former lift you up while the latter weigh you 
down. He goes on to explain, however, that this does not translate directly into a 
desired/undesired continuum. The participant interprets my question as asking 
whether anger is “a sin”, something that must not be felt or expressed – and his 
answer to that is that anger “is never negative”. As his rejection of the desired-
undesired continuum presents, all emotions are natural; they must be embraced, 
experienced and expressed by the person43. The assumption here is that humans 
are endowed with emotional reactions and that engaging with these reactions is 
what brings us closer to the fullest lived experience of being human possible.  It is 
what the person does with these emotions and their expression that can be 
negative. Talking about anger in particular, the participant gives the example that 
if you use anger to assault another person, then you are using it in a negative way 
and thus wrongly. A little later in his account, the participant offers some ideas on 
how anger can be positive: 
“ah:: sometimes anger can be an (.) an inspiration to do (.) activism (..) Um (.) 
if you’re angry with (.) say (.) what the government is doing right now (.) you 
can use that anger to spur you on to (.) um organize a protest to start a petition 
(.) um (.) you know even to even to make a public speech about it and an event 
(.) you can write about it (2sec)” (lines 554-558). 
 
   Anger, then, for Participant 2, can be a force to change the world.  
   Participant 3 offers:  
“ah: would you say anger is a positive or a negative emotion? 
                                                          
43 “-OK (.) so if I’ve got it right you wouldn’t say that anger (.) that feeling angry makes you a worse 
person 
-No (..) feeling anger never (.) never a worse person (.) in fact I would say you’re a better person if 
you acknowledge it and even express it appropriately 
-I see 
-Ah: no (.) a person is never* bad for feeling whatever they’re feeling” (lines 564-567). 
202 
 
- I think anger is a normal emotion (..) It’s how you deal with it (.) ho:w and 
what makes you angry especially (.) it’s like (.) you have to reserve your anger 
for the right* things 
-Mhm 
-For example this person I told you about who made me incredibly angry (.) I 
have no* regrets about that anger (.) I have regrets about plotting his murder 
but I have no:* regrets about that anger (.) not* one* instance* (.) because 
that guy made my life such* a fucking misery right? Now of course* when I 
think (.) I’d be an absolute idiot if I wasn’t feeling anger when I think about this 
guy (..) but I think about all these other situations where I got very angry you 
know I say you know that’s dumb (.) that’s not (.) you know a normal situation 
to get angry in (.) so* (.) in (.) as a means to better the situation to express 
yourself or an outburst of those it’s not a positive thing a good thing at all (.) 
that’s a problem* (.) but* it is (.) anger is a big part of being human you have 
(.) it’s not you have to reserve* it but you have to (.) ah you know ensure that 
you get as angry as little as possible but there are definitely certain situations 
where eh: anger is justified (.) You know? () But yeah it is like (.) that’s almost 
like using anger as a reaction for everything* and any time there is a problem 
() That’s* a problem (.) however there are situations in your life where boy if 
you don’t feel angry then you’re just a fucking idiot basically [laughs] like (.) 
this is a horrible thing but say sexually assaulted a relative of yours and you’re 
like [puts on funny voice] “no just stay Zen about it you know? Anger is a bad 
thing” you know if someone goes like (.) if someone your dad tries to teach you 
Norwegian you can’t read it properly enough you scream and snap your pencil 
(.) that’s dumb you know [laughs] you see what I mean? 
-I do yeah 
-So you have to (.) I think it’s important to make (.) anger is a normal (.) it’s a 
normal thing to feel (.) and it’s but it’s also something that all humans have to 
know how to deal with (.) because it’s such an animal side of us” (lines 785-
817). 
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   Participant 3 describes anger as a “normal emotion” and “a big part of being 
human”. His description is essentially saying that it’s not good to suppress anger, 
to try to present it as something else, or to negate its existence. As human beings, 
we’re hardwired to experience a range of emotions and anger is one of those 
emotions. He then goes on to say that anger can be used justifiably or unjustifiably, 
giving examples of each use. His examples place human agency in the middle of the 
experience: the person is responsible for his/her anger and has to “reserve it” for 
the right occasions instead of using it as a response to anything that upsets or 
annoys him/her. He brings the example of getting very angry when “your dad tries 
to teach you Norwegian” and “you can’t read it properly” as a fine example of 
misplaced anger and describes it as “dumb”; it is frustration with situations that 
one cannot control, hence lets out as anger. Moreover, he repeats the sentiment 
found throughout the interview that “as a means to better the situation to express 
yourself or an outburst of those anger is not a positive thing a good thing at all” 
because, as he explained earlier, it blows things out of proportion and is usually 
followed by regret for this irrational and unjustifiable behaviour. The participant 
stresses, however, that there are times in life where anger is definitely called-for, 
where “boy if you don’t feel angry you’re just a fucking idiot basically”. His prosody 
changes to emphasize this in the two examples he brings to the discussion. In a 
hypothetical situation where one’s relative has been assaulted, one cannot be calm 
and “Zen about it [because] anger is a bad thing”. The participant impersonates the 
“fucking idiot” here by putting on a funny voice, trying to present the full scope of 
idiocy that goes into not getting angry when the situation calls for anger. 
   Going back to his example from his flatmate of many years ago whom he was 
experiencing as a real pest and whom he was planning to murder, he states that he 
has “no* regrets about that anger (.) not* one* instance* (.) because that guy made 
my life such* a fucking misery”. By placing so many emphatic cues (stresses and 
pauses) in such a short text, he signals the necessity of anger as a response to that 
specific situation: the participant felt his life becoming a misery from that person 
so getting angry at him was the reasonable thing for the participant to do. He flags 
up that he does regret plotting this person’s murder though. That is, I assume, 
because murder is a reaction blown out of proportions (he was doing a lot of 
recreational drugs at that time, as he said earlier in the interview) that could have 
had very negative repercussions for him had he carried it out. The emotion itself 
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however is most welcomed by him in that case. His anger is presented like it almost 
gave him a sense of identity: through anger, the participant established his own 
space, strongly separating himself from the source of anger and finding pride and 
strength in doing so: it really is him who reacted in that way and, if he hadn’t, he 
“would be an idiot”, he would have wasted more of his life within that place of 
misery.  
   Bringing the focus with more rigour back to the situation and persons that cause 
anger, the participant explains that if they behave with respect and openness, then 
anger is not justified:  
“I don’t think anger is justified when it deals (.) when it comes to dealing with 
(.) ah:: (.) a normal rational situation a normal rational person a person who is 
dealing with you (.) you know in normal rational ways” (lines 799-801). 
   Again, the focus here is on the other and how they treat the participant – 
therefore, the rise and expression of anger is presented here as a mutual affair: if 
one of the two parties acts irrationally, abnormally (disrespectfully or other) 
towards the other, then the other is justified to, and should, feel angry.  
   The participant ends by calling anger “an animal side of us”, stressing that humans 
need to know how to deal with it: to acknowledge it and to express it accurately. 
This description allows for a peek inside the participant’s experience: “an animal 
side” can be rephrased to mean a primitive state, one where the animal is solely 
interested in its own survival and prosperity and one where dialectic and dialogical 
relationships are done away with. The animal goes wild and makes the participant 
lose his composure. Moreover, the account is telling us that knowing how to deal 
with anger is something humans learn in the process (after finding themselves 
feeling embarrassed and ashamed time and time again). Rationality and anger are 
presented as two states that cannot easily co-exist. Linking anger to the ‘animal 
side’ of human experience takes it away from the ‘cultured’ side and thus makes it 
incompatible with patterns other people can comprehend or relate to. So when the 
participant is inside the cloud of anger, he feels and acts in unacceptable, by social 
standards, ways. Rationality here is therefore presented as something different 
from reason: whereas reason could be defined as concerned with cause-and-effect 
(which would justify the participant’s behaviour since it is caused by something), 
205 
 
rationality seems to be linked to symbolic representations and interactions that can 
be socially comprehended.  
   Participant 4 also presents a balanced version of anger:  
“It depends on the type of anger (.) um (3sec) and when it’s being angry at 
yourself all the time and ah or fuck it a rude person at work or whatever (.) all 
that anger is just everyday trivial nonsense and to get (.) wrapped up in it is 
not good (.) it’s negative (.) um (.) but to be angry and have a reaction if 
someone does* do you wrong or to be angry at the way the world is or (.) you 
know things like that (.) it’s it’s better than being numb* and having your eyes 
closed and your ears closed um (3sec) I’m trying to learn to keep my mouth 
shut more often but I think (.) overall it’s better* to [laughs] you know to stomp 
around a bit and let off steam than just uh (.) you know (.) cruise through life 
asleep or half-awake or something so (.) yeah I’d say it depends on (.) it 
depends on the type of anger and the situation um (.) some things call for 
anger you know? Um:  
-Mhm 
-you can change things politically (.) you can change things socially (.) you 
know (.) how much racists and fascists are empowered now with (.) Brexit and 
Trump and all this kind of stuff (.) you can’t just nod and go [puts on funny 
voice] “oh I understand” you know and “oh it will work itself out” and be calm 
(.) I think the time for that is past (.) so you gotta be angry then (.) you know 
(.) but that’s yeah that’s a positive that’s a productive (.) productive anger (.) 
if it helps you achieve something rather than (.) you know (..) smashing 
people’s faces in” (lines 427-445).  
  The participant begins by stating that anger can be positive or negative – and that, 
as it turns out, is largely dictated by the way one reacts to situations and by the 
situations themselves. Where possible, the person should look for rational and 
reasonable solutions: it might all depend on his own actions, thus feeling angry is 
unjustified. Revisiting his earlier story of going to the bar only to find himself 
caught-up in “a one-way conversation” with someone who is “just chatting (.) 
bullshit at me that I have no interest in hearing (.) um (..) if I’ve had enough drinks 
and I’m depressed and I’m frustrated I::’ll just snap at them (.) because I (.) I feel 
206 
 
like they’re wasting my time and they’re not (.) you know (.) elevating the mood” 
(lines 195-199), he presents the case of “being angry at yourself all the time and ah 
or fuck it a rude person at work or whatever (.) all that anger is just everyday trivial 
nonsense and to get (.) wrapped up in it is not good (.) it’s negative” (lines 430-432). 
So anger for him is negative when it is not offering solutions but instead 
perpetuates one’s misery (and prolonging anger itself via anger’s self-feeding loop).  
   But anger can be positive too – indeed, the participant presents anger as 
mandatory sometimes. His point is that, if there is a reason to be angry, like when 
someone mistreats you or when world events alarm you, then you should get angry. 
“Productive anger” as he calls it can lead to social and political change. For the 
participant, it is mandatory in cases where fascists are empowered or when the 
fabric of equality and peace in society is otherwise under threat. This participant 
uses the prosodic features of a funny voice to mock the people who try to see the 
other’s point of view in everything with the way he says “oh I understand”. This, for 
the participant, seems to go against the idea of anger as asserting one’s authority, 
sense of self and point-of-view; after all, it is the violations of these two that give 
rise to anger. When that happens, the time to be calm is past and the person should 
act as the participant puts it. It is equally interesting to note how he contrasts this 
“positive” type of anger which, for the reader, might be equated with violent 
reactions, with mindless violence (“smashing people’s faces in”) – violence, if there 
is to be any, should serve a purpose. Finally, the participant says that anger is 
“better than having your eyes closed and your ears closed”; anger, then, requires 
being alert to the world around you. He pauses to note that he is in the process of 
self-improvement by learning how and when to express his anger appropriately, 
then adds that “overall it’s better* to [laughs] you know to stomp around a bit and 
let off steam than just uh (.) you know (.) cruise through life asleep or half-awake 
or something” (lines 435-436). In other words, anger is presented as a sign of life, 
as nature’s wake-up call and people need to heed to that call in order to navigate 
their environment maximally.  
    When asked whether there is something he would like to add before ending the 
interview, Participant 7 paused, then gave me the following answer: 
Participant 7:  
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“um (..) I’ll just have a think (8sec) anger (5sec) oh yes there is one thing I would 
like to add  
-please 
-so I do think anger is natural for everyone to have a little bit of anger from 
time to time (.) you know like it’s natural to have sadness from time to time (.) 
happiness from time to time 
-mhm 
-but I feel in my* circumstances anger’s assumed a bigger than normal price 
(place?) 
-mhm 
-so I think I’m […] than other people that’s what I’m saying (.) but I don’t want 
to get rid of anger altogether 
-you don’t? 
-no no (.) cos I think it’s natural (.) it’s more of a philosophical point  
[…] 
-so you do feel comfortable with your anger 
-no I don’t feel comfortable with my* levels of anger  
-mmm 
-but (.) at the same time (.) when I’m (3sec) I hope in 10 years time I won’t have 
any anger problems anymore but (.) I still want to have a little* bit of anger () 
just like I want to have a little bit of sadness from time to time a little bit of 
hope from time to time a little bit of happiness you know it’s just 
philosophically I mean everything should balance (.) like if I couldn’t feel a little 
bit of sadness I would never be able to feel a little bit of hope () just like (.) if I 
couldn’t feel a little bit sadness from time to time I’d have no idea what it feels 
like to feel a little bit happy  
-mmm 
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-from time to time (.) I’m not trying to delete it from my body (.) like I said I 
think it’s perfectly natural to have a little* bit of anger (.) it’s just 
unfortunately* I have an awful lot” (lines 757-792) 
   For Participant 7, it is his levels of anger that make life difficult for him, not anger 
itself. Surprisingly, even though throughout the interview he is talking about anger 
as a possessive force which leads him to self-destruction, he concludes by saying 
that he does not want to get rid of anger altogether. He wishes to gain better 
control over it but he considers it an integral and vital part of being human. His 
concern, therefore, is that he hasn’t mastered yet how to be properly human; how 
to tame his anger and control it at will. This seems to be a point of central concern 
for the participant, since he felt compelled to include it in the interview.  
   Discussing his past, his family and his school, participant 7 concludes that at the 
age of 21 he had “no idea how to express” his feelings.  
 “so then I’m coming out an angry young man aged 21 with no idea how to 
express my feelings (..) or how to deal with anger and you know that wore me 
down a cause of (.) extreme anger and unhappiness (..) 
-mmm 
-I have heard of a school or college that gives anger lessons and also happiness 
lessons to its pupils so maybe that could have been good for me (.) 
-you think so? 
-yes if it was (.) assuming it’s a proper (.) properly taught thing where they have 
experts or professionals who know* how to help people with anger or to get 
people to help themselves with anger (.) that I think would be a very* good 
thing” (lines 565-574). 
 
   In what appears to be a day-dream directed to correction of his self, the 
participant says that he has heard of a school that gives anger and happiness 
lessons; a school, in other words, that teaches pupils how to embrace and control 
their emotions. The participant starts by saying that this school “could have been 
good” for him, implying that his story would be very different (and much brighter) 
had he attended that school instead of the one he was sent to. Then, continuing on 
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the daydream about how that school might be, he brings into the discussion the 
issues of expertise and professionalism that such a place would require. The team 
must be trained to high standards because this is people’s wellbeing on the line: 
one wrong advice, we can almost hear the participant saying, and they might scar 
the “student” further, leaving them even more unable to express themselves 
appropriately and accurately. Having entertained this “safe space” in his fantasy, 
the participant then states that that “would be a very* good thing”, implying that 
he would consider attending even now, in an effort to reach his desired levels of 
control over anger.  
   
 
    The accounts presented here point to the relationship between anger and 
agency/responsibility. Most participants describe the emotion as leading them to a 
crossroad where they have to either accept their lives are going to be miserable 
because of their aggressors or the situations they have found themselves in, or they 
are going to do something to change that. Anger is described elsewhere as taking 
away the calm person’s sense of agency by pushing them to do things they later 
regret. This theme shows that anger can also re-confer a sense of agency to the 
individual: bring them back to a point where they look at themselves in the 
situation, make a plan and take action. This comes with a price though, as they are 
likely to indulge in their anger in excess and thus let the emotion again take the 
reins.  
     
 
6.4 Hell Is Other People  
 
   Much of the literature around anger presents it as arising out of perceived 
injustice, threat, goal obstruction, damage or insult to the self. These inflictions can 
occur through actions of the self alone (e.g. hitting your knee on a corner, regretting 
the purchase you made, or forgetting an important date with your spouse) or from 
natural phenomena (e.g. the hurricane that blew down your house, the bugs that 
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ate your trees, or the death of a loved one); they are, nevertheless, most usually 
served, willingly or unwillingly, from other people.  
   This highlights the logic behind the present superordinate theme: when 
evaluating their experiences, the participants position themselves opposite to the 
offenders, creating thus points of contrast between themselves and the people 
who made them angry. Essentially, these points of contrast between offender and 
offended are deeply ingrained in the experience of anger itself: they shape the 
understanding of the event as it unfolded (both while it was lived and as it is 
remembered), the way the participant views himself and the world, and the actions 
they take as a result of the event.  
 
6.4.1: The others 
   A nice introduction to this theme is the way participants describe “the others” – 
the general population. The participants almost unanimously presented a negative 
picture of society and people and stressed that this gives rise to their anger.  
   What Participant 6 describes when asked what it is that makes him angry is the 
essence of goal obstruction. Either he is facing a problem the solution to which 
eludes him, or he finds himself stuck “because of someone else”:  
“if I’m facing a problem and I cannot find a solution or I find myself stuck 
because of someone else* (2sec) 
-mhm 
-um:: that’s* what makes me angry” (lines 84-86). 
 
  The source of anger in both cases is the obstacle presented to him by a person. 
The two cases are very different though: whereas in the former case he gets angry 
at himself, in the latter case he gets angry at someone who obstructs him. One 
could hypothesize that the way the participant stresses “someone else”, followed 
by the pause in his account, reveal a side of anger specially reserved for “the 
others”. He rounds up his argument by stressing that he gets upset “if people don’t 
behave the way I personally would and feel this has an impact on my freedom on 
my happiness”. 
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   Participant 5 complains that: 
“everything* is just headlines nobody really dives deep into things (.) learns to 
be really great at them (.) but they just know (.) this very upper crust (.) this 
very icing you know rather than the actual cake (..) ah (.) you know it’s ah (.) 
it’s something that frustrates me in society (.) to a large degree (.) but then 
also (.) from my other sort of perspective (.) you know so what? Let them do 
that ()younger generation is just so appallingly* (..) they have basically been 
marketed to the limit that the corporations that (.) now I sound like a hippie (.) 
ah that the big corporations want to be and they easily control that way (.) and 
I find that just to be appalling and the (.) and the fact that the large mass can 
be controlled also means that everything will be shaped and formed in society 
based on the way that (.) they are (.) and the way that you can get the majority 
to (.) ah: to behave and act and it’s just (.) you know that* point even affects 
me (.) it affects me that Brexit’s happened (.) that Trump’s gonna be U.S. 
president you know (.) and that way I find that mass culture is so easily 
deceived () probably 1/4th of the population is probably (.) pretty fucking daft  
-mmm 
-but that doesn’t matter! You can be daft and happy you know (.) doesn’t 
matter to me (.) as long as you don’t make it my problem really” (lines 301-
328). 
 
   In this part of his interview, Participant 5 started talking about the state of the 
world today, even though he was not prompted on such an action. It soon became 
apparent that by talking about the world and other people he was strongly 
expressing anger. He presents, through a series of detours and parentheses, his 
opinion on the people of the world today: brainwashed by the big corporations, 
victims to the click-bait culture and, even worse, having only surface-knowledge of 
skills and a very short attention span. When he pauses and says “now I sound like a 
hippie” the participant probably hints that other people would say that it is his view 
of the world that is distorted, not their way of being in the world. Moreover, he is 
actively taking a step back to tell me that he is probably exaggerating in his 
evaluation of the society. This does not matter when it comes to how he feels about 
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people though; whether or not he would fully back each of his statements in formal 
dialogue, this is how society is making him feel – like he is surrounded by idiots.  
“But that doesn’t matter!” he proclaims: “You can be daft and happy… as long as 
you don’t make it my problem”. As he explains, however, the fact that people vote 
to get figures like U.S President Donald Trump in power or set processes like Brexit 
in motion directly affects his life. So, in other words, the above passage is essentially 
a lament for the modern world: a bleak realization that one’s life is directly affected 
in a negative way by the uninformed actions of those around him.   
   Participant 1, when given the freedom to add anything he wants (or nothing at 
all) at the end of the interview, chooses to speak about the rudeness of people in 
society and about the hypocrisy he witnesses in the world:  
“-Anything you would like to add? 
-Um (.) about (.) treating other people how you want to be treated yourself… 
-Mhm 
It does frustrate me how, given that we’re talking about anger and 
frustration… when I, when I don’t see people do it. So, um, one example would 
probably be like, don’t know… in retail a lot (.) you hear stories about people 
who treat the workers like (.) not very well and they treat them like they’re 
nothing… 
-Mhm 
-But really, if the, the, the shoe was on the other fore, it wouldn’t be like that 
would it? They’d probably be like all rosy and stuff. So, it does annoy me when 
people are a bit hypocritical and they don’t do what they say” (lines 244-252). 
   Essentially, the participant is saying here that, once people feel in some way 
superior to another (e.g. economic status, physical strength), they tend to be 
impolite, rude and nasty to them. This violates the social norm of treating others 
how you want to be treated yourself and the participant offers his idea that, if they 
were the ones on the receiving end, they would not like this treatment. Arrogance 
and not treating others as equals is what the participant sees prevalent in society.  
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   Participant 4 also discusses his dismay at people  in society but, instead of focusing 
on their political actions and behaviour, he focuses on their levels of intelligence: 
“I don’t like rudeness (.) um:: 
-Mhm 
-Or stupidity a:nd working in (.) public (..) working with the public you deal with 
that every day (.) rudeness and stupidity (.) so that kinda wears me down gets 
on my nerves (.) um: (3sec) lot of frustrations (.) generally (2sec) um:: I kind of 
resent (..) that I’m working (.) for idiots basically [laughs] serving idiots (.)” 
(lines 22-27).  
   As a worker in pubs, participant 4 interacts with many people from all walks of 
life every day. His general conclusion is that he deals with rudeness and stupidity. 
The combination of the two is what produces the amalgam of “idiots”, which is the 
noun he uses to describe the customers in his workplaces. Following up on this, he 
brings a small dose of humour in the discussion by labelling his answer as a “cliché”, 
adding that he doesn’t like the “way of the world” and “bad music”, before turning 
more serious and saying that he doesn’t like politicians, fascists and “all that kind 
of stuff”44 (lines 34-36). Through this dose of humour he acknowledges that his 
opinion is not a very original one – many people get angry from these. More 
importantly, however, he flags these as qualities that one encounters very often in 
the world – hence they turn into clichés. Hence rudeness, the thing he does not 
like, is employed as the only appropriate response to these qualities- by calling 
others “idiots”.  
 
6.4.2: The Parents/ Social Forces  
   Participants, then, find their interactions with others painfully stressful: the 
general public is forcing their stupidity and vulgarity on them in ways the 
participants cannot control. This is carried across to their description of their 
                                                          
44 “Yeah: you know (.) all the clichés where (.) way of the world 
-[laughs] 
-Bad music bad bands politicians (..) fascists (.) racists all that kind of stuff (..) 
-I see 
-Makes me angry” (lines 34-38). 
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relationships with their parents which, as many of the participants say, shaped in 
one way or another their relationship with anger. The shape itself that their parents 
gave to that relationship, however, made it a problem for the participants.  
   For Participants 3 and 9, it was their parents’ anger that made them see it as 
normalized (and thus created problems for them later on in life).  
   Participant 3 gives a brief explanation very early in his interview of why he calls 
anger a “problem”: 
“because I come from a family where my.my mother and father would get (.) 
openly very loudly angry very easily and so (.) and they would always argue 
and stuff and so for me it was ah: it took me time to realize that this is not a 
normal thing” (lines 15-19). 
  The way his parents behaved made anger seem like a normal or even the only 
reasonable reaction. His phrase “very easily” points out that they would start yelling 
over trivial things and so anger would be an everyday phenomenon in his house. 
Especially considering how a young child might see his parents arguing “openly very 
loudly angry very easily”, it might be that this appears to him as the normal way 
families (i.e. teams) interact: by getting openly angry at one-another. Thus, it would 
mean that he carries this over to his interactions with friends without realizing that 
he is causing dysphoria or even offence with his behaviour.  
   Participant 9 was brought up among anger, too – only in his case, anger was 
accompanied by violence. This created an environment where the qualities of anger 
and aggression are coupled with those of familial bonds and care:  
“my mother (.) demonstrated that to me my whole life she never* left my 
father he used to beat her (.) stupid day-in day-out and (.) even to her dying 
day she was devoted to him and she was (.) reassured by his devotion to her 
(..) it was like (.) she told me this (.) that (2sec) being hit or being (.) um (.) the 
subject of some (.) my father’s aggression was proof that he loved* her and 
was better than nothing” (lines 257-264). 
   Growing up in a household where violence was commonplace seems to have 
shaped the way the participant approaches anger: he sees anger ultimately as a 
sign that someone cares and thus “better than nothing”. He entertains this thought 
at several parts of the interview but he occasionally steps back to suggest that he 
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might be living a distorted reality and that the messages he got from his parents 
might be problematic. For example: 
“the confusion comes in from (.) perhaps being given the wrong messages as 
a child that (.) love is wrapped up with violence and (.) anger is not always 
proof that there is no love in fact sometimes anger is (..) proof of the opposite 
(.) there would be no anger if (.) someone did not care so I think that’s* where 
I’m (..) troubled” (lines 240-242) 
   His confusion, as the above passage reveals, stems from this intertwinement of 
anger and affection in his head. This goes deeper than simply being happy when 
someone gets angry at him: he actively strives to enrage his loved one(s) in order 
to test their love for him: 
“It’s something I know to be true (..) so secretly I might have made someone 
angry and they’ll be angry with me and it’ll be hard for me to deal with but 
some* part of mine will be like (.) happy like “ah:: they still care” and that is 
just (.) a dysfunctional and disturbing reality that I’ve lived my whole life” (lines 
255-256) 
   He clearly labels this as a “dysfunctional and disturbing reality” (line 257) but he 
sees himself as unable to change it as it has been ingrained in his thought process. 
His label “I know [that] to be true” should be read with an emphasis on “I” and thus 
as a point that distances him from the average person who separates between the 
two: in his account, he clearly states that this way of thinking is dysfunctional so it 
cannot be called factually true but rather something that sets the tone in the 
participant’s own world. In other words, the participant highlights how his 
understanding of anger has brought about a way of relating to it that he finds 
disturbing. 
   He concludes in internal frustration and anger, as banging his hand on the table 
denotes that “that is (.) what I gained [bangs hand on table] from (.) my parents this 
is what I (.) learnt (.) about love (3sec)” (lines 263-264). He thereby blames his 
parents for tuning his mind to that dysfunctional way of thinking and the personal 
and interpersonal disturbances it brings about. 
   For participants 3 and 9, it was their parents’ openness about anger that led them 
to adopt it as a default method of understanding and approaching the world. For 
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participants 2 and 7, on the other hand, it was their parents’ restrained approach, 
and the education of “bottling up” that they see as having set the ground for their 
anger outbursts.   
    Participant 2 offered: 
“I’ve only been realizing, last couple of years (.) stuff that I think I bottled up 
when I was even a little boy () I don’t think I was (.) I don’t think I could, I was 
allowed to fully express myself when I was growing up. () And I think maybe (.) 
then those, some of those emotions manifested themselves into other 
problems. Um (.) quite deep problems. Ah:: and ones that, you know, um (.) 
affected my life in very* negative ways.” (lines 67-74). 
   When asked to elaborate on the negative ways bottled-up anger has influenced 
his life, the participant produced the following account: 
“-Bottled-up (7sec) [sighs] ah (3sec) I would say that (.) bottled-up anger (..) 
becomes* something else (..) it (.) um (.) it becomes (.) it can (.) kinda 
metamorphosize itself into (..) ah (2sec) areas like self-loaving.self.self-
loathing (.) ah (..) lack of confidence (.) um self-harm* (..) even subconscious 
self-harm (.) you could be doing things to yourself that you’re not even aware 
(.) that it’s hurtful (..)  
-Mhm 
-Ah (.) it can (.) manifest* itself into a genuine loathing for other people (.) um 
(.) which in turn can become violent and (.) and abusive () It can result into a 
genuine hatred towards (.) ah (.) towards people and therefore (.) um (.) you 
know I think a person can become completely* self-oriented (..) ah they can 
become (.) it can manifest itself into being so* career-driven that you’re going 
to step on others and hurt others just to get to the top (..) Ah:: it can manifest 
itself into (.) um (.) just a general kind of um (.) ill-treatment whenever you’r. 
you’re out in public um when you’re buying something at the store you can 
snap* to the (.) at (.) at the cork  […] Um (.) I mean one can say that it even 
could even manifest itself into being a very* abusive person and you can end 
up like physically or even sexually abusing a child (..) Ah: because* you’re so (.) 
you’re.you’ve (.) you’re so* repressed (.) ah (.) emotionally yourself (..)” (lines 
447-473) 
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   In what is structured as a general, theoretical approach to the effects of bottling-
up, the participant delivers an account of the metamorphoses anger undergoes 
when it is not expressed. The results of these metamorphoses, as presented by the 
participant, is most commonly oriented towards self-loathing and “a genuine 
loathing for other people”. The person who bottles up, in other words, struggles 
but fails to find a place in the world for him/herself, and thus they end up feeling 
uncomfortable in their own skin and in the presence of others. This mental shift is 
the first step towards a change in behaviour which can result in being abusive 
towards others, violent, self-destructive and even perverted. And all these, as the 
participant stresses, stem from one’s own self-repression; a force that often goes 
unrecognized but leads the sufferer to displaced and misplaced reactions in order 
to ameliorate his/her condition.  
   The participant did not go into details about how bottling up affected his life in 
particular but one can assume that the general, theoretical account offered above 
includes some aspects of his personal experience. The participant explicitly raises 
the issue of parental prohibition against his free and honest expression of his 
feelings. As he says this caused him psychological problems as well as the inability 
to properly express himself, which stayed with him for many years. In other words, 
Participant 2 understands his anger and the ugly, uncontrollable and ever-shifting 
forms it takes as being an extension of his upbringing and the way his parents 
taught him to attend to his emotions. 
   Participant 7 felt the need to bring his upbringing to the discussion to provide a 
background against which his current relation to his anger can be understood: 
“and (.) I think something that I* think is important (.) I really do* wanna share 
(.) is that in my upbringing (..)I was always told that you know anger (.) no not 
only anger but I was explicitly told that violence is bad (.) I (.) I don’t hit people 
I haven’t (.) I’ve never been to prison or anything (.) when I get angry at people 
I don’t hit them you don’t need to worry about that 
-ok 
-but as part of this up(.) upbringing (.) and my school was very strict (.) parents 
very strict you know there is also a sense that if you get upset or angry or (..) 
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something’s (.) annoying* you (..) you should not take it out on other people 
you should not shout you should not raise your voice” (lines 39-48). 
   Early in the interview, when I was asking my exploratory questions about what 
the participants consider important when it comes to their anger, Participant 7 
paused and said that he wishes to discuss his upbringing. Participant 7 describes it 
as very controlled both from his family and from his school. Both sides were telling 
him to avoid displaying any emotion to other people, which he abided. He explains 
that further down the line, his bottled-up emotions led him to strange life choices, 
like attempting to take his own life (Participant 2 also says that bottled-up emotions 
turn into something ugly, including self-harm). For participant 7, however, this 
creates further complications in his day-to-day life, his understanding of himself 
and his relation to his emotions.  
“although I feel my anger is justified I’ve been told my whole life never* to let 
it come out never to let anybody see (.) to bottle it up I suppose we’ve been 
told to bottle these things up bottle good feelings up you bottle bad feelings 
up you certainly don’t get angry at other people (.) at work they’d say it’s 
unprofessional my mother would say it’s immoral you know (.) teachers would 
say it’s wrong you’d get in trouble for it at school (..) and I think that 
contributes a lot because I’m sort of (..) feeling* very angry and grieved (.) for 
something terrible that (.) I think has happened to me and it’s wrong and it’s 
wrong and I’ve (.) every right* to be mad (.) but then at the back of my head 
(..) I’m being told that voice you know from my teachers from my mom (..) from 
society “you can’t get angry” (.) even if they’ve wronged you you can’t get 
angry you know (.) “turn the other cheek” 
-mhm 
-and then that (.) uh (..) it always makes me more* angry you know?” (lines 
51-60).  
   The participant here describes an internal conflict, arising in him through the clash 
of how he feels and how he has been taught to approach his feelings. The way he 
describes it, the feeling is there: he cannot get rid of it. He acknowledges it and, by 
the way he reasons it in his head, he is right to feel this way. That reasoning, then, 
creates a certain flow of emotions and thoughts that are in harmony. This harmony 
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is interrupted, however, from the voices “from my teachers from my mom from 
society” in his head, telling him that he cannot feel angry even if he has been 
wronged; they urge him to “turn the other cheek” instead. Anger is accompanied 
with shame in this instance: an external social monitoring that labels his emotional 
experience as shameful. This conflict generates internal frustration and makes him 
even more angry, as is the nature of a shame-anger spiral. The fact that authority 
figures have prohibited this emotion makes him feel like he is violating social norms 
and expectations when he gets angry. As a result of this, he blames himself for 
getting angry and then he gets even more angry, only this time at himself, for not 
being able to bridge the way he feels with the way others expect him to be and 
behave.  
   Whereas the participants discussed so far were taught how to treat their anger 
by their parents, Participant 6 attributes the greatest part of his anger to his 
parents’ behaviour toward him. He starts with a somewhat general and vague 
comment that brings together parents and other social institutions as elements 
hindering one’s personal development; a society that aims to force people into 
moulds, thus stopping them from being themselves:  
“in our type of society um (.) whether it’s from the parents’ education the 
teachers o:r the society itself forcing people to (.) to be: (.) uh (.) what they 
not*” (lines 654-655). 
   One may assume that these forceful manipulations result from the others’ 
expectations and demands: the parents may demand the child to be successful and 
make them proud, the teachers may expect the student to sacrifice his/her other 
activities to make the grade, “society” (as defined by social norms and dominant 
culture) may demand that one becomes successful, pretty, glamorous and a good 
example for those around them. All these, in order for that one person to feel like 
they actually have a place in society. In that way, the participant presents society 
as composed of the manipulated and the manipulators - not many other options 
are available. People are, therefore, either malevolent or weakened.  
   Then, when the participant starts talking about his anger and how he understands 
and relates to it, he focuses further on his parent’s behaviour, offering: 
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  “I think it’s something that has developed in* me because of frustration (.) 
that’s why I’ve been thinking a lot about it recently (.) to try to understand 
because I don’t think it’s normal* I don’t think it’s healthy because it brings you 
stress (.) you know so: I (.) I am pretty sure it’s related to my education um: (.) 
a lot due to what my parents forced* on me (.) um having no freedom (.) that’s 
probably where the unjustice is from (.) even if my parents are probably one of 
the most kind and giving people I know you know they’re very (.) very-very 
giving people (.) ah the way my mum mainly educated me is that she had an 
idea of who* she wanted me to be  
-mhm 
-so:: she forced* me to do things she (.) instead of just letting me be: and 
discover with me who (.) what kind of person I am (..) 
-I see 
-um: so she wanted me to be either a doctor or a surgeon or you know this kind 
of things (.) a lawyer (.)  
-mhm 
-my mum is Jewish so she wanted me to be a (.) a good* Jewish boy you know 
like following the tradition learning about the Jewish tradition and everything 
(..) 
-aha 
-but it wasn’t me (.) I hated* that” (lines 180-195). 
   The main complaint expressed in this passage is his disappointment at his parents’ 
attitude towards their child: he presents them as having a preconceived idea of who 
they wanted him to be when he grows up and tailored their behaviour to that 
model. They were not open to share his exploration of himself, his tastes and his 
preferences, and they “forced” him down a path he did not feel happy or 
comfortable with. This generated a lot of anger in him. 
The participants therefore present their parents as teaching them wrong lessons 
about relating to their anger. Their parents, the participants say, passed down 
problematic ways of expressing and attending to anger to their children and 
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provided them with a dysfunctional way of viewing themselves under the 
influence/pathos of an emotion.  
 
 
6.4.3: Confronting the Other and Claiming Moral High-Ground 
 
My participants present their experiences of events that angered them through a 
lens of injustice, threat, damage, or insult to the self from the other. In their 
accounts, they highlight the injustice they felt at the time of the event and project 
themselves as being on the morally right side. (This extends to the way they present 
some stable traits of themselves– like just, polite and restrained, as we shall see in 
the quotes that follow).  
 
A nice example of unethical treatment that leads to anger comes from Participant 
5 in the following story:  
“yeah there was another week when a girl at work you know she (.) she wrote 
me sort of a reminder e-mail about  me having forgotten to send her a 
handover e-mail which basically is an e-mail that explains what has happened 
the previous day so then so that (.) when she takes over when I’m not at the 
office (.) she then knows what’s going on (.) so I’d forgotten to send that (.) but 
there was absolutely nothing* to fucking report (.) so she sent an e-mail cc’ing 
the entire* team and my manager so e:verybody saw her and she made me 
look like almost deliberately look like a fucking bitch you know and look like an 
incompetent ba:stard and I’ve just had this day when I couldn’t write much and 
she cc’s the entire team just (.) for no:: reason for no reason that I can justify 
and that was the only time actually ever to get going and she was corny 
answered and and said “was there anyway you could have done that to make 
me look less incompetent and unprofessional?” and she didn’t understand it at 
a::ll* she she was just like “I don’t I don’t understand” and that that made me 
so* angry and I’m so* glad I didn’t do anything stupid cos I was so near of 
writing a proper “fuck off” email to her (..)” (lines 472-483). 
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   In this story, the participant talks of an instance where he was made to feel 
ashamed; he presents a wrongdoing on the side of the other person, who made a 
public spectacle of what was supposed to be a personal reminder. The participant 
clearly states that the girl at his workplace had good reason for sending this e-mail 
and assumes responsibility for not carrying out the work protocol to the letter (even 
though he makes sure to demonstrate the low importance of his omission by saying 
that there was nothing to report on that day), thus achieving further moral ground 
for himself as a man who admits his mistakes. He then explains that the girl included 
every single person from the team to her reminder e-mail when, one would 
assume, just the participant would be enough. Therefore she turned his fairly 
harmless omission into a laughable spectacle, making him look as incompetent and 
unprofessional in the eyes of others. Therefore, even though technically she did the 
right thing by sending him this e-mail, the way she carried out the action was 
unethical, the participant claims. What makes matters worse for the participant’s 
anger is her reaction: after he politely complained to her, she responded that she 
does not understand what his complaint was about. This obliviousness of hers for 
moral matters paints her further as an immoral person to the participant’s eyes. 
This might be an instance of a triple-spiral of anger and shame if we assume a 
similar reaction on the colleague’s side when she received the participant’s email. 
Maybe she too felt humiliated and tried to ward off the attack by foregrounding 
that she does not understand – or maybe her response was addressed to the 
participant’s reaction, not his complaint: maybe she was saying that she does not 
understand (i.e. cannot accept) his reaction. In that view, there is one chain reaction 
of anger and shame in each of the interlocutors, and one between them. 
   The humiliation he received, then, includes a notion of insult which he interprets, 
or at least interpreted at the time, as malice. The question of whether he would see 
it as malicious both when angry and when calm was not answered (directly or 
indirectly) in the interview. One can suppose, however, that the angry self and the 
insult are so intertwined that, even when the person is calm, he will interpret the 
other’s actions from that perspective: after all, it was that action that evoked his 
anger and so the angry self will be hailed into existence with every remembrance 
of that event when he recalls the story. His anger can therefore only be understood 
in response to that, and that can only be understood as the cause for his anger. 
Insult and the angry self then are intertwined into a self-sufficient capsule and, as 
223 
 
insult was inflicted through an unnecessarily degrading process, the participant 
sees himself morally justified for feeling angry. From the distance afforded at the 
time of the interview, he reflects on the event and exclaims that he is happy he 
didn’t let his anger take the reins and “do something stupid” like writing an insulting 
e-mail to her. Therefore, within that setting of the triple-spiral of anger and shame 
between them, he claims for himself the virtue of responsibility, since he managed 
to silence his angry self in spite of the dire circumstances.  
 
Participant 7 states:  
“I always think it’s because I’ve been wronged (.) those people have wronged 
me (.) they’ve done an injustice what I perceive to be an injustice (.) and it’s 
terribly unfair (.) for me: it must* be the sense of injustice* (..) I’ve* been 
wronged and that’s* why I’m angry and I should be angry because I’ve been (.) 
fucked over by someone who’s breaking the law or breaking (.) a social 
contract” (lines 649-653). 
   Participant 7, in his archetypical story of enragement, clearly positions the two 
figures (himself and other, offended and offender) on different moral grounds. As 
he puts it, this difference is essential to evoking anger in him. As it is the other 
person breaking a law or “a social contract”45, the participant is in the right and has 
been offended: he feels that he has been wronged and “should” therefore be angry. 
The others’ immorality is what drives his anger. 
 
Participant 5, exploring the theme of the unhelpful musician again, states:  
“He doesn’t acknowledge that he’s done anything wrong (.) I’ve actually taken 
him aside a few times and tried to talk to him and he (.) “you realize why this 
is not… ok” and he (.) you know (.) for me* (.) that is also something I’m 
currently dealing with I’ve actually stopped caring to a large degree about 
what he thinks or what he does but the thing is what he* does (..) directly 
influences my* life you know I have to write a lot of the music (.) ah (.) create 
a lot* of the product and (..) “what so (..) and then play it with him?” you know 
                                                          
45 The participant here does not refer to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s seminal thesis, but to the 
established norms of acceptable communication within a group of people. 
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after all the crap that he’s done to me I should give him the joy to play music 
that he enjoys? He refuses to really write I just have to tell him what to do and 
yet he keeps on claiming and I believe he’s just having a big break-up in his life 
as well (.) broke-up with his girlfriend for this very reason (.) that he doesn’t 
give a fuck about pretty much anything (.)” (lines 84-91). 
   In this passage, Participant 5 identifies one further source of problems caused by 
other people. Throughout his interview he mentions his belief that hard work 
should be rewarded and that people should carry out their promises. This leads to 
the story involving a member in one of the participant’s bands, who does not care 
about the band and does not work with them despite what has been agreed earlier. 
The participant is aware that that member suffers from winter depression – he 
brings it up frequently when discussing his case. He finds the fact that the musician 
lets it get in the way of the band, however, unacceptable. In the participant’s mind, 
there are things one can do to be functional again despite their depression: seeing 
a “shrink” is just one of those but the musician refuses to even look into the 
possibilities. “He doesn’t give a fuck about pretty much anything”. This becomes a 
problem for the participant since he then has to come up with that member’s 
patterns on top of the melodies and song-structures. What turns this problem into 
further rage, nevertheless, is then having to share the fruits of his labour with this 
apathetic person in the band. “After all the crap that he’s done to me I should give 
him the joy to play music that he enjoys?” (lines 88-89). The injustice in this case, 
then, revolves around the workload (unpleasant) and the results (pleasant); who 
does what; and who gets what. In the participant’s view, it is immoral of the 
musician to ask to be part of the product when he has contributed nothing but 
instead made the whole process more difficult for everyone involved by not 
keeping his word.   
   A sense of moral transgression on the part of the offender gives rise to anger in 
the participants – not only when they are the recipients of the offence themselves,  
but also when they see it happening to others.   
  Participant 8 offers a long-winded story which illustrates the point of moral high-
ground. The story (which can be found in lines 199-324 of his account; see Appendix 
D) can be summarized as follows: he was on the bus, a group of teenage boys got 
on and started annoying other passengers with their music. One of them initiated 
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an attempt to flirt with a girl on the bus, who was not happy about it and asked the 
participant if she could move next to him (so that he would work as a barrier 
between her and the boy). The participant accepted but the teenager continued 
trying to flirt with the girl. That got him in a verbal dispute with the boy, which 
culminated in the boy grabbing the participant, who asked him to let go of him. As 
the teenager did not comply, the participant grabbed the boy and pushed him off. 
“I threw him pretty well” the participant exclaims (thus perhaps giving voice to the 
wild joy of anger as described in the “While in Place, Anger is Irresistible” theme), 
and evaluates the event as:  
“to grab me (.) that was just foolish that is like (.) I mean I can understand if 
it’s (.) the man going after his wife or guy and a girlfriend you know? This is 
different (.) this is like (.) there’s not a po(.) there’s not a po(.) there’s nothing* 
between you (.) you understand? If there’s something between you and you 
I’m at the bus and you’re (.) arguing with your wife (.) I’m not gonna come 
between that* you know? Even if she comes and hides behind me (.) the only 
thing I’ll do is (.) I’ll try and stop you try to reason with you stop from hitting* 
you understand? But I won’t get between you if you want to talk to her (.) you 
know (.) that’s not my business (.) I don’t wanna get involved in that* (..) or 
your girlfriend or whatever it is you understand? This is a different thing (.) this 
is a kid chasing after a girl (.) who don’t want nothing to do with him so (..) I 
was in my (.) I was justified in my position to say “no” (.) to behave like I 
behaved (.) you understand? so: I was angry* but really it was like (.) I was (.) 
kind of I felt (.) little bit justified* (.) to be pissed off” (lines 276-291). 
 
   As the participant stresses, his role in the event was one of a shield for the girl 
who found herself prey to the boy’s lust: he was protecting an innocent. This gave 
him a platform to justify his anger, which in turn paints his figure in the story as 
occupying the moral high-ground since he was acting for the protection of a 
defenceless girl. He solidifies this position by establishing that he can distinguish 
between different cases (like between this boy chasing the girl and a man having a 
row with his wife) and that he would react differently depending on the situation. 
    Anger then, it seems, needs to be talked about with reference to rules and norms 
of behaviour. The participants need to construct it as justified and just to claim for 
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themselves the identity of the avenger instead of the lunatic; the person whose 
anger motivates them for good instead of bad. 
 
  Participant 9, who describes himself as “soft-sounding, caring and compassionate” 
gives a glimpse into his reaction to injustice: 
“I will go any (.) level to (.) to sabotage their life if I see an injustice on my 
friends or on myself  () when the injustice is happening it’s when (.) I’m angry 
(.) when I’m most angry when I feel an injustice (..) 
-and how do you (.) behave or feel? 
-I think that’s when I (.) can* lose control that’s when I can (.) really (.) explode 
that’s when I can become (.) physically (..) you know (..) not violent cos I don’t 
attack people but people coming towards me I will defend myself” (lines 487-
501). 
   In this passage the participant clearly states that he does not attack people, thus 
signalling himself as a peaceful individual. This does not stop him from protesting 
injustice in the fiercest ways, however; he states that these are the times when he 
feels he “can lose control”. In other words, he presents himself as restrained in his 
everyday interactions, but when injustice prevails (and, consequently, when there 
is a moral stance to be taken by those involved), he feels justified to “lose control” 
and address the transgressor and the transgression in ways he wouldn’t normally 
do. Anger here is seen as unleashed because of the moral superiority that follows 
it. 
   Participant 4 lays it out in a very nice way with the following story, where he 
justifies his telling customers at the pub where he works to “fuck off”:  
“I would like to think not without good reason ah:: it will be nights where we’re 
understaffed and it’s really busy (.) a:nd people are just rude and aggressive 
for no reason (.) they (.) they act entitled and they’d be rude and aggressive to 
me or my colleagues (..) um: (..) a::nd when they cross a certain line if they say 
“fuck off” and they’d say something like “I pay your wages” or “you’re here to 
serve me” that’s when I go “OK, they’ve crossed the line, I can say whatever I 
want now” so (.) yeah just shout right back at them (.) tell them to fuck off (.) 
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fuck themselves all that kind of stuff [laughs] there’s the entitlement there’s 
the lack of manners there’s the belief that (.) those who are serving them are 
servants and are below them um:: (..) the lack of yeah lack of respect you know 
I don’t believe you should go into restaurants or bars or pubs and (..) put your 
feet up on the furniture and believe it.act like it’s your living room and these 
people are your (.) you know your servants or whatever” (lines 41-58). 
    In this account the participant presents customers at the pub where he works as 
often “crossing a line”. The line they cross is that they do away with good manners 
and even basic respect to the people who work at the pub. They may be paying 
customers, the participant says, and it is true the workers there get paid to serve 
the customers drinks. This doesn’t mean, however, that workers are servants (a 
term opted by the participant to emphasize the importance of freedom, free-will 
and dignity) or that they are inferior human beings.  
   So there is a line crossed both on the social level (where the participant 
sympathizes with fellow pub-staff) and on a personal level, since the participant is 
himself the recipient of such a behaviour. The inappropriateness of the customers 
is emphasized here by the description “I don’t believe you should go into 
restaurants or bars and put your feet up on the furniture and act like it’s your living 
room” which denotes unjustified entitlement to a space and its services. By bringing 
this information to the discussion, Participant 4 portrays himself as a respectful 
person, who understands the importance of being kind and polite to people around 
him. The customers cross the line of appropriateness by insulting the workers either 
through swear-words or through statements that bring to light this way of theirs of 
looking down on staff members as inferior humans. Customers do sometimes, then, 
drop the politeness strategies of their society and treat fellow citizens in an 
impolite, even dehumanizing way. Once this line is crossed, the participant feels 
entitled to express his anger and “say whatever he wants” (and thus entertain the 
wild joy of anger induced by swearing and shouting). It is interesting to note that 
throughout this account the participant presents himself as being on the right 
moral side: even when he does stop acting politely towards the customer he makes 
no apologies, because he acts in an effort to restore dignity and respect in himself 
and his fellow workers, following a course of action initiated by the offender – it 
wasn’t him who dropped politeness first, but he is happy to respond in an equal 
way. His slight laughter after reporting the “fuck off” and “go fuck yourself” he 
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offers to the offenders also points to his portrayal of himself as “the good guy” in 
the story, but also as the guy who does not feel comfortable using this language 
without good reason, also reinforcing his self-presentation as a “good guy”.  
   For Participant 4, therefore, the qualities of politeness and restraint seem to be 
temporarily halted in order for justice to prevail. More importantly, this does not 
compromise his self-image as a polite and restrained person.  
 
   There is an important point to be made here, as physical violence or other forms 
of retribution appear to be acceptable by my participants when there is a moral 
justification for them. If acts of violence and retribution are not the result of some 
wrongdoing by the other party, they are treated as a different type of response and 
not celebrated. So in their stories of past events, the participants always make sure 
to go into detail about how they had been wronged by the other party, to stress 
that they have the right to (and ought to) be angry. Anger, then, is partly 
destigmatized in the participants’ accounts: it more often than not has its roots in 
an actual injustice or inconvenience. The participants also refuse the stigma of an 
angry person by stressing that they do not enjoy being angry but sometimes it is 
the only reasonable reaction. In that way, the participants stress that the “others”, 
the offenders, are bad because they are lacking intelligence, manners, or morality;   
the participants themselves do not lack any of these qualities however – on the 
contrary, they look out for them and their absence is often what leads them to 
anger. 
   Finally, as an extension of the above, a point can be made about the way social 
forces shape their anger. The participants expressed a high level of distress for the 
way they feel society, their parents, or some other external agent has shaped their 
relationship with anger. They are not happy with the way they attend to their anger 
but this is how they have been moulded by these forces. In that way, they achieve 
a two-fold positioning enterprise. First, they use this statement to reinforce a sense 
of unified character: they have this part of themselves that they don’t like. Then, 
because of that, they achieve a claim to innocence: they shift their description of 
their relation to anger from “this is how I am” to “this is how they made me”. Thus, 
they put the blame for their problematic behaviour to the others, not to 
themselves. Elaborating further on the issue, some participants seem to attempt a 
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presentation of themselves as given to a wave of anger whole-heartedly only when 
the situation calls for it: when an injustice is carried out or when the weak cannot 
raise their voice. This feeds into a discussion on whether the expression of anger is 
voluntary or not; which further elaborates on the tensions presented in other 
themes between anger as harmful or constructive.  
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
 
   This chapter starts with a summary of the IPA and the DP findings individually to 
see what each has to offer: what did we learn about the experience and what about 
the way it is presented? I will then offer a view on how the two can be combined 
on a methodological level, as well as an exploration of the picture of anger and the 
self that emerges from the combination of their results. 
   Before we proceed to a synthesis of the results brought up by the two analyses 
and explore what they reveal about the participants and their involvement in the 
study, it is worth exploring the themes of each mode of analysis separately.  
    
7.1 IPA Findings 
   The four superordinate themes that IPA brought up are: “While in Place, Anger is 
Irresistible”, “When it’s Over, Anger is Regrettable”, “Anger Can be positive” and 
“Hell is Other People”. What do these tell us (individually and combined) about the 
experience of anger as explored by the participants? 
   The theme of “While in Place, Anger is Irresistible” revolves around notions of 
control: control of the self, of the emotional state and of its expression. The 
consensus is that the participants are not good at it: once instantiated, anger seems 
to appear to them like a force that grips them and drives them. This finds shared 
ground with previous IPA findings.  Eatough and Smith note that their participant, 
“Marilyn experiences anger as an emotion which gains ground and slowly takes her 
over” (Eatough & Smith, 2006b:485), while Thomas also writes of her participants’ 
worries that anger exerts control over them. This notion of a grip, subsequently, 
splits into two main directions.  
   On the one hand, we have the participants describing anger as a violent force that 
takes control of their body and demands certain actions and behaviours in order to 
be pacified. Hitting things, getting into verbal disputes, lashing out on musical 
instruments, swearing and screaming incomprehensively are just some of the 
routes anger digs inside them in order to be channelled. This fits nicely with the first 
theme Barber’s (2018) brought up, namely that anger impacts the participants’ 
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sense of agency as well as their physical sensations. My participants therefore 
position themselves as not-responsible for what they do in anger. This state is 
described as consisting of two points: an unsettling point when anger kicks in / 
makes its appearance and the person starts feeling irritated and restless; and an 
almost euphoric point when anger is unleashed and with this comes a sense of 
relief. The process of anger’s arrival and expression, at this stage, is described in 
bodily terms: it is in their bodies that the participants feel the presence of anger, 
and that paints them as puppets in the hands of anger. The theme of bodily 
manifestations of anger seems to be a recurrent one in phenomenological inquiry, 
as it is pronounced in studies from 1971 (E.L. Stevick) through to 2003 (Thomas), to 
2018 (Barber). The participants of the present study seem to be semi-unaware of 
their actions while at that state and almost completely unable to control 
themselves (unless, as P1 stressed, they voluntarily immobilize themselves). This 
ties in well with the second theme Barber identified, namely that anger brings 
about the participants’ changing self-concept, their loss of awareness and control 
and sense of responsibility for actions taken. My participants are all very careful to 
stress that they don’t hit people (unless the other hits them first at least) though. 
This brings a claim of agency and self-control to the narrative, at least on the most 
basic of social and legal levels. The positioning thus achieved is one of moral agency 
– it implies that there is something in the participants’ personality that keeps them 
on track even when they “lose themselves”. 
   On the other hand, the participants talk about the punishing thoughts that anger 
brings with it. Anger is described as latching on to their brains, incessantly 
producing negative thoughts: flashbacks of unhappy memories, labyrinths of 
thought over why things turned out this way, despair at the prospect of being 
unable to rectify the situation that makes them angry. These are presented as 
constantly present and unsettling, as entities that prevent the person from focusing 
on what they would like to, or pursuing the goals they have set for their lives. This 
entails an element of anger hindering their self-improvement – a point which is 
elaborated by several of the participants. They refer to these fits of punishing 
thoughts as preventing them from reaching a point where they could observe their 
emotions passionlessly and act them out in full consciousness and to their own 
advantage (or alternatively Nietzsche’s “notion of the individual striving to reach 
the highest possible position in life, in which all emotions are welcomed and 
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celebrated, including anger, as part of the experience of being alive” – in Barber, 
2018:333); or as derailing them from acting as fully integrated, culturally trained 
members of society. In that way, a self-presentation as weak “victims of anger” is 
achieved by the participants: they want to be understood as suffering from anger, 
which threatens and undermines their status as emotionally and mentally mature 
citizens. They want their accounts to be understood as complaints about the 
presence of anger in their lives.  
   Anger, based on this theme, is presented as an almost atavistic state, throwing 
them away from a state of personal and social integration, back into a state of 
animal instincts, knee-jerk reactions and child-like obsessions.  
   As soon as anger arises in the individual, then, it is bound to have its way – the 
participants all mentioned that there is very little chance of controlling it. This 
doomed attempt at control means that while angry they surrender themselves to 
the wave of the emotion. Consequently, after the emotional event is over, the 
participants will have to look back and face the results of what that force produced. 
This takes on two faces: the positive and the negative one.  
    The negative face of anger is that of regret and shame, as the theme “After it’s 
Over, Anger is Regrettable” illustrates. In that theme, anger is painted as a bad 
adviser. What seems natural to do while in the surge of anger’s wave, what appears 
to be a good idea or a mandatory action, then leads to unexpected results. These 
results more often than not point to a greater backlash than the participants had 
expected. Anger creates a design where the participants are positioned against 
people and they find themselves losing – often leading to an avalanche of negative 
affect and unpleasant necessities to repair their social standing. These lead to an 
experience of shame: They over-react because anger brings together various 
negative thoughts which may or may not relate to the history between the 
participant and the person or situation that made them angry. The participants’ 
anger then brings the negative affect produced by these thoughts and memories 
out as a wave of negativity towards the person or situation. As a consequence, the 
damage the participants cause is greater than the original offence calls for and then 
they have to rectify the situation (often by stooping down to levels where they 
wouldn’t want to, like apologizing or otherwise losing face, which would not be 
necessary if they had not over-reacted), or live with the knowledge that they got to 
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a worse place because of their own fault / inability to control their anger and 
themselves. The participants say that, as a result of the grip their anger has on 
them, they respond with massive intensity to incidents that later on seem trivial, 
they fail to make a concrete and focused case for their argument/complaint, or they 
“take it out” on people they should not be taking it out on: these are usually people 
of their close surroundings. On this last point, anger is not “constructively 
motivated” as Averill (2012:186) would call it. The mismatch between the instigator 
and the receiver of anger means that their loved ones pay for something they did 
not do. So, instead of a constructive expression in an effort to “change the 
conditions that led to the instigation” (ibid), it creates tension between them and 
loved ones, leading the participants to realize that they ruined a relationship, they 
scattered their chances at success at a desired goal, or at the very least they caused 
emotional harm to someone who did not deserve it. Discussing this process, the 
participants stress that they then see themselves in the eyes of the ones they hurt, 
and this makes them realize the full scope of the words and behaviours that were 
brought about by their reaction, making them feel ashamed of themselves. 
Comparably, Marilyn in Eatough and Smith’s (2006) study says that anger episodes 
leave her feeling depressed and desperate while trying to put the blame on 
hormones and alcohol. In search for a greater cause, she blames her mother and 
the way she treated her as a child, which seems to be very similar to the way she 
treats her husband. 
    Observing the ruins the anger wave leaves behind it, the participants see 
themselves in the eyes of others: they see the others’ disappointment or bitterness 
at them and they realize the others have a right to feel that way. This leads to an 
experience that most participants labelled “depression”. This is not “clinical 
depression” as defined by the DSM but rather closer to the everyday/folk sense of 
the word: extreme sadness, and a sense of hopelessness and futility.  
 
    This is not the only direction anger’s effects can take, though. This positioning of 
the participants against others can take a different valence, assuring the 
participants that they were in the right all along. The positive face of anger means 
that the emotion spurs them on to get out of situations where they didn’t feel 
comfortable before. Essentially, they realize in hindsight that where they were / the 
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things that made them angry, were truly toxic for them: people and situations were 
gradually eating away the participants’ wellbeing. Contrary to the effects described 
so far then, anger can also have an “eye-opening effect”. The emotional reaction is 
described as leading the participants to realize that their sense of agency and 
volition was dampened or downright shattered by people and situations. By getting 
angry and lashing out in anger the participants not only create chasms between 
themselves and the toxic people and situations but also, and by doing that, reclaim 
a sense of self-determination. This also ties-in with notions that the participants 
stand their ground in clashes over ideological issues and inappropriate behaviours 
(referencing what they consider to be unacceptable alignments and actions, like 
fascists and rapists; and how anger is a natural and welcome emotion to feel 
towards these people). The experience of anger, in that way, reassures them that 
they are well-aligned with their own viewpoints and morals and that they are 
prepared to take action to defend them. The previous themes show that anger 
takes away the sense of agency from the individual. This one shows that anger can 
also lead people to a place where the sense of agency is restored. Seen from a 
different perspective, the participants here use their narrations to stress that anger 
does bring an enhanced correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes (as 
Huntsinger’s 2013 study shows) and that the way they think and act when angry 
allows them to express dissatisfaction with people they are rightly dissatisfied with. 
In other words, anger works as a trigger for expressing their disapproval to those 
who deserve it and, in the process, the participants mark their territory as their 
own. All participants were quick to stress, however, that they wish they could 
control their anger better: the result might be overall positive, but anger either took 
too long to manifest, or it created some nasty side-effects.  
 
    What the discussion on the two faces of anger shows can best be understood as 
follows: anger digs a tunnel and takes the participants down with it in a wave of 
emotional reaction. When they come out of the tunnel, the participants look 
around, as if they have just been washed ashore by the raging sea. What they find 
is more often than not surprising, in a good or in a bad way. The bad way means 
that they have harmed people they care about and, by extension, harmed 
themselves. The good way means that they have broken out of a place that they 
now realize was not good for them. This links well with the Western discourse on 
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emotions, which “constitutes them as paradoxical entities that are both a sign of 
weakness and a powerful force” (Lutz, 2008:63).   
   It is interesting to note, however, that when left on their own participants only 
discussed the negative consequences of anger. Maybe they thought that this is 
what I was interested in (probably influenced by the way anger is portrayed in the 
media and AMCs as we saw in the relevant chapters), or this is indeed the largest 
part of what anger produces. The participants seemed to come to a discovery (in 
Rogers’ 2004 sense) of the positive effects of anger when they were asked about 
them; the question seemed to be a catalyst that revealed to them what they always 
knew – namely that the wave of anger can wash them ashore to a positive place as 
well as a negative one.  
      
    Following on from the realization that anger can be positive, the participants 
discuss how their anger is evoked by other people and they state that their reaction 
is (when not addressed to loved ones) by and large reasonable and justified, 
considering what the other people are like. Unfortunately, however, anger always 
comes with some harm to the person experiencing it. In the theme “Hell is Other 
People” the participants embark on discussing two main aspects:  
    First, they explicitly compare themselves to the people (and the situations these 
people create) that make them angry. This comparison is carried out by each 
participant against a background of what he perceives to be desirable personal and 
social traits, thus claiming higher moral ground for themselves. The way this is 
communicated reveals a further level of interpretation of the way the participants 
make sense of the experience. No participant paused to ask me if I agree that racists 
and fascists are a problem in society, if I agree that Donald Trump and Brexit are 
signs of a bleak era, or if I agree that observing the etiquettes of politeness is 
important. Given that these people (racists/fascists), situations (Trump 
presidency/Brexit) and behaviours (impoliteness) exist in the world, it is clear that 
not everyone agrees with the participants’ views. It could be expected that, since I 
am a stranger, the participants would feel uncomfortable talking to me about their 
views on these. Instead, the participants went ahead and started accusing people 
who support these ideologies and practices. In their minds, they themselves are 
right for opposing these and they see the need for this opposition as self-evident. 
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As a result, they present their anger as justified and justifiable and stress that their 
reactions are reasonable. Eatough, Smith and Shaw’s (2008) study also highlights 
the theme of anger arising out of (perceived) injustice and thus justifiable. Anger 
here seems to be crystalized around an extended notion of a mental construct 
which encompasses morals and ways of thinking about the world – as “an outcome 
or effect of social processes” (Barbalet, 2008:106), i.e. as a reaction to the violation 
of a socially established cultural construct - and thus as being in the service of the 
community. When social norms and standards are violated by other people, the 
participants’ wild animal of anger is brought forward flying the flag of justice, 
respect and equality. The participants deliberately position themselves as being 
morally in the right and the instigators of anger as being in the wrong. They 
therefore can lay claim to an attack on morally corrupt orders.  
   Secondly, however, the way they have been taught to attend to their anger feeds 
into this theme. Their families, schools and the British society are clearly portrayed 
as agents who shaped the participants’ relation to their own anger (and emotions 
in general) in a dysfunctional way, like Marilyn’s mother (in Eatough and Smith’s 
2006 study) did for her. These figures have made the participants’ lives hell 
precisely because they, in the participants’ view, have not taught them how to cope 
with anger productively. This is made relevant to the notion of controlling the 
expression of anger but also to the way they experience the emotion. Main 
complaints that arise from the participants on this front are about the British notion 
of “bottling up” (according to which emotions should not be expressed, even their 
very existence is to be negated) and prescriptive approaches to what the 
participants should do with their lives, which never took into account the 
participants’ own will/desire. The participants were therefore found lacking agency 
and control over their goals and on top of that felt that their emotions are 
unwanted by other people – by extension, they felt that these emotions in 
themselves are hindering social and personal integration. As a result, participants 
stress that they grew up without knowing why they feel the way they do about 
some things and, more importantly, not knowing how they should express 
themselves about these feelings. Expressing these emotions in a socially 
comprehensible and acceptable way is not an easy task and the participants feel 
they are lacking these skills precisely because their family/school/society taught 
them how to hide them away instead of embracing them. This creates a sense of 
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incongruity within the self (“why am I feeling this way?”) but also leads to a 
mutation of emotions into more nasty forms. Sadness or even happiness are 
transformed into anger, whereas anger itself takes on a more nasty face than it 
should. It is this nasty face that makes its appearance when they break down and 
finally express it, and it is this that makes them then regret their anger release. 
Anger, therefore, is cast as part of a wider psychical complex. The positioning 
achieved against the “others” is here turned on its head, therefore. Whereas they 
can claim to act against injustice when angry, the way they relate to their anger 
positions them as victims of the norms, morals and rules that have been instilled in 
them. This highlights an ambivalent relation with the moral order, where the 
participants see the value of upholding it in a broad social level but stress that the 
way their close social circle trained them to approach their own emotions is 
problematic.  
    
   Each of these themes (“While in Place, Anger is Irresistible”, “After it’s Over, Anger 
is Regrettable”, “Anger Can be Positive” and “Hell is Other People”) revolves around 
notions of agency, self-control, justification, as well as questions of what parts of 
themselves are invested in the experience of anger. The participants achieve an 
array of different (often opposing) positions through their utilization of these 
elements.   
 
     Anger is presented as a force which possesses the individual and leads them to 
thoughts and actions they have little agency over. This force is personified and 
treated as an entity with physical as well as mental properties: it can be described 
as a body within the body or, indeed, a self within the self. The sub-self that inhabits 
the calm, rational individual is the “angry self” and comes with a notion of altered 
consciousness from the “primary self”. After the emotional event is over, they have 
to look back and account for what the angry self did. The problem that arises here 
is that the angry self occupies the same body as the calm self. To the observer, 
therefore, it is the one, indivisible person who acted in the way they did. The 
person’s themselves, however, finds it difficult to take responsibility for the actions 
of the angry self, precisely because their calm self was not exactly present at that 
stage. 
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    Let’s turn now to how the participants draw on different discourses that underpin 
their accounts and that  bring that experience to life in the interview setting.  
 
7.2 DP Findings 
    The four themes that DP brought up are: “Anger In and Out of the Body”, “Anger 
as Chaotic and Harmful”, “Constructing Anger as Shameful” and “Anger and 
Frustration”. Each of these maps onto how the origin of anger, its manifestations 
and the consequences of its embodiment/enactment are communicated by the 
participants. This is where the role of the Google-analysis and AMCs as presented 
in this study’s early chapters becomes more obvious, as these analyses also reveal 
similar tensions. It is worth bearing in mind how discourses about anger are formed, 
as described in the thematic analysis of Google-search and the discourse analysis 
of the AMCs. 
   Discourses create assumptions and presuppositions about the object that is 
addressed.  From a constructionist perspective, one can see the thoughts of the 
participants, as laid out in the interviews, having “a discursive, argumentative or 
dialogical character that utilizes the ‘common sense’ themes and dilemmas” of 
their culture (Cromby, 2004:797). It is, of course, perfectly possible that none of the 
participants of this study ever visited AMCs-websites or even googled about anger. 
However, the way similar discourses make their way into both entities (the cultural 
data and the interview data) is an indicator of how ‘common sense’ and 
uncontested they have become in the British society.   
 
   The theme of “Anger in and Out of the Body” resonates with what is found in 
AMCs’ websites, which speak of anger through its bodily manifestations. This 
includes both what afflicts the body (acid reflux, headaches) and what goes into the 
body (“what we eat and drink also contribute to the way we experience and deal 
with anger”, as Anger Clinic states, whereas others stress the importance of correct 
breathing).  The theme implies that anger is not always there – the participant is 
normally a calm, composed individual. Anger strikes are presented as distinctive 
and as creating a sharply differing state from the calm state of the individual. The 
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onset and dissipation of anger are clearly marked, since the body is a discrete object 
in space, delineated by the skin. Also, it implies that anger is an entity, not an 
integral/organic part of the participants’ personality. Furthering the material 
nature of anger, participants talked of it in terms of physical sensations like 
pressure and heat. These coincide with folk representations of anger which have 
even found their way into the language we use everyday (across several cultures, 
as well): Blood that is boiling, heat in the head, pressure in the chest etc. What is 
achieved by such a presentation of anger is a part negation of responsibility for the 
thoughts and actions the participants make when angry since they are under the 
influence – something beyond themselves has taken control and dictates their 
behaviour. 
      
   The theme of “Anger as Chaotic and Harmful” finds agreement with the view of 
anger as something that gives rise to tensions within the individual and his/her 
relations to other people; a maladaptive attitude towards the others, the self, and 
the relation between the two; a result as well as a cause of problematic thinking, 
mistaken attitudes, and blowing things out of proportion. The theme implies that it 
is not the individual who brings about chaos and harm – it is anger instead. The 
participants therefore partially negate responsibility for the harm and chaos they 
cause, attributing it to anger. Again, anger is here portrayed as an entity distinct 
from the person, not as part of their personality. Chaos and harm are also brought 
together as two aspects that support each other: chaos causes harm and vice versa. 
By employing this joint presentation and evaluating these traits negatively in their 
narratives, the participants signal that they value order and safety and therefore 
signal themselves as disapproving of anger’s effects and stress that they are not 
proponents of anger as an excuse for bringing about these qualities. 
   “Anger and Frustration” corroborates the link between the two that is also 
presented in the AMCs.  The centres stress that the relationship between the two 
is reciprocal; situational frustration leads to anger (e.g. anger is seen as the 
breakdown of one’s understanding of what the other person asks of them) and 
anger leads to internal frustration (e.g. anger is presented as bringing with it a 
generalized and vague sense of dread which the sufferer interprets as what AMC 
Centre for Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy’s website describes as “threat, violation, 
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frustration, fear and guilt”). The previously-seen valuing of order also shines 
through in the theme of “anger and frustration”. Frustration is talked about as the 
participants’ emotional reaction to not being able to fruitfully interact with people 
and situations when they feel they should. This generates negative affect which, in 
turn, leads to diminished problem solving abilities like Isen et al.’s (1987) study 
shows. Therefore, this situational frustration generates more internal frustration 
and thus more anger.   This shows that anger comes from a dark place – a place 
where reason, order and expectations are not as clear as they used to be before 
the advent of the emotion. By employing this construction, the participants further 
highlight that they are the victims of anger, not its enactors.  
    In the AMCs, anger is also presented as having a pulse of its own: a force that 
sweeps the individual down a one-way path where anger dictates their thoughts 
and actions. The AMCs paint the situation of anger’s rise as one of a wind-up (where 
the person is tricked into letting down his/her guard and thus opens up to anger) 
and as appearing to leave no choice to the sufferer but to indulge in it and allow it 
to take control over their thoughts and actions. The Google-search strongly paints 
the angry person as a sufferer who cannot exert control over the emotional events 
and is left to witness their relationships being damaged, see their public face 
threatened and surrender to helplessness – all because of actions the others 
witnessed the sufferer’s body and face carrying out. The participants utilize this 
discourse to negate those attributes, the “stereotype of the angry man” – in doing 
so they recognize the position offered to them but refuse to take it up, and in the 
process they construct the theme of “Constructing Anger as Shameful”.  
   In their construction of anger as shameful, the participants attempt the reverse 
process of what Scheff calls the “shame-anger spirals”. Whereas in Scheff’s terms 
one feels angry because they (were made to) feel ashamed, what my participants 
describe is a process where they feel ashamed because they felt angry, and because 
they expressed that anger in the way anger demanded. They see themselves as 
childish and immature for letting anger lead them onto behaviours they would not 
approve of while calm. The participants speak of the aftermath of anger as a source 
for shame (internalized anger and shame), precisely because they look back at how 
they acted while angry and they are not happy with what they see. In order to 
express this shame, the participants revert to discursive practices of disclaiming and 
neutralization techniques. Campbell and Muncher (1987) pointed out that women 
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in their sample “seemed to place themselves in the role of an observer and offered 
precisely the kind of condemnation that would be expected from an unsympathetic 
onlooker” (p. 507). The researchers termed this form of defensive self-presentation 
as “preemptive self condemnation”. Although for Campbell and Muncher this 
strategy was only found among women, in my sample it was very prevalent among 
men46.  
   However, when discussing the three events that can be seen as instances of triple 
shame-anger spirals, the participants used the narrative to construct their figures 
as being the mature and responsible party in the interaction: they were the ones 
who halted the chain reaction of shame and anger between themselves and their 
insulters, therefore highlighting that they managed to rise above the overwhelming 
pressure. Participant 5 did not send an insulting e-mail to his colleague; participant 
6 stopped the fight in the parking space because there was danger that they could 
get seriously hurt; whereas participant 7 opted to remove himself from the office 
instead of having to bear his boss’ contempt. Shame is thus used to cast the 
participants in a favourable light, either through their own explicit pre-emptive self-
condemnation or through their construction of their figures as able to rise above 
the triple shame-anger spiral and give an end to it.  
    Throughout their accounts, the participants constructed figures and principles of 
masculinity as well. Most strikingly, the participants went to great lengths to assure 
me that they do not practice violence, hostility or aggression towards women and 
children. By stressing this to me the participants attempt a presentation of the way 
they do masculinity. They present themselves as strong but also responsible, thus 
constructing their figures as understanding the biological differences that would 
render such an attack an instance of asymmetrical aggression, stressing the social 
role of men as upholders of peace and order. In the process, however, they also 
emphasize these traits and implicitly take up a dominant role against women: the 
thoughtful and careful dominant who will restrain himself to not hurt the weak – a 
dominant person nonetheless!   
     Furthermore, by presenting anger expression to other men as acceptable (in 
contrast to that expression towards women or children) the participants treat it as 
                                                          
46 This could be a sign of changing gender roles, as there is a 30-plus year gap between the 
two studies; or an indication of cultural differences between the U.S. and the U.K. 
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a communal and even bonding experience. Anger is an acceptable emotion for men 
and therefore its expression solidifies the state of being a man in the eyes of 
observers. Similarly, it could be argued that, in order to arrive to that presentation, 
the participants draw from common, ‘normalized’ and uncontested versions of 
social constructions of anger as an acceptable emotion for men. Therefore, by 
presenting it as part of their socialization with other men they mark themselves as 
men.  
   The issue of gender remains relevant when taking a step back and looking at the 
accounts as produced in interaction. The participants most of the times present 
angry as a natural response, something that is hardwired in their beings. This 
involves the regrettable as well as the benevolent aspects of anger; and the way it 
is or is not allowed to be expressed towards another based on the other’s sex and 
age. Would they present it as a normal response if the interviewer was a woman, 
though? Presumably, they understand that, as discussed in the introduction, 
women have different ways of doing anger.  
“From a self-presentational perspective, the aim of account giving is to 
construct a mutual and sympathetic social framework for the aggressive 
reaction which will cast it in the most favourable light. The construction of this 
common framework depends upon the speaker bringing the audience’s 
interpretation of both the aggressive situation and the speaker’s behaviour 
into line with his or her own and to achieve this the speaker must first establish 
the prevailing social climate – he or she must anticipate where the audience 
currently stands on the issue” (Campbell and Muncher, 1987:490).  
    My (visible) gender probably gave the participants a first indication of what I 
might expect to hear. The rest they had to discover as the interviews unfolded and 
they shared their experiences with me, and that is the topic of the next section.  
    
7.3 Methodological Considerations  
 
   Let’s turn now to a brief overview of how the two methods of analysis can 
complement each-other in our understanding of the experience anger. Part of the 
purpose behind this study is to demonstrate how IPA and DP can be complementary 
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to one-another. Together, the two analytic methods can provide a fuller and more 
solid presentation of what the participants did with their narratives. In this part of 
the discussion I will present a combination of the themes of the two methods, to 
illuminate the presentation of the self’s involvement in the experience as 
accomplished by the participants. The way I conceptualize it, the experience of 
anger is talked about with the use of discourses available to the participants 
through the society they live in. These discourses are brought in to form the 
discursive construction of the experience – but in the process they also guide the 
narrator to what may be the “important parts” or “highlights” of that experience. 
Similarly, the experience leads the person to attend to specific aspects which are 
then coloured through the discourses that make their way in their accounts. 
Language and experience are thus intertwined in a way that one allows for a fuller 
exploration of the other, leading to something that could be likened to a chain-
reaction. By utilizing certain discourses the participants are able to talk about their 
experiences; and by talking about their experiences in the idiographic way they do, 
they form repertoires to illuminate the particularities (and peculiarities) of their 
experience. 
     Interviews unfold in time. So at X point the participants could be telling me about 
their experience and at Y point they could be justifying why they present the 
experience in that way, ad infinitum. This has implications for how they believe they 
are understood and how they want to be understood.  
   
 
7.3.1  Complementary Methods:  IPA in DP 
 
    The IPA theme of anger-as-irresistible consists of the sub-themes of “The Wild 
Joy of Anger” and “The Punishing Thoughts of Anger”. The Wild-Joy is expressed in 
a discourse of anger-in-the-body, where it is their bodies that host the anger and 
act out its demands, but also in a discourse of anger-as-harmful-and-chaotic, 
because that wild-joy then leads to unforeseen and often damaging consequences 
for the participants and for others. The punishing-thoughts are constructed as 
harmful and chaotic too, since they do not allow participants to focus on what they 
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want and they fill them with negative affect while leading them to doubts about 
their relationships with other people and themselves. Accordingly, punishing-
thoughts are also talked about in a discourse of frustration, because it is precisely 
these thoughts that create a labyrinth of internal frustration.  
    The discourse of anger-and-frustration is also utilized to talk about seeing 
themselves in the eyes of others, which is a sub-theme of the IPA theme of anger-
as-regrettable. Seeing how others react to their anger outbursts leads participants 
further down a path where they feel they cannot be understood and they cannot 
understand why they are not understood. Anger-as-regrettable is rounded up by 
the sub-theme of anger-as-bad-adviser, which also finds expression through the 
discourse of frustration, but also through the discourse of anger as harmful-and-
chaotic because the advice participants take from anger doesn’t seem to help them 
make something productive out of the situation. By presenting their experiences in 
that way, the participants disclaim the angry self (as the DP chapter underlines). 
   Turning to the exploration of the IPA theme of anger-as-positive, the participants 
are essentially disclaiming the angry-self (as stated in the DP theme). By calling it a 
blessing-and-a-curse (DP theme), they claim that they have ways to make it work 
to their advantage, even though more-often-than-not they fail to do that. This 
further leads to an expression of a wish-to-control it better, which also employs the 
discourse of anger-in-the-body to be presented clearly. The body provides both the 
platform for the rise of anger and the means by which it is expressed, so an 
examination of embodied experience, how they feel anger and relate to the world 
with their bodies, allows for the exploration of the possibilities of a firmer control 
of anger. The frequent inability to control their anger, as the IPA theme underlines, 
is expressed again through a discourse of frustration, because the strategies are 
clear to them when they are not angry – it is almost as if they perennially realize in 
hindsight how they should have acted.  
   The discourse of frustration is also employed to provide a way for the participants 
to talk about their views of other people and how these others make the 
participants’ lives hell, as the IPA theme revealed. Both in the behaviours they 
encounter every day, and in the way they have learnt to attend to and express their 
own emotions and viewpoints, the participants run into a wall of frustration 
generated by the lack of understanding of why things can’t be better.  
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7.3.2  Complementary Methods: DP in IPA 
 
    Respectively, the DP theme of anger-and-frustration was subdivided in the 
themes of “bringing anger and frustration together”; and “expressing frustration-
as-anger”. Bringing anger and frustration together paints the process of getting 
angry as one provoked by punishing-thoughts (as the IPA theme illustrated): 
internal frustration lingers and generates more anger, bringing negative memories 
and affect back to the mind of the angry person. Furthermore, the deployment of 
that discourse points to the IPA theme of Hell-is-other-people because, both the 
way people in the world think and act, and the way their parents/schools/society 
taught participants how to think and act, generate internal frustration in the 
participants since these ways do not match the way they feel. Expressing-
frustration-as-anger feeds into the IPA sub-theme of the wild-joy-of-anger because 
the process of getting rid of internal frustration brings with it an exhilarating sense 
of joy. This then leads to either bad repercussions, which paints anger-as-a-bad-
adviser; or to good results, which is what leads participants to talk about anger as 
a force-for-improvement.  
    The tension between the IPA themes of wild-joy and anger-as-a-bad-adviser is 
also brought up when discussing anger-as-a-body (one of the two sub-themes of 
anger-as-in-and-out-of-the-body). Anger is portrayed as an entity of its own, a 
creature which leads the participants to bizarre or inexplicable behaviours in order 
to get its pleasure. Once the emotional event is over, however, and the participants 
are left alone with their bodies, they look at the costs of that wild-joy and realize 
that anger is a bad adviser. Talking about anger-in-the-body (the other sub-theme 
of this DP finding) allows participants to invoke the possibility of tighter control over 
it in the future. If anger is not a separate entity but instead is to be found in their 
own bodies, then there is a chance of actually getting a grip on it through training 
and focus. 
    When engaging in the discursive practice of disclaiming the angry self, the 
participants speak of themselves as generally calm, composed and in-control; and 
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they make a claim against the angry self. Attempting this construction of 
themselves as calm and in-control creates the notion that anger is disrupting this 
balance and is, hence, regrettable as expressed in IPA terms. They see themselves-
in-the-eyes-of-others (as IPA brought up) and realize that this is not the image they 
want to portray, hence they suspend the narration of the emotional experience to 
posit that their calm selves are very different from their angry selves. Following this 
line of thought, they position their calm selves against the angry selves, blaming 
anger for being irresistible and regrettable, while expressing the wish that they 
could control it better.  
    The DP theme of Chaos and Harm discusses anger as a cause as well as a result 
of chaos and harm, and it brings chaos and harm together as one leading to the 
other in a vicious circle. In doing so, the participants paint anger as regrettable, 
because they cannot make sense of its commands and neither can others.  
 
7.4 The Person in the Experience 
    
   This part of the discussion examines the discursive constructions of anger and the 
self with reference to Rom Harré’s positioning theory; as well as Averill’s Five 
Principles for interpreting emotion as passions.  
 
    When talking about anger as in and out of the body, the participants address 
several notions at the same time. The onset and dissipation of anger are clearly 
marked, since the body is a discrete object in space, delineated by the skin. There 
might be a gradual transition between the calm and the angry self, but the two are 
clearly distinguishable. The act of distinguishing between the two creates the basis 
for the negation of responsibility for the actions, thoughts and judgments the 
participants engage in while angry. In order to do that, though, they have to provide 
a good supporting reason – something that would make the listener agree with 
them that they really had no option. Describing how anger gets in and out of the 
body, participants talked about anger as a substance that is inserted in the body. It 
takes the shape of either a substance in itself (with reference to hydraulics and 
steam-pressure) or of alcohol. This substance, the IPA findings tell us, takes control 
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of the individual. Therefore, they somehow also negate notions of agency and 
control over their actions, since they claim that it was the substance and its 
irresistible nature that made them act in that way. A substance enters the organism 
and puts its parts under influence, gaining control of the person’s thoughts and 
actions. It is the substance’s dominance over the individual’s agency and self-
control that is to blame then – an evil agent derailing the smooth course of events. 
The participants therefore position themselves as victims of anger, which is here 
constituted as a passion because of the way it is made relevant to the biological 
imperative. 
   Anger is described as chaotic and harmful, which is another way of describing 
what Averill referred to as “cognitive disorganization”. The participants acting out 
their anger lose sight of where their volition starts and ends, feeling like they 
actively augment something that is beyond their control. There are several layers 
to be explored here. First of all, harking back to notions of regression to an animal 
stage, anger seems to be the enemy of focused thinking and planning. Not only do 
the two modes not work well together, anger actively ravages one’s focus and 
planned actions every time. Anger can be seen here personified: the emotion is an 
agent in itself, the appearance of which alters the organism. When angry, the 
organism is preparing to fight and thus cause harm to the 
opponent/instigator/tormentor and it is the attack of anger that brings about this 
change in one’s physiology. The harm is also inflicted on one’s own self however. 
Taken together, these two attributes constitute anger as evil (Baumeister, 1999): 
an evil force leading the inflicted down an evil path. This coincides with notions 
about the loss of agency (a form of evil blinding the sufferer) and also with popular 
perceptions of what an evil person/evil deed is characterized by: destructive mania, 
which on a P grammar is both the agentive factor and, at the same time, the factor 
derailing agency.  The positioning achieved here is one of lack of agency for the 
participants: it is anger driving them, and that makes them a less composed 
individual –indeed a different individual- to what they normally are in their calm 
state. Consequently, they further solidify the position of the victim, and also stress 
they are incapable of accounting for anger’s acts. 
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   Anger in the body, then, distorts the individual’s sense of understanding. The 
theme of anger and frustration can be best seen as the participants talking about a 
cycle. Frustration can be best understood as a situation where the participants feel 
they are not understood and cannot understand why they are not understood. It 
makes them feel like they are out of control of the situation and themselves and 
that generates a sense of loss, as they find themselves in the air when they thought 
they were on solid ground. Frustration leads to anger, which then leads to more 
anger and frustration because it disrupts the person’s focus and planning, leaving 
them at a state where they feel unable to hold on to logic or knowledge they have. 
By employing this discursive construction, the participants negate part of the 
responsibility over their thoughts and behaviours while angry, claiming that not 
even they understood exactly where these come from. They position themselves 
as channels of anger clouded in confusion.  The notion of social imperatives 
surfaces here, as the breakdown of understanding for the participants comes either 
through the others’ transgression of social norms, or through the way they 
taught/instilled these social norms to the participants. Furthermore, anger is also 
utilized for the expression of internal frustration. Given its forceful nature, the 
participants attempt to get back to solid land (i.e. to make themselves understood 
and understand again) by getting rid of the thing that pushed them out of the solid 
ground in the first place. This of course cannot be done simply by one’s own efforts, 
because what it actually takes is reasoning and discussing with another person (i.e. 
the one who does not understand the participant). All the while, anger is inviting 
them to become more angry in an effort to get rid of that emotion. Therefore, the 
cycle expands but its negative affect stays with the individual, leading them down 
a spiral of self-doubt and incomprehension. By expressing anger in whatever way 
they can, like screaming incoherently (as Participants 3 and 5 stressed) or swearing 
(Participant 2), the participants communicate something to the other: that the 
situation is not ok or, at the very least, that they are not ok themselves. This is an 
attempt to cut through the internal frustration by acknowledging it and sharing its 
experience with the people who cause it. 
 
    It should therefore come as no surprise that the participants are disclaiming their 
angry selves. They do admit these selves are there, but they stress that these are 
only sub-selves, and that their main mode of operation is a calm and composed self, 
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able to introspect, to detect and correct flaws, and to socialize properly and 
appropriately with others.  The positioning here achieved runs contrary to that of 
the ‘victim of anger’. Here the participants attempt a positioning that portrays them 
as reasonable and rational individuals, well-accustomed to the social life of the 
community and aligned with forces of improvement. They distance themselves 
from the stereotype of the “angry man” as portrayed in AMCs and as it shines 
through in the other themes generated by their interview. They stress that they can 
be many other things/selves besides angry and that they are composed enough to 
avoid anger’s bad advice, generally. When anger strikes they have no option but to 
give in, but they are capable of postponing its strikes under some circumstances. 
Also, they point out that they strive to make their anger outbursts coincide with 
instances where one would be justified, even compelled, to feel anger (like 
injustice).  
 
    The participants, as we have seen, take up the position of the “victim of his own 
anger” that is offered by the AMCs and Google-search. But they also go one step 
beyond with (the IPA theme of) anger-as-positive and their disclaimers-of-the-
angry-self to show me that they can incorporate anger within an overall socially-
acceptable framework, thus achieving a positive positioning of themselves-as-
persons.   
    Participants engage in internal dialogues to attend to their memories of anger, 
which are then adequately phrased for another person (the researcher) to 
comprehend. These dialogues bring into the discussion the 
unavoidable/mandatory (body) with the optional (agency concrete or thwarted –
e.g. by alcohol-) in relation to how the participants feel during/after anger episodes 
and the effects this has for their relationships to other people and to themselves.  
 
     
  7.5 The Self, The Angry Self 
   All this points to a re-thinking of the self-in-anger. The participants talk about their 
attendance to their experience while angry as a very different thing than when they 
are calm. Most of the “public models of being a person share three features that 
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together form the dominant version of Western personhood” (Fischer and Jansz, 
2008:166-167): Rationality, self-determination, and responsibility. A disruption of 
these signifies a disruption in the individual’s organisation of personality.  
    The bodily sensations, along with cognition, behaviour and judgment, is 
presented as altered during anger. For the participants it feels like a different self 
has taken control during the anger episodes. They see through that self’s eyes and 
that self acts through their bodies – but the angry and the calm self are presented 
as distinct from one-another. Like Marilyn in Smith and Eatough’s (2006) study, the 
participants in the current study experience “anger as an emotion which gains 
ground and slowly takes [them] over” (Smith and Eatough, 2006b:488). Similar to 
Marilyn, then, they present depictions of their anger as a powerful force that 
“constructs a self which is experienced as non-agentic” (Smith and Eatough, 
2006b:489) 
   The transition resembles Averill’s description of emotions-as-passions: frustration 
builds progressively internally and they can feel anger coming as a result of it, but 
once it strikes they cannot find a way not to experience it and act it out.  The 
attempt to then look back and find a clear line of thoughts and actions between the 
two self-positions leads to further internal frustration, since they realize that anger 
has made them over-react and behave irrationally and their calm self cannot justify 
that sweep of change. Indeed, throughout the interviews, anger is portrayed as 
incompatible with rationality. The angry self, then, is something they clearly 
experience but are not proud of.  Eatough and Smith’s ‘Marilyn’, “instead of citing 
provocation as an excuse, she portrays a situation in which she is an object who 
becomes a ‘wild’ person because of external and internal forces. In effect, she is 
the excuse in that she invokes the behaviour as a consequence of who she is. […] 
she represents her emotion and behaviour as illogical and arbitrary” (Eatough and 
Smith, 2006b:489). 
   The angry person is not the same as anger though. The participants (with the 
exception of P.1) clearly indicate that there are positive sides to anger: it is an 
appropriate reaction to situations, it arises as a response to violations of social 
norms and desirable behaviours (hence working in favour of order), and it even 
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leads to surges of creativity47. However, when it comes to how they embody and 
channel the emotion themselves, these traits are turned around as the problem of 
control and agency comes into question. They see themselves as emotionally 
incontinent, unable to break free from the chains and demands anger places on 
them – thus, as comparable to “drunk, mad or sleeping people” (in Aristotle’s 
terms). 
   The participants try to ameliorate this loss of agency and state that their anger is 
induced by instances of injustice and in an effort to correct wrongdoings. 
Surrendering to an emotional wave that is shaped by discontent and moves 
towards the direction of (personal or social) improvement should mean that, even 
though they are not in control of their thoughts and actions, at least they are given 
to a force for improvement. However, anger brings memories from past events 
along with it and multiplies the affect in a way that leads the participants to blow 
the situation out of proportion. In that way anger almost inevitably ends up causing 
chaos and harm.   
 
7.6 A Critical Look at the Status of the Accounts  
 
   This study started by acknowledging the role of affect, pre-conscious and bodily 
processes have in the generation of what is later identified as an emotion; and that 
emotions are relational patterns. The participants of this study used the former 
definitions to disclaim their responsibility and agency for their thoughts and actions 
when they are angry, and to present the emotion itself as a ‘passion’ in Averill’s 
terms; and the latter to justify their thoughts and behaviours when angry. 
   The body is beyond reason and therefore presenting the emotion as a bodily 
affect dissolves any possibility of having agency over it. Their personal and social 
relations are also portrayed as inherently problematic, which somehow 
automatically confers a ‘right’ to them to get angry in that way.  
    The participants also took up the task of openly condemning the effects of anger 
on their lives, which appears to be the broader context of understanding anger in 
                                                          
47 Like Morgan and Averill (2008:161) mention, “crisis and disorder […] provide the strongest 
occasion for both creative and “true-feeling” episodes”. 
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the 2010s U.K. as the literature review and the thematic analysis found earlier in 
this study show. When they talked about the positive effects of anger, they made 
claims of justice in their behaviour and a type of need to act that way – a need that 
has, nevertheless, been shaped by moral orders that align with prevalent social 
norms in the U.K.  
   The participants’ decision to present themselves in that way takes us to the very 
notion of a “sign” as composed of a signifier and a signified (Labov), which only 
works so within a particular community and historical era. “Peirce (and Ogden and 
Richards) see the sign, that to which it refers, and its users as the three points of a 
triangle” (Fiske, 2011:39) Therefore, one of the implications of this study is that the 
participants (neither of whom are close acquaintances of the researcher) discussed 
their experiences within that framework (“triangle”) informed by the term “anger” 
and the meaning it has been endowed with in the present-day London. Many of my 
participants come from other countries but the very fact that a) they have been 
living in London for a minimum of five years (most of them have been here for over 
a decade); b) talk to a person who also lives in London; and c) do so in English, will 
lead them to a certain way of putting their appraisal of the experience into words. 
This method can accommodate many different views on the subject (e.g. from a 
celebration of anger to a condemnation of it; from describing their experience of 
violence as a liberating event to a self-demeaning event) all of which, however, are 
tailored to be understood by someone who partakes in the reality of living and 
communicating in a British context.  
   The “British context” is something non-concrete but infused in society. For this 
study I took the “expert discourses” of AMCs as a good indicator of what this 
context entails for anger. These centres present anger as pathology and the angry 
person as helpless and hopeless (without these centres’ guidance). They construct 
a prevailing repertoire for understanding anger in the U.K., which (as the 50% 
Google-hits supports) has largely found fruition in the mouths and minds of people 
in London.  
 I would even venture as far as to claim that probably (a large number of) my 
participants had a hypothesis that these repertoires were precisely what I expected 
them to bring to the study, and they therefore foreground it in their accounts. It 
was always late in the interview and/or after a prompt of mine (which was 
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intentionally designed to counter the repertoires offered by the AMCs and 
therefore often surprised them) that they started bringing in different perspectives 
of what the experience of anger is like (presumably, these are the perspectives they 
were there to bring from the start). Since I did not ask them, however, this remains 
my own speculation.  
    Along this line of thinking, on the interactional level, at the time and place of the 
interview, the participants almost en masse act out a role – that of the person 
afflicted by anger. One should therefore be careful how much truth they accredit 
to the accounts of the participants. Their interviews are not objective and 
impassionate accounts of how they feel, think and act during anger. Instead, they 
are subjective and passionate explorations of who they are; and an attempt to 
present this exploration to a stranger. The participants do address anger as a “true 
feeling” as Averill described them: deep, intense and passionate, close to the literal 
meaning of “beyond-control”; markers of “authentic being” that map onto the 
individual’s “inner” needs and capacities; and helping to form an answer to the 
question “Who am I?” (Averill and Morgan, 2008). Their interviews can be best 
viewed as emotion narratives though, the primary function of which “is the repair 
of a person’s status as a responsible member of society (Shotter, 1984), and more 
specifically of his or her threatened identity” (Fischer and Jansz, 2008:168). 
    At different times of the interview, each participant explores the possibilities of: 
a) recasting themselves (i.e. the repeated experience of anger which has shaped 
what they are talking about in the interview) as either victims, hence powerless, 
hence not responsible; or as channelling the essence of what is socially desirable 
(in Fairclough’s terms, e.g. justice, respect) through anger; and b) stressing the 
necessity to get in control of anger and channel it for ‘good’ only. There is a tension 
prevalent here. The participants essentially say that there is a reason for them to 
get angry; hence the evocation of the emotion is achieved through a reasonable 
and thus justifiable process, which marks the participant as a rational person. Once 
they get angry, though, they get irrational. The participants therefore report a loss 
of reason but also make a claim to reason at the same time.  
   Like Averill (2012) claimed, then, anger is presented by the participants as a 
passion that alters the organism across a variety of systems. Similar to Lench et al’s 
(2011) study, the participants report that their second-order monitoring of their 
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experience of anger is accompanied by a detection of change in their cognition, 
behaviour, judgment and physiology.  
   For James (1890), possible selves are characters that one chooses to bring to 
fruition. They are termed characters because they come part and parcel with a story 
(in Hermans, 1996:36). Hermans (1996:38) then wonders whether the self is a story 
(me – in Jamesian terms), or the teller (I) of the story. Based on the findings of this 
study, I would claim that the self is the teller of the story trying to make sense of 
that story as it is constructed to address the specific audience to which it is told. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and Prospects 
8.1   Main findings/ Contributing to Debate:  
The main findings about what constitutes the experience of anger is that it is felt 
like a passion: an out-of-control imposition that affects or even controls one’s 
actions and thoughts.  
A tension prevails between and within participants when discussing the effects this 
passion has in their lives. On the one hand, it is presented largely as justifiably 
instantiated and benevolent. The participants stress that the target of their anger 
has either committed an offence against them, or broken one of the social norms 
that are found in the British culture and therefore anger energizes them to respond 
to that offence and correct the wrongdoings. On the other hand, however, the 
expression of anger is presented as problematic in two ways: either its intensity is 
usually much greater than that of the offence and thus compromises the person’s 
public face; or the expression is concealed and anger is directed inwards and 
compounds with frustration, leaving the person at a loss over making sense of their 
experience.  
When it comes to a presentation of themselves during anger, the participants 
sketch a clear distinction between anger and non-anger states. The advent of anger 
marks a different mode of operation with the world in their accounts, one of 
clouded judgment and heighted physical responses. The combination of these leads 
to unwanted consequences which the participants describe as shameful. The 
accounts of the participants therefore invite the audience to make excuses for the 
angry persons, implying that their agency is compromised.   
Also, the pluralistic approach presented in this study can work as an example of 
how different qualitative methods can be combined. DP and IPA can be combined 
by drawing attention to how one informs the other, whereas Thematic Analysis can 
provide a solid background for the prevailing social constructions against which the 
interplay of DP and IPA can be illuminated. What linguistic repertoires are mobilized 
to address what aspect of the experience? Similarly, which aspects of the 
experience best illustrate which repertoires? Furthermore, what could be the 
256 
 
reason that this presentation of the experience and the person in it was preferred 
over another? 
   8.2   Future research: Given the physiological differences between the two sexes 
and, perhaps more importantly, the differing social expectations attached to each 
of the two genders, this piece of research could work as a first part of a comparison 
of the analysis of the experience of anger between men and women. Many women 
I spoke to while working on the thesis expressed a strong interest in having their 
experiences included in the study (and I had to politely remind them that I am 
exploring the experience in men exclusively, which occasionally made them take 
offence as they thought I was downplaying the shape the emotional experience can 
take in women). This interest (verging on enthusiasm), combined with the notions 
of restrictive emotionality and the expression of emotion in the two genders, could 
bring up very interesting results both from a phenomenological and from a 
discursive perspective: it could reveal characteristics of anger that are shared 
between men and women while also drawing attention to the differences between 
them. Besides covering a broader range of human experience, it could also be a 
methodological shift in IPA, a discipline which does not endorse comparisons 
between groups. Furthering the role of linguistics in this sphere, the nature and 
experience of swearing and curse words can also be a fascinating area of research. 
Why do people swear when there is no obvious practical gain from that? What 
social and biological processes guide this behaviour? This could even link to medical 
conditions like coprolalia and the Tourette syndrome to explore how the brain 
accommodates and employs the swear words.    
 
8.3   Limitations: Now that the study is over, I see that it would benefit from a more 
defined context. Following the advice of the then-secondary supervisor of the 
project, I aimed to keep the inclusion criteria as minimal as possible so as to tap 
into the pan-human experience of the emotion. Looking back at my readings and 
findings, it is apparent that at the age range of the participants should be controlled 
more rigorously. I was lucky that all of my participants were between their early-
20s and early-40s, but given my research design, if a participant in his 60s appeared, 
I would have to include him. This would stretch the age range, while also potentially 
creating the equivalent of outliers in quantitative research: the case that what one 
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person says have very little in common with what the others say. Limiting 
participation to a ten-year range (e.g. males between 20 and 30, or 30 and 40 years 
old) would make sense in two ways: First, from a biological perspective. Anger 
appears to be inextricably linked with physiological processes so having participants 
who are closer to one-another in years would add depth to the physiological 
processes and how they translate to an aspect of the experience of anger. Second, 
from a socio-historical perspective. The world is rapidly changing and so bringing 
together participants from the same generation would improve the focus on how 
they have learnt to attend to, as well as express, emotions and situations. 
      
8.4   Strengths: I believe there are some strong points in the study. First, I myself 
have a strong interest in anger and therefore I was naturally interested in what the 
participants had to say. This leads to the second point, that the interview situations 
proved to be successful in making the participants willing to explore their 
experiences with me. They managed to relax early in their respective interviews 
and seemed responsive to my questions and prompts for further exploration. The 
interview schedule displayed a nice balance between allowing the participants to 
address whatever issues they considered important and pushing them for further 
justification of why they consider these aspects important and why they present 
them in that way. Finally, the way I attended to the participants’ exploration of their 
experiences allowed for the hermeneutic circle to provide vivid results. 
 
8.5   Quality: Yardley (2000) has outlined four key dimensions for demonstrating 
the quality of qualitative research: sensitivity to context, commitment and rigor, 
transparency and coherence, impact and importance.  
   The IPA themes and interpretative repertoires were extracted with close 
attention to what came before and what came after the quotes I used in the 
participants’ accounts. From this view, the context of the account was treated as 
one of primary importance. The social context was also given a central role in the 
analysis, starting with the version of anger presented in Britain from Google, 
following with the thematic analysis of Anger Management Centres’ “expert 
discourses”, and finally by focusing on the way the participants’ accounts draw 
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attention to the ways their social surroundings have shaped their experiences of 
anger, their expression of anger, and their understanding of these processes.  
   I strived for a high level of transparency in a number of ways. The procedure of 
recruiting and interviewing participants is clearly outlined in the study, and they 
received full information on the study before participating as well as a detailed 
debrief after their interviews had ended, explaining what would happen to their 
data. I included verbatim transcriptions of the participants’ accounts in the 
appendix, and each of the quotes is referenced appropriately to the line in the 
transcript it can be located. Finally, I spelled out my reasons for labelling each 
theme the way I did and why each quote was included in each theme; and I included 
sections on researcher-reflexivity as well as notions of that reflexivity in the text.  
    Different analytic techniques were used in different parts of this study. Each was 
developed individually according to its respective methodological and theoretical 
underpinnings. Some compromises had to be made (e.g. using a set of data that did 
not occur naturally for the DP analysis) in order to promote the feasibility of the 
project (within the PhD timeframe) but these were kept to a minimum and are 
addressed in the text. Moreover, the results these different techniques generated 
were then brought together in the discussion to afford a deeper understanding of 
the phenomenon (i.e. the experience of anger as it is discussed in the interview 
setting) and to offer a triangulation: to reflect different aspects of the phenomenon 
and to inform the researcher “about both the phenomenon under study and the 
research process” (Frost, 2011:8). 
    The importance of the study is twofold. On the one hand, it sheds light on the 
emotional experience of anger – and this is important because it is still an under-
explored, stigmatized emotion which nevertheless has very real consequences in 
people’s lives. On the other hand, it works towards formulating a critical way of 
looking at participants’ accounts when discussing such stigmatized states, where 
they also have to make attempts at self-presentation and disclaim undesirable 
connotations that the popular view of the emotion and the person experiencing it 
bring along.   
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8.6 Applications: The very act of thinking about the times one was angry could be 
applied to a number of disciplines, including Anger Management, Health 
Psychology, Social Psychology; and policy-making in education. The benefits of 
getting one to reflect on that state include (but are not limited to) a way to 
overcome (or bypass) the notion of ‘bottling up’ without necessarily expressing 
emotions that could lead to social awkwardness and/or sanctions. The act of 
reflecting on the emotion and the self while in that emotional state could bring 
about an all-encompassing view of the self, with the various sub-selves or different 
ways of being and seeing while under different conditions. This, by extension, could 
lead to lower levels of internal frustration when faced with the question of “Why 
did I act or feel this way?” and the attempt to reconcile the different aspects of the 
self. Applying this to Anger Management, it could lead to a more multi-dimensional 
image of the self, not simply as a victim of anger but also as someone who is right 
to be angry – and therefore lead to a cleaner expression of that anger with better 
practical results when it comes to inter-personal relationships. Also, including the 
notion of anger more elaborately in education might prevent pupils (and therefore 
people) from falling blindly into frustration when the emotion is brought about; it 
might lead to a more composed way of thinking about the situation, its origins, and 
its potential solutions. A hopeful thinking might even extend this to result in less 
violence in society, since people will not be expressing their frustrations to other 
people through anger. 
8.7   A note on reflexivity: Given my passion for the exploration of, and multi-
angular interest in anger, I think my approach influenced the process of this study’s 
unfolding. From the conception of the topic, to the interview questions (and 
prompts especially, which were purposefully designed to challenge the versions of 
anger found in anger management centres and in its popular perceptions in the 
Western world), to the way themes made sense to me, to the way I wrote about 
and explained the themes.  
    My sincere interest in the emotional state itself probably shone through during 
the interviews. I assume this made the participants feel more comfortable talking 
to me about their experiences because, I presume, they felt (or sensed) the non-
judgmental stance I was taking. My desire to actually find more about the state and 
go deep into the experience was also probably evident (as I wasn’t going through 
questions one-by-one but rather dwelled on what the participants had to say) and 
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that probably helped them open up even more. The fact that I am male also 
probably helped, since they could be more direct in their answers, assuming a 
common ground of experience and understanding of the self in the social setting.  
    At the same time, I was influenced by the study too, in two main ways. First, the 
literature review helped me frame my interest in more solid theoretical and 
historical grounds. I started thinking about anger and emotions in general in ways 
that I had not envisioned earlier. Second, my pursue of the topic was partly inspired 
by my desire to find out more about my own anger. The literature review helped 
me add depth and meaning to emotions and how they intertwine with other 
aspects of life; whereas my participants’ answers often strongly resonated with me, 
even to the point of giving me words to explore my own experiences (as was made 
evident in my personal psychoanalysis sessions).  
 
8.8   Last Words: Anger has been with the human race as a result of evolution but 
is not yet harmoniously incorporated into our lives. Given its disruptive nature and 
the human ability for –and social expectations of- accountability, there is a chance 
it never will. This should not stop us from reflecting on it, trying to bring it under 
control and thus reap the benefits it can give.  
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